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impacts from climate changes are disproportionate compared 
with the continent’s contribution. These articles review the key 
challenges and prospects in sustaining the outcomes of the sev-
enth African Development Forum to address climate change, 
and the effects of establishing renewable energy feed in tariffs 
in South Africa. 
As the climate conference in South Africa approaches 
and the international community again prepares for negotia-
tions extending into the early mornings, we must remember 
that while climate change is most often seen as an international 
issue, actions, agreements, and compromises at all levels are 
required to succeed in our efforts to mitigate climate change.
Paulo A. Lopes  Melissa Blue Sky
Editor-In-Chief  Editor-In-Chief
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Sustainable Development Law & Policy publishes a Climate Law Reporter each year with a goal of pro-viding practitioners and academia around the world 
with an accessible and concise report on the current state of 
climate law. After taking stock and regrouping following the 
UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen, the international com-
munity began to focus on the December 2010 meeting in Can-
cún, Mexico. With the continued inability of the U.S. Congress 
to pass a climate bill, expectations were not high going into the 
Cancún negotiations. Although Parties moved forward with the 
acceptance of numerous Agreements and Decisions, a succes-
sor to the Kyoto Protocol with the continuation of a bifurcated 
approach—different obligations and responsibilities for devel-
oped and developing countries—appeared even more uncer-
tain. As the international community looks toward the 2011 
negotiations in Durban, South Africa, expectations are again 
increasing.
One of the major challenges to reaching an international 
binding agreement over the past ten years has been the opposi-
tion by the United States. But in more recent years the inter-
national community has also come to recognize China as a 
countervailing force. This issue of the Climate Law Reporter 
includes proposals for climate change mitigation, as well as 
shifting approaches to address climate policy and effects of cli-
mate change. One of our authors reviews the tension between 
the United States and China on “green technology” and ques-
tions whether the portrayal of a “green energy race” is accu-
rate or advantageous for either country. Other articles focus on 
climate change mitigation mechanisms such as the role of due 
process in the carbon markets; which metrics are best for addi-
tionality of carbon sequestration projects; the inclusion of other 
ecosystems and services beyond the confines of current forestry 
programs including reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (“REDD”) programs; and even if private 
property monetization of carbon reduction is an approach we 
should pursue. Another article performs a comparative analy-
sis of the successes and failures of climate change litigation 
tactics across venues and continents, while one author sug-
gests that litigation and legislation might not be necessary 
because the U.S. President already has authority under existing 
national security laws to mitigate the threat of climate change. 
Additionally, one article focuses on an aspect of human rights 
challenges inherent in climate change—developing country 
use of clean energy technologies that are protected by intel-
lectual property rights, frequently held by developed countries 
thousands of miles away. Two authors focus on Africa, where 
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InTroducTIon
Since the Renewable Energy Law went into effect in 2006, the Chinese government has implemented numerous laws and programs designed to encourage renewables.1 While 
China has made strong progress, many factors will influence the 
nation’s future success in renewable energy deployment, includ-
ing the need for consistent pricing policies to stimulate private 
sector development and the need to upgrade the country’s trans-
mission grid.2
The issue of China’s support for renewables has taken cen-
ter stage in a United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) 
complaint alleging that China unfairly subsidizes its greentech 
industries, in violation of its obligations as a member of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).3 Well before that inves-
tigation began, numerous Americans believed the United States 
was less engaged in greentech promotion than China,4 and many 
feel the United States is falling behind. New York Times col-
umnist Thomas L. Friedman has been perhaps the most active 
proponent of this view,5 but he has plenty of company. If recent 
reports are to be believed, China could be generating more elec-
tricity from renewables in 2020 than any other nation on Earth. 
It has also advanced rapidly in private sector spending on renew-
able energy technology and research and development spending.
Many observers state that the two nations are engaged in 
a new “green energy race.”6 This term deliberately invokes the 
“space race” competition between the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States to achieve milestones in space after the 1957 launch of the 
Sputnik satellite. To simplify matters a bit, there are two related 
but different arguments being made. The first is that China will 
dominate the global market for greentech, diminishing Ameri-
can companies’ ability to compete with Chinese firms. This, of 
course, is the bedrock principle of the USTR investigation, and 
must be considered in the context of the complex relationship 
between the two nations. The United States has departed from 
its “courtship” of China, criticizing it for its currency stance and 
other economic policies.7
To some, “losing” the race and falling behind the Chinese 
would have serious consequences for national supremacy. Even 
senior military leaders recognize that the United States is jeop-
ardizing its future by not taking appropriate steps to address the 
dire situation presented by climate change. In this view, failing 
to transition to a clean energy economy would leave the United 
States vulnerable to ceding its position as a major world power.
Playing into fears about China provided a convenient means 
of political theater in the 2010 election season,8 but portraying 
China’s ascendancy in greentech as a national threat will have 
unacceptable costs. Given our nations’ pressing needs to address 
climate change, it would be much more productive to forego the 
rhetoric of the greentech war and support both nations’ green-
tech initiatives. Moreover, the reasons given for why China is 
“winning” the “race” are not yet completely convincing.
Invoking a race metaphor may be less productive than cap-
turing national attention in the United States with concrete, clear 
domestic goals. I believe that the United States should articulate a 
single, clear national goal, just as it did with space research in the 
Cold War era. Elsewhere, I have argued for the creation of “solar 
utilities”9 that would deliver greentech in the residential setting 
by consolidating all of the functions of financing, installing, and 
servicing in single entities that would ramp up to utility-size scale 
in individual areas. This is the sort of idea that could capture the 
popular imagination and lead to more greentech development in 
the United States than casting China as a competitor.
GeopolITIcal compeTITIon In GreenTech?: 
suITabIlITy oF The “space race” meTaphor
The idea that the United States and China are in a compe-
tition for greentech supremacy has many adherents. A recent 
Internet search for “China” and “green energy race” yielded 
over 300,000 results, with most of the top one hundred having 
titles such as “Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?,”10 “Is 
China Beating the U.S. in Green Technology Development?,”11 
and so forth. The “China as green competitor” narrative has 
captivated journalists,12 bloggers,13 politicians,14 environmen-
talists,15 think tanks,16 executives of venture capital and energy 
companies,17 financial market analysts and commentators,18 and 
many others. The USTR investigation is yet another measure of 
china’S GReentech pRoGRamS anD the  
uStR inveStiGation*
by Joel B. Eisen**
* Excerpted from “The New Energy Geopolitics?:  China, Renewable Energy, 
and the ‘Greentech Race,’” 74 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. ___ (2011).
** Professor Joel Eisen teaches courses in Environmental Law, Energy Law, 
and Law of Climate Change, and Environmental and Energy Law in China. 
He also teaches the Environmental Law and Policy course to undergraduate 
students in the University of Richmond’s Environmental Studies program.  In 
recognition of his contributions to teaching, scholarship, and service, he has 
been named the University’s Distinguished Educator for 2010-2011. In spring 
2009, Professor Eisen was a Fulbright Professor of Law at the China University 
of Political Science and Law in Beijing, China. He has become an authority 
on renewable energy law and policy in the United States and China, and has 
published extensively in law journals, periodicals for general consumption, and 
books and treatises. He is a co-author of the leading law and business school 
text on energy law, Energy, Economics and the Environment, with its third edi-
tion published in 2010. His most recent articles on renewable energy (includ-
ing two on China’s energy programs) were published in law journals at Notre 
Dame, William and Mary, and Chicago-Kent. Professor Eisen is a graduate of 
the Stanford Law School (J.D. 1985) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (B.S. degree in Civil Engineering in 1981). 
winter 2011 4
the strength of the race idea. Some say the race is already over. 
One observer notes, “[t]he United States ceded its leadership 
in the production of clean energy technologies during the past 
decade of neglect.”19
what iS the “Race,” anD iS china “winninG”?
In the space race, there were concrete goals in physical 
space: put satellites and humans in orbit, and land a man on 
the moon. Here, it is not so clear. What is the competition with 
China? To have more solar panels and wind turbines in place? 
More governmental and private investment in greentech? More 
greentech-friendly governmental policies? All of the above? 
Those writing about it often have different agendas. Companies 
want more investment in greentech and more access to China’s 
markets. Environmentalists want more active federal policies to 
encourage deployment of renewables. Free traders want barriers 
to trade removed.
Consider a threshold question: Why are we competing with 
China? European nations20 have had greentech policies for many 
years, have seen strong growth in greentech, and have generated 
much electricity from renewables.21 Some observers note that 
the race is not with one nation but many,22 yet the prevailing 
comparison is to China. There is something more to the “race” 
metaphor, then, than growth in greentech. As in the space race, 
there is the pervasive sense that if China has more extensive 
greentech investments and deployment than we do, there will be 
drastic consequences for national power and wealth. Denmark 
and Germany attract less attention than China because they pose 
less of a threat to the United States’ superpower status.23
Evaluating the “race” claims on their merits, it is hardly 
clear that the United States is “losing” to China. The differences 
between the two nations are much more subtle than they appear 
in the prevailing narrative.24
Growth of China’s Greentech Industry
One fear is that multinational companies will find it dif-
ficult to sell their greentech in China, and Chinese companies 
will flood the United States with their products. This fear reflects 
broader American unease about China’s potential for global eco-
nomic dominance. In 1979, China began to experiment with the 
free market, and since then, has experienced robust growth.25 In 
2010, China’s economy had become the world’s second largest, 
surpassing Japan’s.26 China’s “pace of industrialization is signifi-
cantly faster than that experienced by other countries throughout 
history.”27 So much of China’s manufacturing output is already 
sold in the United States that observers believe we are “joined at 
the hip economically.”28 Many believe domestic products can-
not compete against those manufactured in China due to China’s 
advantages in less expensive labor, more lax protections of intel-
lectual property, fixed currency rates (until very recently), and 
weaker environmental protections.29 In the depths of a recession 
in the United States, descriptions of growing Chinese greentech 
firms invoke images of a rising Asian industrial juggernaut.
Is greentech destined to be another area in which the Chi-
nese overpower American firms? China’s 2007 “Medium and 
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China” 
contained an explicit goal to develop a domestic renewables sec-
tor.30 China’s wind turbine industry rose from virtual nonexis-
tence to become a major player in the global market in less than 
five years. In 2009, three of the largest wind turbine manufac-
turers in the world were Chinese.31 China leads the world mar-
ket for solar photovoltaics (“PV”) cells and modules, producing 
more than forty percent.32 Chinese firms’ share of the domestic 
market has increased rapidly,33 and Chinese companies have 
become major players around the globe.34
The USTR petition details a growing imbalance in “envi-
ronmental goods” between the United States and China,35 but 
in some categories, Chinese firms have been less successful in 
the United States. Chinese firms sold only 28 megawatt (“MW”) 
worth of wind turbines outside of China in 2009.36 Some predict 
an upswing in Chinese greentech exports to the United States,37 
and at least one high-profile proposed project involving Chinese 
technology has attracted negative attention.38
Another factor cited in the USTR investigation is that the 
Chinese government appears to be shutting foreign manufactur-
ers out of its domestic market.39 Official Chinese government 
policy promotes “indigenous innovation,” calling for reliance 
on foreign technology to decrease to thirty percent or less.40 
Foreign observers report that it has become more difficult for 
foreign companies to get their technology accepted in domes-
tic projects.41 A recent report states that thirty-six government 
regulations promote domestic greentech and hamper foreign 
firms’ ability to compete in China.42 The USTR investigation 
petition claims, for example, that the indigenous innovation pol-
icy gives Chinese firms a five to ten percent advantage in wind 
turbine procurement processes.43 Encouraging announcements 
of joint ventures and other developments seem to contradict 
this protectionist trend.44 China has dropped a requirement that 
seventy percent of the components in wind turbines come from 
domestic sources.45 Agreements between American companies 
such as First Solar46 and Chinese local governments to develop 
renewable energy projects point to a potentially large market for 
American greentech in China.47 Perhaps ironically, however, 
the USTR investigation complaint cites the First Solar memo-
randum of understanding to develop a 2 gigawatt (“GW”) solar 
project as impermissible under the WTO because First Solar 
agreed to work to support China’s domestic industries.48
The concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate 
the global greentech market if current growth rates continue. 
However, some signs in the past year point to overbuilding and 
overcapacity in the wind industry, and a possible retrenchment 
and consolidation. In mid-2010, concern about the failure to 
agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slowing 
demand in China for wind energy made for an uncertain busi-
ness climate for wind energy companies.49 The top three IPOs 
in 2010 in global greentech were by Chinese companies.50 Other 
firms moved forward with their offerings,51 but a planned initial 
public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid-2010 due 
to unfavorable market conditions.52
There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet com-
petitive in certain market segments. Some provincial utilities 
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have chosen Western wind turbines due to superior control sys-
tems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine 
sizes.53 As recently as 2009, Chinese wind turbines were less 
capable than their foreign counterparts,54 as measured by lower 
capacity factors (the percentage of time that turbines operate to 
generate electricity).55
Chinese firms often do not hold key technology patents that 
would enable them to develop more sophisticated equipment.56 
Firms have grown rapidly through acquiring manufacturing 
equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower 
cost of labor.57 As a result, they have a leadership position in 
“downstream” areas of the PV production chain, but lag behind 
in “upstream” areas requiring more technological skill, such as 
silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufacturing.58 In 2009, 
American companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in 
solar technology.59
Many familiar with China believe that it is only a matter 
of time before Chinese greentech improves through importing 
foreign technology and assimilating it. Even if Chinese solar 
and wind technology improves, however, the greentech industry 
in the United States is growing.60 The cost advantages of Chi-
nese firms may eventually fade,61 or the gap may close. Chinese 
workers increasingly are demanding higher wages and better 
working conditions.62 Some greentech, like larger components 
of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to transport.63 In the 
American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from 
China might outweigh higher domestic labor costs. And Ameri-
can greentech firms enjoy other cost advantages, such as prefer-
ential tax policies.64
On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible jug-
gernauts displacing their foreign counterparts. There is obvious 
concern, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions 
and trade missions suggest.65 Some retort that fear of Chinese 
firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s claiming that mighty 
Japan was about to dominate the world economic scene.66 Setting 
up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential drawback: it 
could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two 
nations. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be 
best to drop the rhetoric about a green energy race.67
Central Government Support
Observers believe China’s national government offers con-
sistent and committed support to the greentech sector. In this 
view, a Communist nation with a central government planning 
process can develop renewables far more quickly.68 However, 
the reality is that China occasionally struggles to find consis-
tency in its greentech policies. Some have led to considerable 
progress,69 such as the Renewable Energy Law and the 2009 
stimulus package,70 but others, including reorganizations of the 
governmental energy bureaucracy, have been less successful.71
The most frequently cited instance of government support 
is direct financial aid, in the form of low-interest loans, export 
promotion, and other aid such as subsidized land made avail-
able to developers.72 The USTR complaint cites “prohibited 
subsidies to green technology”73 that include the Ministry of 
Finance’s “Special Fund for Wind Manufacturing,” the Min-
istry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce’s “Export Product 
Research and Development Fund,” and the provision of financ-
ing through export credits by China’s Export-Import Bank.74 
The state-owned China Development Bank made $42 billion in 
loans in 2010 to solar and wind energy companies,75 a sum that 
exceeds comparable financing levels in the United States.76
Yet some other policies, such as pricing for electricity gener-
ated from renewables added to the national electricity grid, have 
been anything but consistently encouraging. Over the past two 
years, prices in China’s feed-in tariff for solar have been incon-
sistent.77 A project priced in late summer 2010 involved a feed-in 
tariff of 0.73 renminbi (RMB, $0.108 at 6.8 RMB to the dollar) 
per kilowatt-hour.78 This was more than one-third less than a 
previous project’s winning bid, which suggests the winning bid-
der may have been a state-owned enterprise (“SOE”) that could 
undercut a private company’s bid. This hybrid system of state-
owned and private companies competing for the same projects is 
cited in the USTR complaint as disfavoring competition.79 It is an 
ongoing challenge to China’s energy system,80 and as one report 
observes, “lack of competition reduces efficiencies and innova-
tion that come from open and competitive markets.”81
Until 2009, a bidding tender system was also in place for 
electricity generated from wind turbines above 50 MW. That 
system was criticized for failing to promote wind power devel-
opment.82 For smaller wind installations, provincial govern-
ments set pricing policies on a project specific basis, which 
provided little long-run guidance on pricing. A new system of 
“zonal tariffs” largely replaced the previous pricing scheme, but 
it is too early to tell whether it will encourage more wind power 
development.
No fewer than nineteen governmental bodies have respon-
sibility for some aspect of greentech policy.83 There are inevi-
table delays in coordination. Ambitious announcements are 
not always translated quickly into concrete policies.84 National 
proclamations tend to be broad frameworks requiring imple-
mentation by administrative organs of the national government. 
Unlike the American system, where public involvement can help 
steer actions of administrative agencies, the Chinese govern-
ment has little accountability to accomplish its advertised objec-
tives.85 Key personnel changes in the inner circle of the Chinese 
Communist Party can make for policy reversals or alterations.
The Chinese government’s top-down nature creates enor-
mous reliance on provincial and local governments to imple-
ment national policies. Robust policy announcements by Beijing 
do not easily translate to the provinces,86 and coordination 
between national and local officials is difficult.87 Local officials 
often have incentives to prefer projects that can deliver short-
term profits,88 not renewable energy projects that might not pan 
out for years.89 Some local governments have direct conflicts of 
interest between responsibilities to promote SOEs and mandates 
to implement national policies.90
The perception that China’s government is unwaveringly 
committed to supporting greentech is often accepted uncriti-
cally, without these or any other caveats. Observers often jump 
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to conclusions that might be erroneous or oversimplified. It is 
difficult to obtain accurate information from China’s national 
government, which is secretive and prone to releases of propa-
ganda (as any reader of Xinhua knows).91 Information routinely 
available in the West is often protected in China as state secrets, 
and recent efforts to promote a freedom of information regime92 
show how difficult it is to understand governmental actions.93 
According to the USTR petition, “there is a lack of official, 
detailed information regarding the terms upon which financing 
is provided by China ExIm Bank.”94 Thus, sweeping pronounce-
ments about the Chinese government’s intentions and policies 
should be avoided when possible.
The Results Speak for Themselves . . . Or Do They?
By some metrics, Chinese greentech progress is impressive. 
In 2009, China obtained a larger share of electricity from renew-
able sources than the United States (17% versus 8.8%),95 but 
this figure is skewed by the predominance of hydroelectric gen-
eration in China,96 especially the mammoth Three Gorges Dam 
project.97 China added 13.8 GW of new wind power capacity to 
10.0 GW for the United States in 2009,98 but its installed total 
capacity still trailed that of the United States (35.1 GW versus 
25.8 GW). Those numbers cannot be compared directly, as Chi-
na’s wind projects have been less efficient.99 In 2009, China had 
a mere 0.4 GW of grid-connected solar PV capacity,100 though 
it pledged to meet a much higher target by 2020.101 The United 
States had a larger 1.2 GW of installed PV capacity, still far less 
than world leader Germany’s 9.8 GW.102
At present, then, China is not outstripping the United States 
in total installed capacity, but it might if it achieves its ambi-
tious targets for 2020—30 GW for wind (or possibly 100 GW, 
according to recent reports) and 1.8 GW for solar PV (or pos-
sibly as much as an astounding 20 GW).103 However, much of 
the increase will be in hydropower.104 And apples should be 
compared to apples: Europe and the United States also plan to 
increase installed capacity substantially above current levels by 
2020.105
Some point to a different metric. Asset financing levels 
in China have recently outpaced those of American firms.106 
According to a recent report,107 in 2009, Chinese spending 
(excluding R&D) totaled $34.6 billion to $18.6 billion for the 
United States.108 As the spending levels are within the same 
order of magnitude, it does not seem that this is reason for panic. 
The real fear seems to be that if the United States does not adopt 
progressive climate measures (including a cap-and-trade law), 
it will fall further behind China.109 The market data seems to 
capture the spirit of American inaction on renewables, but does 
it matter, except for international bragging rights, whether the 
United States or China occupies the top spot in solar and wind 
investment or installed capacity?
Total investment figures or gigawatts of renewable energy 
capacity installed do not tell us how China is moving toward 
reducing its usage of fossil fuels and achieving climate goals. 
China is adding renewable energy capacity rapidly, but is much 
more dependent on conventional fossil fuel generation than the 
United States. Coal accounts for a staggering seventy percent 
of the nation’s electricity generation capacity.110 Even large 
deployment of renewables will not enable China to reduce that 
number substantially over the next decade.111 And that only tells 
part of the story. China’s growth and increasing appetite of its 
citizens for modern conveniences has resulted in rapid increases 
in energy demand.112 In 2010, China achieved the dubious mile-
stone of surpassing the United States as the world’s largest pri-
mary energy user.113 Its industries are far less energy-efficient 
than those in the United States and Japan.114 The government’s 
initiatives have helped,115 but China still has a long way to go.
To satisfy its increasing energy demand, China has added 
more conventional generation capacity than greentech.116 An 
article on China and greentech stated that, “China’s investment 
in renewable energy and other green technologies is miniscule 
compared to the resources devoted to its continued building of 
coal-fired power plants and efforts to secure dirty oil shale sup-
plies in Canada and elsewhere.”117 In 2009, China began con-
struction of a mammoth 13.6 GW power base fueled by coal in 
Gansu province, the same location planned for a much-praised 
10 GW wind farm.118 New investments in conventional tech-
nology made up over one-third of the 134.4 billion RMB (just 
under twenty billion dollars) in the first half of 2010.119 As of 
2010, China “uses more coal than the United States, Europe, and 
Japan combined.”120 That context should be a central part of any 
discussion that touts China’s achievements in deploying solar 
panels and wind turbines or in greentech financing levels.
invokinG the Space Race metaphoR iS counteR- 
pRoDuctive foR aDDReSSinG climate chanGe
While many believe the United States is losing the green 
energy race, the reality does not yet match the rhetoric.121 
However, there is more at stake. We need to confront a power-
ful reality: the United States and China are interdependent, not 
independent competitors.122 We need China to take the very 
actions some posit as competition. This makes the USTR inves-
tigation especially unwelcome.123 Without its greentech efforts 
and other measures124 such as its announced goal to reduce the 
“carbon intensity” of its economy (CO2 emissions per unit of 
GDP),125 China’s increasing energy demand and spending on 
conventional technology would add considerably to greenhouse 
gas emissions.126
There will be no effective global reduction of emissions 
that does not include the United States and China,127 because 
they are by far the world’s two largest emitters of green-
house gases.128 Failure by either nation to reduce its emissions 
would imperil the entire global effort.129 We should encourage 
and support China’s efforts, not consider them a threat to our 
national wellbeing.130 Rather than creating the scorched earth 
of a “greentech war,”131 both nations can benefit from collabo-
ration.132 The urgency to do this is compelling. No nation has 
ever had to address such daunting environmental challenges 
at the same time as it has pursued such rapid growth.133 This 
poses major hurdles to tackling climate change that must be sur-
mounted by nations working together. And there are not just two 
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nations involved, but the whole world.134 Rather than creating a 
two-nation race, we should encourage China’s domestic policies 
and the climate change collaborations of the “BRIC” developing 
economies (Brazil, Russia, and India, in addition to China).135
Nationalistic rhetoric on climate change would be espe-
cially unfortunate for the U.S.-China relationship on climate 
matters. The two nations have ongoing tensions on a whole 
host of sensitive topics,136 but have worked productively with 
each other to address climate change.137 In the two-year period 
of international negotiations between the promulgation of the 
Bali Action Plan and the December 2009 Copenhagen summit, 
talks took place under the auspices of the U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue.138 Discussions also took place during 
2009 with world leaders at the Pittsburgh G-20 summit139 and 
at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.140 The 
two nations have pledged several times to take mutual action 
to address climate change,141 and while the promises are often 
hortatory, the ongoing discussion does have important value 
in strengthening the bilateral relationship.142 Advocating com-
petition with the Chinese undercuts these activities. Continued 
antagonistic rhetoric about a clean energy race will also make 
it difficult to conduct cooperative efforts in energy and environ-
mental matters. Unlike the near-complete scientific secrecy that 
marked the Cold War era,143 China and the United States are 
working to develop technology together.
Some even argue that China’s programs to promote renew-
ables can be good for the United States’ economy.144 The Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations’ Michael Levi, argues that “it’s quite 
possible for the United States and China both to win, with China 
lowering the cost of relatively low-tech parts of the value chain, 
in turn growing the market for the higher-tech parts that are still 
handled by the United States.”145 Levi compares this to other 
situations in which China manufactures products developed in 
the United States.
Finally, greentech warring makes it more difficult to reach a 
global climate agreement. According to some accounts, China’s 
foot-dragging146 and refusal to adopt binding reduction targets 
was in part responsible for the failure of the Copenhagen Accord 
to incorporate global binding limits.147 As China’s economy 
continues its rapid growth, there will be even greater demand for 
it to agree to limit emissions.148 Castigating it for its greentech 
policies could foster a climate of distrust and delay further prog-
ress on a post-Kyoto agreement.
For all of these reasons, the symbolism of the space race is 
simply not helpful in a discussion of global climate change.
Lessons for Energy Policy From the “Space Race”
Blaming China deflects attention from our own inabili-
ties to develop progressive policies on renewables and climate 
change. Numerous observers have noted that we lack a stable set 
of policies to encourage greentech research, development, and 
deployment.149 While we have done well to invent new tech-
nologies,150 our efforts to advance them to the commercial stage 
and promote their deployment are “fragmented,” spread among 
numerous agencies, and lacking coordination.151 As many have 
noted, “[g]overnment policies can provide a strong impetus for 
constructing renewable generation facilities,” and there is a wide 
variety of potential incentives, including support for research and 
development, tax incentives, government procurement policies, 
renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), carbon cap-and-trade 
programs, and feed-in tariffs.152 Federal spending on renew-
able energy is both anemic in its overall levels153 and, even after 
the added billions of dollars in the 2009 stimulus package,154 
well behind that devoted to fossil fuels.155 Federal tax policy for 
renewables is inconsistently supportive,156 and in some years, 
many new projects come to fruition, but the pipeline often dries 
up.157 The cyclical pace of support “clearly illustrates the conse-
quences of on-again, off-again short-term federal incentives for 
wind as a market signal.”158
Some Obama administration actions are similar to actions 
taken in response to Sputnik, such as the creation of a Cabinet-
level position to address climate change, which echoes gov-
ernmental reorganizations taken in the late 1950s. One action 
that is especially comparable and noteworthy is the funding of 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (“ARPA-E”) 
with four hundred million dollars from the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) stimulus package. ARPA-
E’s name and mission deliberately echo that of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (“ARPA”)159 created after Sputnik in 
the Department of Defense.
The moon landing was the product of an amalgamation of 
many disparate efforts to develop different types of technologies. 
So too is energy research and development. Like the Apollo pro-
gram, it is not clear at the outset which technology will prevail, 
so we need to work on a variety of fronts over a long period of 
time. Programs established in the stimulus package are tempo-
rary, not the comprehensive approach we need.160
Much of our effort to develop greentech is mired in a rut. No 
climate bill, renewable electricity standard, or national feed-in 
tariff is forthcoming.161 Progress toward a stand-alone national 
renewable electricity standard is doubtful.162 Many have noted 
the failure of federal leadership163 and the actions of progres-
sive states that have stepped into the void with their own pro-
grams.164 These policies are not uniform throughout the country. 
A national program may achieve results that piecemeal state and 
regional efforts underway cannot.165
How can we make more progress? Addressing climate 
change requires the kind of committed and strong support from 
the federal government that the space program received through-
out the 1960s.166 The race is really to meet a national goal that 
we have articulated and that is in our national self-interest, 
whether or not it has geopolitical significance. We put a man 
on the moon in part because we were captivated by the idea of a 
simple, clear goal. I have focused on one idea that could catalyze 
a push toward rapidly increasing development of renewables: a 
“solar utility” that would reduce the upfront cost of panels to 
nearly zero by subsidizing and installing them at houses.167
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Conclusion
China has become a major player in greentech in a short 
amount of time. If it could keep up its breakneck pace of 
growth it might look like it has pulled far ahead of us in the new 
“green energy race,” but at present the picture is more muddled. 
The “space race” metaphor and the USTR investigation are 
counterproductive in that they pit the two nations against each 
other, when they should emphasize interdependence and coopera-
tion. In the end, competing with China in greentech is about as 
useful as “energy independence.” It may be much more produc-
tive to convince Americans that their nation’s future depends on 
investment in renewables through a specific national goal.
Endnotes:  China’s Greentech Programs and the USTR Investigation
1 See generally Joel B. Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for 
Green Leadership?, 35 wm. & maRy envtl. l. & pol’y Rev. 1 (2010).
2 Id.
3  United States Launches Section 301 Investigation into China’s Policies Affect-
ing Trade and Investment in Green Technologies, off. u.S. tRaDe RepReSenta-
tive (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/node/6223. A full discussion of this 
investigation under prevailing trade law is beyond the scope of this article.
4 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Failure Is Not an Option, n.y. timeS, 
Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/opinion/28friedman.
html?ref=thomaslfriedman (opening the column with “China is having a good 
week in America. Yes it is. I’d even suggest that there is some high-fiving going 
on in Beijing. I mean, wouldn’t you if you saw America’s Democratic and 
Republican leaders conspiring to ensure that America cedes the next great global 
industry—E.T., energy technology—to China?”).
5 Friedman has written often in his column about the need for American energy 
policy to move forward expeditiously, frequently contrasting America’s lack 
of progress unfavorably with China’s policies. See Christina Larson, America’s 
Unfounded Fears of a Green-Tech Race with China, yale env’t 360 (Feb. 8, 
2010), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2238 (stating that “Fried-
man has used the bully pulpit of his influential New York Times column to 
warn that the United States is engaged in a global green-tech competition 
with China, whose potential dominance represents a ‘new Sputnik’”). Fried-
man has written numerous columns in the first half of 2010 alone that mention 
China’s energy ascendancy. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, We’re Gonna 
Be Sorry, n.y. timeS, Jul. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/
opinion/25friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman; Thomas L. Friedman, What 
7 Republicans Could Do, n.y. timeS, Jul. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/07/21/opinion/21friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman (noting that 
“by 2012, China should pretty much own the clean-tech industry”); Thomas L. 
Friedman, No Fooling Mother Nature, n.y. timeS, May 4, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/05/05/opinion/05friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman; 
Friedman, supra note 4; Thomas L. Friedman, Global Weirding Is Here, n.y. 
timeS, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/opinion/17friedman.
html?ref=thomaslfriedman (“China . . . is investing heavily in clean-tech, 
efficiency and high-speed rail. It sees the future trends and is betting on them. 
Indeed, I suspect China is quietly laughing at us right now.”).
6 See infra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
7 Sewell Chan & Keith Bradsher, U.S. to Investigate China’s Clean Energy 
Aid, n.y. timeS, Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/
business/16wind.html. Note this comment from Rep. Charles Schumer, however: 
“An investigation into China’s illegal subsidies for its clean energy industry is 
overdue, but it’s no substitute for dealing with China’s currency manipulation.” 
Id.
8 See CAGWmedia, Chinese Professor, youtube (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=OTSQozWP-rM.
9 Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The 
Case for Solar Utilities, 24 notRe Dame j.l., ethicS & pub. pol’y 53 (2010).
10 the pew chaRitable tRuStS, who’S winninG the clean eneRGy Race?: 
GRowth, competition anD oppoRtunity in the woRlD’S laRGeSt economieS 7 
(2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Global_warming/G-20%20Report.pdf (containing a section titled “China Takes 
the Lead, While the U.S. Slips”).
11 Is China Beating the U.S. in Green Technology Development?, builDaRoo.
com (Mar. 7, 2010), http://buildaroo.com/news/article/china-green-technology-
development.
12 See e.g., Keith Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, n.y. timeS, 
Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/business/global/09trade.
html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=keith_bradsher; Keith Bradsher, China Lead-
ing Global Race to Make Clean Energy, n.y. timeS, Jan. 30, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-environment/31renew.html; Kent Gar-
ber, U.S. Lacks a Coherent Clean Energy Strategy: China Is the Main Competi-
tor in the Global Energy Race, u.S. newS & woRlD Rep., May 7, 2010, http://
politics.usnews.com/news/energy/articles/2010/05/07/us-lacks-a-coherent-clean-
energy-strategy.html; Evan Osnos, Letter from China: Green-Tech Space Race, 
new yoRkeR, Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanos-
nos/2009/04/greentech-space-race.html; Bruce Usher, Red China, Green China, 
n.y. timeS, May 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/opinion/07Usher.
html (observing that “[b]y giving China more time to develop its capacity while 
neglecting our own, America is not just losing the clean-tech race, it’s forfeiting 
it”); Gerard Wynn, Is Clean Tech China’s Moon Shot?, ReuteRS, Jan. 28, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60R02520100128; supra note 5 and 
accompanying text (including Thomas Friedman’s New York Times columns).
13 Richard Brubaker, Will China Surpass the US as a Superpower?, all 
RoaDS leaD to china (Jul. 16, 2010, 6:22), http://www.allroadsleadtochina.
com/2010/07/16/will-china-surpass-the-us-as-a-superpower; Derek Thompson, Is 
China Winning the Energy Race?, the atlantic (Jun. 17, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/is-china-winning-the-energy-
race/58321, republished by Julian L. Wong, Interview with The Atlantic on China 
and the Clean Energy Race, GReen leap foRwaRD (Jul. 8, 2010), http://green-
leapforward.com/2010/07/08/interview-with-the-atlantic-on-china-and-the-clean-
energy-race.
14 Rep. Ed Markey, Landing a Clean Energy Victory, huffinGton poSt (Jul. 20, 
2009, 9:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-ed-markey/landing-a-clean-
energy-vi_b_240938.html.
15 Frances Beinecke, In the Clean Energy Race, Jobs Can Stay in America, 
SwitchboaRD: nat. ReSouRceS Def. council Staff bloG (Feb. 23, 2010), http://
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/in_the_clean_energy_race_with.html 
(providing commentary by Frances Beinecke, President of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council); Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., The New Arms Race, huffinGton poSt 
(Nov. 19, 2009, 3:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-f-kennedy-jr/
the-new-arms-race_b_364211.html.
16 Daniel J. Weiss & Susan Lyon, Running for First in the Clean-Energy Race, 
ctR. foR am. pRoGReSS (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2010/01/sotu_energy.html. The Center’s “Out of the Running” report, as 
discussed below, analyzes the race in detail. Rob atkinSon et al.. bReakthRouGh 
inSt. & the info. tech. & innovation founD., RiSinG tiGeRS SleepinG Giant: 
aSian nationS Set to Dominate the clean eneRGy Race by out-inveStinG the 
uniteD StateS (2009), http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Rising_Tigers.pdf; Van 
Jones & Pan Jiahua, Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Climate Change, Innovation 
and the Clean Energy Race, Gov monitoR (May 23, 2010), http://www.the-
govmonitor.com/world_news/britain/climate-change-innovation-and-the-clean-
energy-race-31528.html.
17 John Doerr & Jeff Immelt, Falling Behind On Green Tech, waSh. poSt, Aug. 
3, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/02/
AR2009080201563.html (providing commentary by John Doerr, partner in the 
venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and by Jeff Immelt, chair-
man and chief executive of General Electric, a major manufacturer of wind tur-
bine equipment).
18 Eric Pooley, Senate Inaction Cedes U.S. Energy Race to China, bloombeRG, 
Jul. 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/senate-inaction-
cedes-u-s-energy-race-to-china-commentary-by-eric-pooley.html; Kerri Shannon, 
Endnotes: China’s Greentech Programs and the USTR Investigation 
continued on page 70
9 SuStainable Development law & policy
InTroducTIon
The compliance and voluntary carbon markets are fac-ing an identity crisis. Despite minor victories following the 16th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, 
the voluntary carbon markets are attempting to grow in an uncer-
tain regulatory world where the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and 
its market mechanisms hang in the balance. At the same time, 
the voluntary carbon markets have been able to survive through 
flexibility and strong self-governance.
Critics initially attacked the fledgling voluntary market for 
its lack of conformity to rules and attentiveness to real environ-
mental action. Now, as the voluntary markets mature, stricter 
codes of conduct are emerging. Many of the almost two-dozen 
carbon offset certification standards that exist in the voluntary 
carbon markets today seek to establish credibility and account-
ability for voluntary environmental commitments. They seek to 
enforce their rules through transparency and reputation to ensure 
that these commitments are fulfilled in a real and verifiable way. 
Indeed, social and environmental product certification systems 
that include third-party auditing “are remarkable for their simi-
larity to state-based regulatory and legal systems.”1 But are the 
legal systems similar? Certainly, the successful certification 
standards have “establish[ed] their own governing systems, 
largely independent of state governments, with the regulatory 
capacity to back up those obligations with enforceable rules.”2 
But what happens when the certification standard makes a mis-
take in enforcement?
Several voluntary certification standards include dispute 
resolution mechanisms for private parties harmed by an adverse 
decision from an auditor or the standard itself during the certi-
fication process. However, these dispute resolution mechanisms 
vary widely and encompass diverse degrees and notions of due 
process rights. The available dispute resolution mechanisms in 
the voluntary carbon markets are important because they can 
serve as models for how dispute resolution will be addressed by 
the compliance markets, and, in particular, the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (“CDM”) under the Kyoto Protocol,3 which is 
currently framing its own appeals procedure for private parties.4
This article explores due process rights in the carbon mar-
kets and discusses how innovation in the voluntary markets can 
set an important example for the compliance markets. This arti-
cle provides an overview of the carbon markets and then exam-
ines whether the four leading offset certification standards in 
the voluntary carbon markets have achieved enough credibility 
and status to influence the CDM’s governance structure for the 
resolution of conflicts. Finally, it outlines the appeals procedures 
currently available in the voluntary market and advocates for 
their continued development in both the voluntary market and 
the CDM.
an overvIew oF The carbon markeTs
the compliance caRbon maRketS
There are two types of carbon markets: compliance and 
voluntary. Compliance markets are government-mandated cap-
and-trade programs. The cap-and-trade programs established by 
the Kyoto Protocol,5 the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (“EU ETS”),6 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”) in the northeastern United States7 are examples of 
compliance carbon markets. To date, the success of these mar-
kets has been mixed. Although these programs have proven that 
carbon is a viable commodity that can attract significant capital, 
several problems have repeatedly plagued these markets, includ-
ing the ability to set appropriate caps to enable real emissions 
reductions over time.8
Carbon offsets, which must be certified by a third-party cer-
tification standard, are integral to any cap-and-trade program. 
“Certification standards” are independent organizations that 
provide the guarantee that a carbon offset project has achieved 
the promised emissions reductions.9 When a project’s emissions 
reductions have been verified against a standard’s rules and 
requirements, the standard will issue the project carbon credits 
equivalent to the emission reductions achieved.10 The credits are 
then considered “certified” and the credits can either be sold or 
“retired.”11
CDM Process of Certification
The most prominent carbon offset certification standard in 
the compliance markets is the CDM. The Kyoto Protocol per-
mits Annex I Parties (developed countries) to satisfy part of their 
emissions reduction targets by using Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (“CERs”) created by registered CDM project activities.12 
The CDM is a global market-based mechanism overseen by the 
CDM Executive Board (“EB”), which facilitates the creation and 
issuance of CERs from eligible CDM project activities.13 Before 
a CDM project can begin to generate CERs, it must proceed 
through the CDM project cycle. As a preliminary matter, the 
nation hosting the CDM project must belong to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol as a non-Annex I (developing) country.14 After the project 
is designed using an approved methodology that quantifies the 
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emissions reductions, a designated operational entity (“DOE”) 
is appointed to act as an independent auditor to validate and 
subsequently request registration of the proposed CDM project 
activity.15 The DOE then submits a validation report to the EB, 
thereby confirming that certain preset requirements are met.16 
The EB then decides whether to formally accept the DOE’s rec-
ommendation and if so, it “must register CDM projects within 
eight weeks of the [DOE’s] request unless three members of the 
CDM Executive Board, or a CDM participant, require a review 
of the proposed activity.”17
Once registered, the project participants implement the 
CDM project. A second and different DOE is appointed to moni-
tor the project during implementation and to ultimately confirm 
that the project’s resulting greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions 
are real, measurable, and verifiable below an approved base-
line.18 This second DOE requests the EB to issue CERs after it 
is satisfied that the GHG reductions are “appropriate”.19 There 
is then a fifteen-day window during which time a three-member 
panel of the EB or a CDM participant can request a review of the 
DOE’s findings.20 However, “[b]ecause the scope of the review 
is limited to issues of fraud, malfeasance, or incompetence of the 
[second DOE], issuance of CER[s] by the Executive Board . . . 
is almost . . . automatic.”21 If no review is requested, the CER 
“issuance is considered final.”22
the voluntaRy caRbon maRketS
In contrast to the compliance markets, voluntary carbon 
markets do not impose a mandatory cap on greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Instead, they rely on participants’ voluntary commitments 
to reduce emissions. A unique dynamic has developed between 
these two types of markets in which the voluntary markets often 
appear to act as a test-drive for companies facing the prospect 
of the enactment of complex, and sometimes confusing, com-
pliance markets.23 Indeed, the voluntary markets buoyed the 
credibility of the overall carbon markets when the compliance 
markets were most vulnerable. This was particularly evident 
following the failures at the 15th Conference of the Parties 
(“COP15”) where regulators hesitantly noted the Copenhagen 
Accord.24 The robust growth of the voluntary markets is thus a 
logical response to the Kyoto Protocol’s complex rules, dispa-
rate enforcement and inefficiencies that have resulted in CDM 
capacity bottlenecks and slowed credit issuances.25
In the past, the voluntary markets were accessed through 
the Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”), a voluntary but legally 
binding cap-and-trade program, or through an over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) purchase or sale. However, CCX’s emissions trading 
program shut its doors at the end of 2010.26 Consequently, OTC 
transactions will now dominate the market.
Most of the transactions in the OTC market involve offset 
credits from third-party certification standards.27 In 2008 and 
2009, more than ninety percent of the credits transacted in the 
voluntary markets were certified by a third-party standard.28 
Over the last few years, the following certification standards 
have emerged as leaders in the voluntary market: the Veri-
fied Carbon Standard (“VCS”), the Climate Action Reserve 
(“CAR”), the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”), and the Gold 
Standard (“GS”).29
The VCS was launched in 2007.30 It was founded by The 
Climate Group, the International Emissions Trading Associa-
tion, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment.31 The World Economic Forum and approximately one 
thousand carbon market stakeholders also assisted in developing 
the standard.32 VCS issues credits called Verified Carbon Units 
(“VCUs”) for carbon offset projects throughout the world that 
can demonstrate emissions reductions that are real, measurable, 
permanent, additional, independently verified, unique, transpar-
ent, and conservative.33
CAR, formerly the California Climate Action Registry 
(“CCAR”), was established in 2001 after a group of CEOs lob-
bied the state of California to create a mechanism by which they 
could track their firms’ early emissions reductions in anticipa-
tion of the future state and potential federal regulation.34 CCAR 
was thus born from a state mandate.35 The program eventually 
separated from the state to be incorporated as a nonprofit orga-
nization and, in 2009, the organization began transitioning its 
tracking and inventory operations to The Climate Registry, a 
national nonprofit body established in 2007 that was actually 
modeled after CCAR.36 In turn, CAR flip-flopped its role as part 
of CCAR to become the new parent organization focusing on 
developing an offset credit, Climate Reserve Tonnes (“CRT”) 
that apply to GHG reduction projects within North America.37
ACR was established in 1996 by the Environmental Defense 
Fund and Environmental Resources Trust.38 It was the first of its 
kind in the United States and over the last fifteen years, it has 
issued over thirty million offset credits.39 These credits, called 
Emission Reduction Tons (“ERTs”), are issued in accordance 
with ACR’s requirement that reductions are “real, measurable, 
permanent, in excess of regulatory requirements and common 
practice, additional to business-as-usual, net of leakage, verified 
by a competent independent third party, and used only once.”40 
ACR’s reach is not limited to the United States and accepts 
international projects.41 In 2007, ACR became an “enterprise” 
of Winrock International, an American nonprofit organization 
working globally to “empower the disadvantaged, increase eco-
nomic opportunity, and sustain natural resources.”42
The GS Foundation, which manages the GS carbon certifi-
cation scheme, was founded in 2003 by a network of large non-
governmental organizations (“NGO”), including the Worldwide 
Fund for Nature, Helio International, and SouthSouthNorth, in 
response to criticism that the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM did not ade-
quately address sustainable development.43 These NGOs devel-
oped the GS as a complement to renewable energy or energy 
efficiency CDM projects through the addition of a sustainabil-
ity assessment.44 If a project proponent successfully applied the 
GS’s sustainability assessment to its CDM project, then the GS 
would provide the CDM project with an additional GS label.45 
The project could then sell the GS-labeled CERs for an addi-
tional premium in the marketplace.46 Subsequently, in 2006, the 
GS launched its voluntary standard whereby it issues GS Vol-
untary Emission Reductions (“VERs”) to renewable energy or 
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energy efficiency projects that successfully meet the Standard’s 
rigorous technical and sustainable development criteria.47
Unlike the CDM, which was born out of climate diplo-
macy and is therefore vulnerable to global politicking, VCS, 
CAR, ACR, and GS operate in an unregulated market, free 
from bureaucracy, political hostage-taking, and other possible 
effects of governmental intervention. This gives VCS, CAR, 
ACR, and GS freedom to respond to market demands through 
innovation, limited only by their own creativity and available 
resources. As such, these standards can experiment with a vari-
ety of governance, financial, and technical mechanisms. Indeed, 
experiments in the voluntary carbon markets—the successes and 
failures alike—can set examples for the compliance markets as 
they develop over time.
These third party standards play another critical role in the 
voluntary markets, acting as civil regulatory bodies to build con-
sumer trust by ensuring a consistent level of quality. Thus, vol-
untary certification standards become “distinctive . . . because 
they transform the global marketplace by developing ‘delib-
erative and adaptive governance institutions designed to embed 
social and environmental norms in the global marketplace that 
derive authority directly from interested audiences, includ[ing] 
those they seek to regulate, [but do not derive their authority] 
from sovereign states.’”48 Such non-state global governance 
institutions are known as non-state market driven (“NSMD”) 
governance systems.49 The application of the NSMD analysis to 
voluntary carbon certification standards is appropriate because 
the framework was originally developed to explain forest certifi-
cation, which is similar to carbon certification.50
VCS, CAR, ACR, and GS must establish credibility, build 
consumer trust, develop a strong reputation in the marketplace, 
and operate with a certain degree of political integrity to be 
considered as relevant and appropriate examples for the CDM. 
The NSMD governance system, an academic analytical frame-
work, provides a framework from within which to measure these 
characteristics.
The nsmd Framework– 
a measure oF markeT credIbIlITy
It is generally accepted that a NSMD system displays five 
features.51 First, a NSMD system’s authority is not derived 
from the state.52 That is, “there is no use of state sovereignty to 
enforce compliance.”53 This element is arguably the most impor-
tant because of the lack of a connection with the state, which dis-
tinguishes NSMD systems from public-private partnerships or, 
in the case of carbon markets, the standard-setting CDM, which 
derives its authority from an international agreement between 
nations.54 Second, NSMD systems must have established gov-
ernance mechanisms,55 whereby “NSMD institutions constitute 
governing arenas in which . . . adaptation, inclusion, and learn-
ing over time occur . . . across a wide range of stakeholders.”56 
At its core, this element rests on democratic ideals of fairness, 
accountability and transparency, and its intent is to promote 
“good practice” and “practical reason.”57 Third, the NSMD’s 
authority is market-based,58 deriving its power from the market 
and civil society.59 Fourth, the NSMD is concerned with social 
impacts.60 A NSMD governance system seeks to address global 
issues that private firms are not incentivized to address, and 
which governments may not have the capacity or, in the case 
of climate change mitigation in the United States, the political 
will to remedy.61 Finally, the NSMD system has enforcement 
mechanisms and mandatory requirements.62 These are rules and 
regulations where compliance can be verified and non-compli-
ance can be punished.63 “Once firms sign on, they are subject to 
governance, rules and enforcement that have more in common 
with state regulation than standards of voluntary bodies that can 
be abandoned with little consequence.”64
While the NSMD framework omits any express reference 
to due process rights for the NSMD system’s constituents, it is 
recognized that “entities that are affected by the decisions of a 
regulatory body [should] have access to a full and fair review of 
the decision in question.”65 If NSMD systems are akin to demo-
cratic regulatory bodies, then it would seem logical to expressly 
incorporate the protection of individual rights into the NSMD 
theoretical analysis. The exclusion of due process principles 
would appear to contravene the democratic ideals upon which 
the NSMD systems are founded and rely.
It is possible that the second element of a NSMD system, 
related to governance mechanisms, could be interpreted to 
include due process rights. Within the governance aspect, “good 
practice” is defined in terms of “fairness and procedural legiti-
macy,” but there is no consensus as to how to achieve it.66 Like-
wise, “practical reason” relates to ideas of procedural fairness.
Practical reason builds on the notion that reasons derive 
from interpretative and dialogical processes (e.g., 
legal processes) in which intersubjectively validated 
knowledge and normative understandings of fairness 
play a role. [Practical reason] . . . concerns the epis-
temic requirements for democratic practice, which . . 
. requires “discursive validation” [and] “ideal speech” 
conditions where validity claims can be assessed.67
In other words, constituents should be afforded the opportunity 
to challenge validity claims and be heard.68 “Practical reason,” 
however, is interpreted on a case-by-case basis in accordance 
with specific historical context and cultural values.69
Status as a NSMD system is important as these certifica-
tion systems pursue legitimacy as civil regulatory bodies.70 
Otherwise, standards that cannot meet the NSMD test risk cat-
egorization as merely a string of coordinated activities adopted 
by self-serving stakeholders. Under the existing five-part test, 
three out of the four voluntary certification standards have the 
elements of a NSMD system and one standard, CAR, which 
has gained credibility through its connections with the State 
of California, may be more aptly described as a public-private 
partnership.
vcS
Under the five-part NSMD test, VCS meets all of the 
requirements. As an industry-created standard, its power is 
not derived from the state. It is governed by the VCS Standard 
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2007.1 and Program Guidelines 2007.1,71 which outline the 
rules and methodologies required of project developers, verifi-
ers, and validators.72 VCS meets the third element of the orig-
inal NSMD analysis because its authority is derived from the 
market. In 2009, VCS held thirty-five percent of the transaction 
volume in the voluntary market.73 VCS also meets the fourth 
and fifth NSMD elements because it is concerned with the social 
domain (its mission is climate change mitigation) and its rules 
are enforceable. The VCS Secretariat operates the Standard on a 
day-to-day basis and is responsible for, inter alia, a mechanism 
to license auditors as VCS validators and verifiers.74 In addition, 
“[t]he VCS Board reserves the right to sanction validators and 
verifiers, project proponents and registry operators based on evi-
dence of an improper procedure.”75
caR
The first NSMD prong, prohibiting the standard to have 
derived any power from the state, is where CAR falls short 
because it was created by the State of California. Despite its 
subsequent separation from the state to become an independent 
nonprofit organization, CAR is still recognized and rewarded for 
its early connection, and may thus be more appropriately cat-
egorized as a public-private partnership.76 In arguendo, suppos-
ing CAR did comply with the first NSMD prong, the standard 
would easily satisfy the remaining original requirements: CAR 
has established its own governance mechanisms with the Veri-
fication Program Manual and Climate Action Reserve Program 
Manual; its power is market-based (it had thirty-one percent 
of the voluntary market share in 2009);77 it is concerned with 
climate change, and it has instituted enforcement mechanisms 
and mandatory requirements in the form of a detailed program 
schedule and penalty structure.78
acR
Like VCS, ACR also meets the five NSMD requirements. 
First, as a standard founded and owned by NGOs, its power 
is not state-based. Second, it also has strict rules. Generally, 
ACR’s project cycle is similar to that used by VCS.79 ACR eas-
ily meets the third and fourth elements because its authority is 
market-based, with four percent of the voluntary market share, 
and its mission is also to mitigate climate change. 80 ACR’s 
rules are enforceable, but it relies primarily on domestic courts. 
The Guidelines specifically state that any legal responsibili-
ties or rights of ACR or parties involved (verifiers, proponents, 
members, etc.) are outlined in the contractual agreements they 
sign with one another.81 For example, the attestation agreement 
signed by parties seeking to become ACR-approved verifiers 
requires the parties to obtain their own liability insurance, agree 
to limit ACR’s liability, indemnify ACR, and submit any claims 
that may not otherwise be provided for in the contractual lan-
guage to the courts and laws of Arkansas.82
GS
The GS also meets the five-part NSMD test. First, like ACR, 
GS was founded by NGOs. Second, it has strict governance 
mechanisms. The Gold Standard Requirements (“GSR”) detail 
a multi-step project cycle for its voluntary standard in which the 
project proponent must first assess the eligibility of the project 
against the GS’s criteria, including strict rules regarding addi-
tionality and sustainable development.83 The third NSMD fac-
tor, requiring market-based authority, is also satisfied here. In 
2009, GS accounted for seven percent of the transaction volume 
in the voluntary market.84 Fourth, the GS mission’s concern for 
social impacts is two-fold: it seeks to promote sustainable devel-
opment and mitigate climate change through its offset projects. 
Finally, the GS rules are enforceable. The GS Terms and Condi-
tions (“GSTC”) provide that a breach of its rules may be “pros-
ecuted as a violation of [GS’s] intellectual property rights.”85 In 
addition, Section 10 of the GSTC addresses sanctions, including 
fines and/or the freezing of a GS registry account, for a violation 
of the GS’s rules.86
prIvaTe parTy dIspuTe resoluTIon  
mechanIsms In The carbon markeTs
There are several types of potential disputes that may arise 
between a private party project proponent and a certification 
standard.87 The first type involves the investment relationship.88 
Project development requires large up-front capital expenditures 
and, because certification is a time-consuming process, investors 
may not see returns for a few years. Consequently, even a slight 
delay may change the investment analysis. Second, disputes 
can arise over registration, issuance, or revocation decisions.89 
These disputes could involve a myriad of scenarios, such as 
when a standard rejects a project, revokes credits based on 
changes to the project, or where one project participant claims 
that the certification standard issued credits to the wrong party. 
Third, disagreements over bookkeeping could escalate into 
a potential dispute over, for example, an allegedly erroneous 
transfer.90 Fourth, a certification standard may invalidate credits 
where it has reason to believe the project documentation was 
fraudulent.91 Finally, disputes could arise in connection with the 
validation or verification reports from the third-party auditor on 
issues including, but not limited to, carbon quantification or the 
correct application of a methodology. A dispute could also arise 
when the certification standard accepts an allegedly defective 
validation or verification report.
Litigation may be the obvious recourse in the event of a dis-
pute between a private party project proponent and a certifica-
tion standard. However, here, litigation may be an inadequate 
mechanism for several reasons. A compliance market certifi-
cation standard, such as the Clean Development Mechanism, 
may be afforded sovereign immunity.92 In the case of a private 
certification standard, domestic court systems may not have the 
technical expertise to properly adjudicate registration, issuance, 
revocation, or auditing decisions, and hiring the appropriate 
expert witnesses can be expensive for both sides. Furthermore, 
project proponents may not reside in the same country as the 
private certification standard, and a foreign party may distrust 
the ability of a foreign court to be impartial.93 Private arbitra-
tion may be a better forum for disputes with public or private 
certification standards because it has the potential to be less time 
13 SuStainable Development law & policy
consuming and less expensive than litigation, parties can select 
independent, technically qualified judges, and some arbitration 
bodies provide standing to both public and private parties.94 
More importantly, unlike potentially hostile foreign courts, a 
project proponent will not question the allegiance of an arbitra-
tor if it was involved in the selection process.95 On the other 
hand, private arbitration may not be well suited to resolve dis-
putes between project proponents and a certification standard 
because of the lack of uniform decision-making and difficulty 
for the prevailing party to enforce an award.96 Instead, an inde-
pendent internal dispute mechanism, tailored to the standard’s 
rules, could be the best forum for resolving such disputes.97
DiSpute ReSolution unDeR the cDm
The significance of the CDM lies in the way it marries the 
public and private sector. “The CDM is unique in regulating a 
market dominated by private players that depend, in the creation 
of the market’s underlying asset, on a United Nations commit-
tee, the CDM Executive Board that approves calculation meth-
ods and projects.”98 However, as the CDM grows—at the time 
of this writing, over 2,000 projects have been registered and the 
pipeline of undeveloped projects is equal or greater in size99—
questions about the CDM’s governance structure have arisen. In 
particular, the EB functions as a regulatory agency issuing deci-
sions and creating rules that have financial and legal implica-
tions for private parties.100 But, unlike many regulatory agencies 
that operate in accordance with democratic notions of good gov-
ernance, including “legality, certainty, formal equality, account-
ability, due process and access to justice,” the EB is not subject 
to the same governance controls.101 Compounding the problem, 
there is no independent tribunal for reviewing the EB’s deci-
sions and, consequently, CDM project proponents have little, if 
any, due process rights.102
DiSpute ReSolution in the voluntaRy caRbon 
maRketS
VCS, CAR, ACR, and GS have all developed their own 
frameworks for appeals. Likewise, the CDM is following suit 
in developing an appeals process and can look to the voluntary 
market for guidance.103 Understanding how the different certifi-
cation standards address due process rights may provide insight 
into how the CDM should evolve.
VCS
The VCS Program Guidelines acknowledge the possibility 
of disagreements between project proponents and the valida-
tors and verifiers empowered to certify their project under the 
VCS Standard.104 Contractual disputes under the VCS program 
involving verifiers, validators, and project participants are gen-
erally governed by English law and will be heard exclusively in 
English courts.105 The VCS Guidelines do provide “an appeal 
process for cases where project proponents feel that the vali-
dator or verifier [has] misinterpreted the VCS Program and all 
avenues of discussion with the validator or verifier have been 
exhausted.”106 In those instances, “[t]he VCS Association will 
commission an independent consultant to perform this review. 
The independent consultant will be selected by the VCS Sec-
retariat and paid for by the project proponent demanding the 
review.”107 Ultimately, though, the final decision rests with the 
VCS Board.108
CAR
CAR offers a means of recourse for parties adversely 
affected by its decisions that is tailored for the specifics of its 
program.109 For example, CAR explains that disputes between 
a verifier and project developer are to be handled by the veri-
fier’s internal procedures, but nonetheless offers itself as an 
informational resource to assist in the resolution process.110 
However, if the parties cannot reach resolution through private 
negotiation, then the parties can look to CAR to play the roles 
of judge, jury, and prosecuting attorney.111 Once the verification 
is complete, a committee of at least three CAR staff members 
will review the submitted paperwork and interview the verifiers 
and project developers involved before issuing a final, written 
determination.112
Likewise, disagreements with regard to CAR’s decisions 
affecting verifiers and project developers are also addressed 
in CAR’s Verification Guidelines.113 Upon written request for 
appeal, CAR will assemble a Dispute Resolution Committee 
containing “an odd number of individuals, including at least 
one Reserve staff member not directly involved in the case, one 
Reserve Board member, [and] a representative from an appro-
priate oversight agency—potentially . . . [a] regulatory or gov-
ernment agency—that is knowledgeable of Reserve policies and 
procedures.”114 The Dispute Resolution Committee will review 
all relevant paperwork and is authorized to consult outside 
experts.115 A decision is reached by majority vote and is consid-
ered final and not appealable.116
ACR
ACR, unlike its aforementioned counterparts, does not 
detail any appeal process in its Program Guidelines and although 
the framework for the program provides project developers 
opportunities to resolve issues discovered in the verification 
process, there is no express recourse in the event of a material 
disagreement or breakdown of communication.117 Instead, as 
discussed above, ACR relies primarily on domestic courts for 
dispute resolution.
GS
GS also provides an appeals process that protects constitu-
ents’ due process rights in a manner akin to traditional govern-
mental regulatory bodies. In July 2010, GS released a proposal 
for an appeals procedure to provide project developers with 
recourse against adverse decisions by GS regarding registration, 
issuance, or labeling.118 The purpose of the appeals procedure is 
to “fill the gap in remedies between the decisions from the certifi-
cation standard and the consequences for project developers.”119 
It is the first of its kind in the voluntary carbon markets.120
Although the GS appeals process is in its pilot phase, it is 
currently the most developed dispute resolution mechanism in 
the voluntary carbon markets. If successful, it can serve as an 
14winter 2011
example for other certification standards—both in the compli-
ance and voluntary markets—that do not currently afford their 
project proponents the same level of independent review.
The GS Rules for Appeals on Registration, Issuance and 
Labeling (“Arbitration Rules”), which are based on the Interna-
tional Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (“PCA”) 
“Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Envi-
ronment and/or Natural Resources,” (“Environmental Rules”), 
will govern the arbitration procedure.121 Created in 2001, the 
Environmental Rules fill a gap in international environmental 
dispute resolution by providing a forum in which governments, 
NGOs, private entities, and individuals can seek redress.122 Cer-
tain changes have been made to the Environmental Rules to 
account for the particular characteristics of GS projects and the 
GS project cycle.123
Initially, the scope of the proposed appellate procedure would 
be limited to project proponents, project applicants, and project 
owners.124 These parties would be required to submit their dis-
agreement with a GS decision to mediation within six weeks.125 
If the mediation proves unsuccessful, the parties would have the 
option to appeal the dispute to the PCA at the Peace Palace in 
The Hague, who will serve as the registrar of proceedings and will 
channel communications between or among the parties.126
In accordance with the GS Arbitration Rules, the parties will 
have the option to choose one arbitrator or a tribunal of three 
arbitrators, with opportunities to challenge the appointment 
of an arbitrator on various grounds.127 The arbitrators will be 
appointed from a list of specialized arbitrators to be created and 
maintained by a neutral appointing committee.128 Hearings may 
be held in person, or via telecommunication and parties may call 
experts to provide evidence during the hearings.129
With regard to the award, the purpose of the arbitration pro-
cedure is not to award damages or pecuniary compensation.130 
Rather, the award will determine whether the adverse decision 
was well-founded and in accordance with the relevant version 
of the GSRs.131  If it is determined that the adverse decision was 
not well-founded or it violated the relevant GSRs, the arbitra-
tion tribunal may issue an alternative decision or provide for an 
alternative action.132 
conclusIon
The right to due process is fundamental to democratic ide-
als and governance systems. As the compliance markets and, in 
particular, the CDM, evolve, they will likely seek to incorpo-
rate mechanisms to protect individual procedural rights. Those 
best positioned to play the part of role model are CAR, ACR, 
VCS, and GS, having all achieved a level of market credibility 
measured by the NSMD framework. However, the appeals pro-
cedures provided for by these four standards vary widely. The 
voluntary carbon markets, and the offset certification standards 
that operate within them, are gaining credibility and can set the 
tone for the compliance markets.
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InTroducTIon
Carbon reduction projects follow a cycle that includes conceptualization, due diligence, implementation, documentation, audit or validation, and finally certi-
fication, with the eventual issuance of verified, serialized car-
bon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets. To fulfill 
this process, there are several technical elements that must be 
addressed: monitoring or measurement, reporting, and verifica-
tion (“MRV”), permanence (i.e. ensuring the project’s duration), 
leakage (i.e. addressing negative and identifying positive offsite 
impacts), and additionality.
Additionality is a test that a carbon reduction project must 
meet to ensure the project would not have been implemented 
without the revenue of the carbon markets.1 This test of addi-
tionality must be satisfied if the project is being submitted to the 
voluntary carbon markets—for which, voluntary buyers want to 
be ensured their donations actually matter for a project—or to 
the compliance markets since buyers need to be confident that 
regulators will accept their carbon reduction purchase.
It is important to further note that all of the most prominent 
carbon reduction certification standards—again, whether a com-
pliance market under the Kyoto Protocol or an internationally 
recognized voluntary standard—require some type of addition-
ality test. This includes, but is not limited to, the following cer-
tification standards: the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”),2 
Center for Resource Solutions (“CRS”),3 Green-e Climate 
Protocol for Renewable Energy,4 Chicago Climate Exchange 
(“CCX”),5 Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”),6 Climate 
Action Reserve (“CAR”),7 Climate, Community and Biodiver-
sity Standard (“CCBS”),8 Gold Standard,9 Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),10 and the Verified Carbon Standard 
(“VCS”).11
Additionality is an important requirement because if non-
additional (i.e. “business-as-usual”) projects are eligible for car-
bon finance, then the net amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
will continue to increase and the environmental integrity of car-
bon reduction projects will be called into question. For example, 
if a project was already far exceeding its industry average return 
on investment and was implemented over fifty years ago when 
no carbon markets existed, why should this particular project 
also be eligible for additional revenue from the carbon markets? 
Similarly, if an activity was legally required, then why should 
this activity of a regulated entity also be eligible for additional 
revenue from the carbon markets? The challenge with addition-
ality, however, is that one must prove a counterfactual argument 
(i.e. what would have otherwise happened in the absence of a 
project) to ensure the project provides carbon reductions that 
would not have otherwise occurred. This article explores the dif-
ferent concepts of additionality, while acknowledging its con-
troversial elements and proposing inclusion of some important 
considerations to ensure net emissions reductions.
leGal or reGulaTory addITIonalITy
Legal additionality, or what is sometimes referred to as 
regulatory additionality or surplus, is perhaps the most objec-
tive type of additionality. If a law exists and a given activity 
is regulated, then the project is most likely not eligible for car-
bon finance. Therefore, for a project to meet the legal addition-
ality standard, it must provide carbon reductions beyond those 
required by law.12
To put this in context, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) regulates large municipal solid waste (“MSW”) 
landfills, and according to the Climate Action Reserve’s Landfill 
Project Protocol Version 3.0, “[t]here are several EPA regula-
tions for MSW landfills that have a bearing on the eligibility of 
methane collection and destruction projects as voluntary GHG 
reduction projects.”13
Two challenges with legal additionality are that on one 
hand, the concept might create perverse incentives, and on 
the other hand, sometimes following the law is not common 
practice. With the first idea in mind, the Montreal Protocol is 
an international treaty designed to phase out the production of 
ozone depleting substances (“ODS”).14 While the United States, 
Canada, and European nations have phased out the production 
of hydrofluorocarbons (“HFC”), which are ODSs and green-
house gases, the largest contributor of certified emission reduc-
tions (“CER”) under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism are from HFC projects in China and India.15 Since 
legal additionality would rule out the eligibility of HFC proj-
ects hosted in China and India if these countries were to pass 
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domestic laws eliminating the production of HFCs, they have 
little incentive to begin regulating HFCs. If they did pass regu-
lations, China and India would experience a reduction of for-
eign investment towards the purchase of these carbon reduction 
credits and would need to use their own public funds to phase 
out HFCs. Due to the perception that manufacturers are actually 
producing excess HFCs, the European Union Emission Trad-
ing Scheme will no longer accept these HFC reduction credits 
beginning in 2013.16 Another example of this legal additional-
ity challenge is the tough predicament a government might face 
when contemplating the passage of a strict feed-in tariff or an 
aggressive renewable portfolio standard. Such a passage would 
effectively legally require an increase in renewable energy pro-
duction, however, there would be fewer carbon reduction credits 
from these renewable energy sources eligible for purchase from 
international buyers.
On the second challenge of additionality, there are legal 
reserve requirements on private property in Brazil. Depending 
on the region (e.g. Amazon Region versus Cerrado Region), a 
landowner is restricted from using twenty to eighty percent of 
his or her land.17 However, it is a somewhat common practice—
particularly in the remote Amazon—to illegally clear forests 
from the legal reserve.18 Now, if such practices are deemed to be 
common, should legal additionality still apply and thus prevent 
the reforestation of this fallow land using carbon finance?
Corruption also presents challenges for ensuring the legal 
additionality of a project. There are currently carbon reduc-
tion projects either certified or under development in Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Kenya, and Venezuela.19 Yet, Trans-
parency International’s Global Corruption Report 2009 rates 
Ethiopia as the 126th most corrupt country out of 180 countries, 
Nicaragua as the 134th, the Philippines as the 141st, Kenya as 
the 147th, and Venezuela as the 158th.20 Where projects provide 
much needed financing in developing countries with already 
corrupt infrastructures, there may be a disincentive to upgrade 
or improve legal frameworks that could reduce the number of 
carbon reduction projects.
The evolving regional compliance carbon markets of the 
U.S.—which are the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the Mid-
western Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (“Accord”)—have 
Canadian Provinces and Mexican States as either participants 
or observers.21 As these regional programs transform, it will be 
interesting to see how state or national laws, and thus legal addi-
tionality, will be applied.
common pracTIce or TechnoloGIcal 
addITIonalITy
Common practice additionality, which could incorporate 
either the technological or market penetration of a given project 
type based on its geography, is another objective additionality 
test. The aspect of geography is important because what is prev-
alent in one location—for example, wind turbines in Texas or 
solar photovoltaic systems in California—might not be so preva-
lent in other locations (i.e. such as New Hampshire or Alaska). 
According to the American Carbon Registry’s standard, com-
mon practice is determined by whether there is “widespread 
deployment of the project . . . within the relevant geographic 
area.”22 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard defines it as one 
which is “not common practice in the sector/region, compared 
with projects that have received no carbon finance.” 23
Yet, how does one define common practice and what spe-
cifically would be the particular geographic focus (i.e. a coun-
try, state, local electric grid)? Perhaps one of most controversial 
examples surrounding common practice was the Chicago Cli-
mate Exchange’s acceptance of soil conservation carbon reduc-
tion projects (i.e. also known as no-till), which were previously 
enrolled in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation 
Reserve Program.24 Under this program, farmers were rewarded 
by the purchase of their carbon reduction credits for activities 
that they were already undertaking without revenue from the 
carbon markets.25 If a regulated industry is allowed to emit 
greenhouse gas emissions because they are supporting non-addi-
tional carbon offset projects, then the environmental integrity of 
the system should be called into question because the net green-
house gas emissions will continue to increase. Climate Action 
Reserve (“Reserve”) aptly points out that there are many dif-
ficulties in actually defining the common practice of a region. 26
According to Derek Six, the Portfolio Manager for Environ-
mental Credit Corporation, the best assessment of additionality 
would be the use of a market penetration approach.27 Such an 
approach, which is similar to common practice, would incor-
porate knowledge and technology barriers to implementation, 
along with financial aspects of additionality.28 For example, 
agricultural methane destruction or agricultural methane gas-to-
energy projects are only installed on about 0.5% of U.S. farms.29 
Thus under a market penetration approach, all agricultural meth-
ane destruction and agricultural methane gas-to-energy proj-
ects would be eligible for carbon finance whether or not there 
were projects clustered in a specific region (e.g. California) or 
whether a particular project had a slightly higher financial return 
(i.e. financial additionality).
FInancIal addITIonalITy
Many carbon market participants are averse to the concept 
of financial additionality, which is much more subjective than 
legal additionality or common practice. Likewise, financial 
additionality is difficult to determine due to matters of confiden-
tiality, proprietary internal business decisions, and the potential 
use of arbitrary metrics. The Clean Development Mechanism, 
which refers to financial additionality as the investment analy-
sis, considers whether the project would have been financially 
attractive without the revenue from carbon reduction credits.30
The Verified Carbon Standard considers financial addition-
ality, which it defines as an investment barrier and a subset of 
implementation barriers.31 The American Carbon Registry also 
considers financial additionality a subset of implementation bar-
riers and asks whether funding from carbon reduction credits 
will incentivize the project’s implementation.32
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Confidential and proprietary internal business matters that 
make financial additionality a subjective and difficult assess-
ment include, but are not limited to:
•	 Capital	 budgeting	 decisions	 (i.e.	which	 projects	will	 get	
funded and why?)




•	 Required	 internal	 rate	of	 return	(“IRR”),	 return	on	assets	
(“ROA”), return on equity (“ROE”), and/or payback 
period (i.e. which metric does a firm use and what is the 
requirement?)
While the Clean Development Mechanism has an extensive 
discussion on appropriate metrics for financial additionality 
(i.e. discount rates and benchmarks), arbitrary metrics such as 
the following could be used as justification for allowing or not 
allowing a project to count as eligible for carbon finance:
•	 Companies	of	the	same	size	(e.g.	in	terms	of	money	and/or	
employees)




This said, how do you compare a small, specialized renewable 
energy company to a large, diversified provider? Similarly, do 
start-ups differ from “well-established” companies enough 
to present a challenge when comparing financial additionality 
thresholds? Also, how does the ownership structure (i.e. non-
profit, limited liability corporation, type C corporation, public-
owned entity, joint-ownership) impact financial decisions and 
thus, financial additionality?
Applying financial additionality across a broad spectrum 
of project types is another significant challenge, posing many 
serious questions. Likewise, why should carbon markets reward 
projects that demonstrate the poorest financials? If two different 
projects existed and with one thousand dollars, one could reduce 
one thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide and the other could 
reduce one hundred metric tons, why should the one hundred 
metric tons project be considered more financially additional? 
On the other hand, why reward projects that already have “supe-
rior” returns and that existed before the formation of carbon 
markets (i.e. a question which relates to voluntary buyers want-
ing their donations to matter)?
Financial additionality should be phased out of future certi-
fication standards and new revisions of current certification stan-
dards, a position supported by Green-e Climate.33
projecT-by-projecT addITIonalITy
Under the project-by-project test for additionality, each proj-
ect individually undergoes a series of additionality tests accord-
ing to the given standard. Two main standards, which apply a 
project-by-project additionality test, are the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism and the Verified Carbon Standard. The Clean 
Development Mechanism is the carbon reduction standard for 
Certified Emission Reductions (“CER”) for the Kyoto Proto-
col’s international compliance market.34 In contrast, the Verified 
Carbon Standard is the leading voluntary carbon markets stan-
dard, in terms of market share, and has adopted methodologies 
from the CDM.35
Essentially, project proponents—whether referring to inves-
tors, project developers, landowners or buyers—need to assess 
whether each and every individual project meets the additional-
ity tests. Such a process can be expensive, time-consuming (i.e. 
reduces scalability and time-to-market), and difficult for both the 
general public and local communities to grasp. Furthermore, it is 
difficult for auditors to determine an individual project’s subjec-
tive assertions, especially with regard to financial additionality.
perFormance or secToral addITIonalITy
Many current and evolving certification standards—includ-
ing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Cli-
mate Initiative, and the Climate Action Reserve—are adopting 
performance or sectoral approaches to additionality. Essentially, 
such performance or sectoral approaches use a uniform addition-
ality test or benchmark, which could be based on an industry or 
geographic region. It is important to note, the same additionality 
criteria—such as legal, common practice/technology, and finan-
cial—can be applied to a performance or sectoral approach, the 
main difference is that such criteria are not uniquely applied to 
each single project. Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”) offset projects may not be government ordered 
projects, may not receive incentives from RGGI auction pro-
ceeds, and must meet certain requirements to qualify.36
Recent discussions of the WCI indicate that it will attempt 
to set a standardized baseline for offset protocols that reflect 
the strictest regulatory and legal requirements.37 The Climate 
Action Reserve uses standardized performance based tests for 
additionality because they are administratively easier to imple-
ment and less subjective.38
For the level of scalability required to address global cli-
mate change, there needs to be a near-full transition to sectoral 
or performance benchmarks for additionality. To this end, one 
of the decisions made at the sixteenth session of the Conference 
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, was for the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism to work towards standardized baselines and 
additionality tests.39 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard 
has convened a steering committee, which is developing “VCS 
requirements and guidance on performance benchmark and 
technology test approaches to baselines/additionality.”40
conclusIon
Carbon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets, are 
an effective cost-containment mechanism and have the potential 
to produce greenhouse gas reductions alongside a host of co-
benefits (e.g. local jobs, technology transfer, reforesting critical 
wildlife habitat). However, the general public, regulators, and 
environmentalists do not want to hear, “well we were already 
doing the project and we are doing nothing different, but now 
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we are getting revenue from the carbon markets.” To ensure 
overall reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, additionality is 
a useful technical tool to ensure the integrity of carbon reduction 
projects, but certification standards should be less concerned 
about financial additionality and more focused on transitioning 
to sectoral or performance approaches.
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InTroducTIon
Climate change is a private property problem. Some may react strongly to such a bold claim—after all, private property is seen as a solution to the crisis, as 
illustrated by the current fascination with the “commodifica-
tion”1 and “propertization”2 of carbon through “cap-and-trade”3 
schemes.4 Notwithstanding the current fashionability of legisla-
tive responses to climate change, in the last year governments 
seem to be backing away from taking bold action.
In late 2009, the United Nations climate talks in Copenha-
gen failed to produce a successor agreement to the Kyoto Proto-
col5—participants opted instead for a weak political agreement.6 
Throughout 2010, this compounded the inability of national gov-
ernments, especially those of the major developed nations such 
as the United States7 and Australia,8 to mitigate greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions through “cap-and-trade” legislation aimed 
at permitting the purchase and sale of rights to emit GHG.9 Gov-
ernments let their initiatives lapse.10 Some more cynical might 
say the failure of Copenhagen galvanized the resolve of such 
governments to oppose mitigating legislation of any kind.11 
Finally, at the end of 2010, the Cancún UN climate talks, rather 
than focusing on mitigation through binding political agreement, 
issued a set of agreements, a major portion of which aims at 
adaptation to the changes wrought by the un-mitigated emission 
of GHG.12
As matters currently stand, as of January 1, 2013, the day 
Kyoto expires, the world will have no binding limits on GHG.13 
For many,14 this fact causes real alarm. And it ought to, for this 
governmental failure stands as a depressing indictment of the 
effects on people of anthropogenic climate change. Bjørn Lom-
borg, the self-proclaimed “skeptical environmentalist,”15 puts it 
this way:
The risks of unchecked global warming are now widely 
acknowledged: a rise in sea levels threatening the exis-
tence of some low-lying coastal communities; pres-
sure on freshwater resources, making food production 
more difficult in some countries and possibly becom-
ing a source of societal conflict; changing weather pat-
terns providing favorable conditions for the spread of 
malaria. To make matters worse, the effects will be felt 
most in those parts of the world which are home to the 
poorest people who are least able to protect themselves 
and who bear the least responsibility for the build-up 
of greenhouse gases . . . . Concern has been great, but 
humanity has so far done very little that will actually 
prevent these outcomes. Carbon emissions have kept 
increasing, despite repeated promises of cuts.16
Another way of looking at humanity’s inaction may simply 
be the recognition, by governments if not yet by humanity as 
a whole, that what is necessary is nothing short of wholesale 
change to the dominant concept of private property. This brief 
essay aims to explain why private property, touted as recently as 
last year as the saviour to the challenge posed by climate change, 
may in fact be the source of the problem and why we need to 
take individual, personal action rather than wait for governments 
to act for us.
whaT prIvaTe properTy Is
We begin with liberal theory, from which the dominant 
contemporary concept of private property emerges.17 Liberal-
ism concerns itself with the establishment and maintenance of 
a political and legal order which, among other things, secures 
individual freedom in choosing a “life project”—the values and 
ends of a preferred way of life.18 In order for life to have mean-
ing, some control over the use of goods and resources is nec-
essary; private property is liberalism’s means of ensuring that 
individuals enjoy choice over goods and resources so as to allow 
them to fulfill their life project.19
In simple terms, the liberal conception of private property is 
a “bundle” of legal relations (or rights) created, conferred, and 
enforced by the state (through law) between people in relation 
to the control of goods and resources.20 At a minimum, these 
rights typically include use, exclusivity, and disposition.21 One 
can use one’s car (or, with few exceptions, any other tangible or 
intangible good, resource, or item of social wealth), for exam-
ple, to the exclusion of all others, and may dispose of it. The 
holder may exercise these rights in any way to satisfy personal 
preferences and desires.22 Alternatively, crafting this in a way 
that comports with the language of liberal theory—rights are the 
shorthand way of saying that individuals enjoy choice about the 
control and use of goods and resources in accordance with and 
to give meaning to a chosen life project.
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Notice, though, that in this definition, such rights exist only 
as a product of relationship between individuals. This is signifi-
cant, for it focuses our attention on the fact that where there is a 
right (choice) to do something, there is a corresponding duty (a 
lack of choice) to refrain from interfering with the interest pro-
tected by the right.23 Rights would clearly be meaningless if this 
were not so. As concerns a particular good or resource, then, the 
liberal individual holds choice, while all others (the community, 
society) are burdened with a lack of it. C. Edwin Baker sum-
marizes the idea of rights and relationship this way: “[private] 
property [i]s a claim that other people ought to accede to the 
will of the owner, which can be a person, a group, or some other 
entity. A specific property right amounts to the decisionmaking 
authority of the holder of that right.”24
Private property, then, is not merely about the control and 
use of goods and resources, but also significantly about control-
ling the lives of others.25 Using evocative and graphic language, 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger puts it this way:
[t]he right [choice] is a loaded gun that the rightholder 
[the holder of choice] may shoot at will in his corner 
of town. Outside that corner the other licensed gunmen 
may shoot him down. But the give-and-take of com-
munal life and its characteristic concern for the actual 
effect of any decision upon the other person are incom-
patible with this view of right . . . .26
Identifying the importance of relationship reveals the fact 
that private property and non-property rights overlap; choices 
made by those with the former have the potential to create nega-
tive outcomes—consequences, or what economists call “exter-
nalities”—for those with the latter.27 At the highest level of 
generality, Unger’s “gunman” is vested with absolute discretion 
to “an absolute claim to a divisible portion of social capital[]” 
and that “[i]n this zone the rightholder [can] avoid any tangle 
of claims to mutual responsibility.”28 The individual revels in 
“a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others, whether 
private citizens or governmental officials, may not invade.”29
Every legal system acknowledges this problem and, in doing 
so, seems to accept that with rights come obligations towards 
others.30 The state, through law, creates private property, just 
as through that same law (what is more commonly known as 
regulation), it is said to mediate the socially contingent bound-
ary between private property and non-property holders. This is, 
in fact, the essence of private property—state conferral of self-
serving rights that come with obligations towards others.31
Yet there is something much more disturbing lurking just 
below the surface of what appears to be state control aimed 
at preventing harmful outcomes like those of climate change. 
What is really being conferred by private property is what Dun-
can Kennedy calls the legal ground rules giving “permissions to 
injure” others, to cause legalised injury.32 This is insidious, for 
“we don’t think of [them] as ground rules at all, by contrast with 
ground rules of prohibition. This is Wesley Hohfeld’s insight: 
the legal order permits as well as prohibits, in the simple-minded 
sense that it could prohibit, but judges and legislators reject 
demands from those injured that the injurers be restrained.”33 
And they are invisible, in the sense, that
when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have noth-
ing to do with the outcome. But when one thinks that 
many other forms of injury are prohibited, it becomes 
clear that inaction is a policy, and that law is respon-
sible for the outcome, at least in the abstract sense that 
the law could have made it otherwise . . . . It is clear 
that lawmakers could require almost anything. When 
they require nothing, it looks as though the law is unin-
volved in the situation, though the legal decision not to 
impose a duty is in another sense the cause of the out-
come when one person is allowed to ignore another’s 
plight.34
This brings us full circle to the broader liberal theory with 
which we began, for the importance of relationship in under-
standing private property reveals an important, yet paradoxical, 
dimension of choice. It is simply this: the freedom that liberal-
ism secures to the individual to choose a life project means that 
in the course of doing that, the individual also chooses the laws, 
relationships, communities, and so forth that constitute the polit-
ical and legal order. In other words, in the province of politics 
people choose their contexts (through electing representatives, 
who enact laws and appoint judges who interpret those laws), 
which in turn defines the scope of one’s rights—choice, deci-
sionmaking authority—and the institutions that confer, protect 
and enforce it (bearing in mind the ground rules of permission 
as well as the ground rules of prohibition). Individuals as much 
choose the regulation of property as they do the control and use 
of goods and resources.35
how prIvaTe properTy FacIlITaTes The 
exTernalITIes oF clImaTe chanGe
When we focus on relationship as central to private prop-
erty and the political-regulatory contexts we choose, we begin to 
see something else that was always there, although it was hidden 
from our view. The externalities of private property create many 
other types of relationship in which the lives of many are con-
trolled by the choices of a few.36 Anthropogenic climate change 
is a stark example.
While the science is complex, it is clear enough that humans, 
through their choices, produce the GHG that enhance the natu-
ral greenhouse effect, which heats the earth’s surface.37 Among 
other effects, anthropogenic climate change results in drought 
and desertification, increased extreme weather events, and the 
melting of polar ice (especially in the north) and so rising seas 
levels.38 We might call this the “climate change relationship.” 
Private property, as a concept, facilitates choice (both human 
and corporate) about the use of goods and resources in such a 
way that emits greenhouse gases.39
Our choices about goods and resources cover the gamut of 
our chosen life projects: where we live, what we do there, how 
we travel from place to place and so forth. Corporate choices are 
equally important, for they structure the range of choice avail-
able to individuals in setting their own agendas, thus giving 
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corporations the power to broaden or restrict the meaning of pri-
vate property in the hands of individuals.40 Green energy (solar 
or wind power), for instance, remains unavailable to the indi-
vidual consumer if no corporate energy provider is willing to 
produce it.41
Externalities do not end at the borders, physical or legal, 
of a good or resource; choices occur within a web of relation-
ships, not only legal and social, but also physical and spatial. 
Who is affected? Everyone, the world over, is affected, with the 
poor and disadvantaged of the developing world disproportion-
ately bearing the brunt of the human consequences of climate 
change42—decreasing security, shortages of food, increased 
health problems, and greater stress on available water supplies. 
Indeed, as Jedediah Purdy argues,
[c]limate change threatens to become, fairly literally, 
the externality that ate the world. The last two hundred 
years of economic growth have been not just a prefer-
ence-satisfaction machine but an externality machine, 
churning out greenhouse gases that cost polluters noth-
ing and disperse through the atmosphere to affect the 
whole globe.43
Consider human security. It will decrease both within coun-
tries affected directly by climate change, and in those countries 
indirectly affected through the movement of large numbers of 
people displaced by the direct effects of climate change in their 
own countries.44 In the case of rising sea levels, for instance, 
sixty percent of the human population lives within one hun-
dred kilometers of the ocean, with the majority in small- and 
medium-sized settlements on land no more than five meters 
above sea level.45 Even the modest sea level rises predicted for 
these places will result in a massive displacement of “climate” 
or “environmental refugees.”46 Private property, by secur-
ing choice about the use of goods and resources to those in the 
developed world, makes all of this possible.
conclusIon: Is IT The soluTIon?
Nonetheless, private property and the commodification 
upon which it depends seem to be in vogue at the moment as a 
solution to anthropogenic climate change. Creating a proprietary 
interest in carbon that can be bought and sold is the answer—is 
the political choice, it is claimed and we believe—to the climate 
crisis. Is it really? We could just as easily say that the concept 
of private property is the primary culprit. Is it wise to entrust 
the solution to the concept that put us here? Or might it be more 
appropriate, as Mike Hulme suggests, to “see how we can use 
the idea of climate change—the matrix of ecological functions, 
power relationships, cultural discourses and material flows 
that climate change reveals—to rethink how we take forward 
our political, social, economic, and personal projects over the 
decades to come.”47
Before we pin our hopes on it as a cure-all, we might ask 
first whether the liberal concept of private property is ripe for 
just such a reappraisal. We can choose, but we must do so with 
our eyes open to the reality: that private property and the con-
texts in which we live are in fact our choice, not that of gov-
ernments. We can no longer wait for government to act, with 
cap-and-trade schemes or any other form of regulation. At the 
very least, it is not enough, and at worst, it will take too long. 
Now is the time to act. And only we can take action. In exercis-
ing choice about our context and about goods and resources, we 
must take responsibility for ourselves, rather than waiting for 
our governments to act for us.48
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InTroducTIon
The concept of “Blue Carbon,” or atmospheric carbon captured by coastal ecosystems, has recently been the focus of reports by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (“UNEP”) and the International Union for the Con-
servation of Nature (“IUCN”).1 The international community is 
increasingly interested in exploring the potential of conserving 
coastal ecosystems for their role in climate change mitigation, 
reflected in the Manado Oceans Declaration signed by countries 
in 2009 which recognizes that “healthy and productive coastal 
ecosystems, already increasingly stressed by land-based and 
sea-based sources of pollution, coastal development, and habitat 
destruction, have a growing role in mitigating the effects of cli-
mate change on coastal communities and economies in the near 
term”2 and “invite[s] the scientific community/institutions to 
continue developing reliable scientific information on the roles 
of coastal wetlands, mangrove, algae, seagrass, and coral reef 
ecosystems in reducing the effects of climate change.”3
blue carbon In The clImaTe conTexT
The 2009 UNEP “Blue Carbon” report noted that fifty-five 
percent of atmospheric carbon captured by living organisms 
is captured by marine organisms and between fifty to seventy-
one percent of that is captured by ocean vegetated habitats (e.g. 
mangroves, salt marshes, seagrasses, seaweed), which account 
for less than 0.5% of the seabed.4 The report states that coastal 
vegetated habitats sequester between 114 and 328 teragrams 
(“Tg”) of carbon per year, or 1.6 to 4.6% of total anthropo-
genic emissions (7,200 Tg per year).5 Furthermore, the report 
found that between two and seven percent of these marine and 
coastal ecosystems are lost annually6—one of the highest rates 
of loss amongst all ecosystems.7 Because of their high carbon 
sequestration potential, there is a growing interest in exploring 
the potential of including Blue Carbon in existing and emerg-
ing climate change frameworks.8 However, considerable uncer-
tainty surrounds these estimates and the level of understanding 
of carbon storage in coastal ecosystems.
Several opportunities for Blue Carbon exist within the 
United Nations Climate Change Framework (“UNFCCC”). The 
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty with a goal of 
the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmo-
sphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic9 
interference with the climate system.”10 The UNFCCC includes 
coastal and marine ecosystems in Article 4(d), which states that 
all parties shall “promote sustainable management, and pro-
mote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as 
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all GHG not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol, including . . . oceans as well as other 
. . . coastal and marine ecosystems.”11 However, the current 
UNFCCC processes does not include adequate measures for 
protection and restoration of Blue Carbon ecosystems as a cli-
mate change mitigation strategy, and this represents a missed 
opportunity in our global portfolio of options for combating cli-
mate change.
Countries that have signed the UNFCCC are obligated to 
submit annual National Inventory Submissions (“NIS”); these 
inventory submissions record the country’s greenhouse gas 
emissions from anthropogenic activity, as well as sequestration 
from land use and forestry, based on guidance from the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).12 Within 
the NIS, there is a section on Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (“LULUCF”) that accounts for the carbon budget (i.e. 
emissions and reductions) due to the management of terrestrial 
ecosystems including forests, peatlands, grasslands, and agricul-
tural wetlands.13 In this section, only the carbon sequestered or 
emitted due to direct human management of ecosystems can be 
included.14 However, unmanaged ecosystems are not accounted 
for.15 Blue Carbon ecosystems—whether managed or not—
are not accounted for under LULUCF and thus, not included 
in the UNFCCC.16 The IPCC should amend their guidance on 
LULUCF in order to include Blue Carbon ecosystems under 
LULUCF and UNFCCC processes. Moreover, management of 
coastal and wetland ecosystems should be defined as an activ-
ity under LULUCF. The IPCC operates based on peer-reviewed 
science and therefore, the current scientific gaps in knowledge 
regarding carbon fluxes,17 need to first be addressed in the peer-
reviewed literature. In order for Blue Carbon ecosystems to be 
included in the wider UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol processes, 
an important step would be to have Blue Carbon ecosystems 
fully embedded and accounted for in the LULUCF process.
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exIsTInG InTernaTIonal clImaTe chanGe 
mITIGaTIon Frameworks
Although the UNFCCC is legally non-binding, the Kyoto 
Protocol (“Protocol”) adopted in 1997 commits industrialized 
countries to reduce emissions of the greenhouse gases, carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and sulfur hexafluoride by at 
least five percent from 1990 levels.18 The Protocol includes flex-
ible mechanisms such as emissions trading and offsets for indus-
trialized countries, known as the clean development mechanism 
(“CDM”), which allows the nation to meet its emission reduc-
tions obligations by funding carbon capture in developing coun-
tries.19 Blue Carbon projects could potentially become an offset 
category for CDM projects and—although presently standard-
ized—UNFCCC-approved methodologies do not exist for estab-
lishing project baselines and monitoring results.20 UNFCCC 
criteria would have to be amended to include Blue Carbon proj-
ects under the CDM in the form of protection or rehabilitation of 
coastal ecosystems. However, as discussed above, appropriate 
methodologies would have to be developed and approved.
In addition to the CDM, under the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord, developing countries agreed to report Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (“NAMAs”) to the UNFCCC 
every two years; such mitigation actions are monitored domesti-
cally.21 NAMAs refer to a set of policies and actions countries 
undertake as part of a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, recognizing that various countries may engage in 
different actions based on equity, and in accordance with their 
respective responsibilities and capabilities.22 Presently, NAMAs 
include, for example, investments in alternative energy or in 
reducing illegal logging, but not Blue Carbon projects.23 There 
is potential to expand NAMAs to include protection and resto-
ration of Blue Carbon ecosystems, but as discussed previously, 
an international standard approved by the UNFCCC needs to be 
developed and applied to Blue Carbon.
Furthermore, the Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (“REDD”) program within the 
UNFCCC presents another opportunity for Blue Carbon eco-
system protection. This program aims to create financial incen-
tives to reduce forest destruction and degradation, thus reducing 
emissions and maintaining sequestration.24 REDD+ is a pro-
gram defined under the Cancun Agreement as including activi-
ties such as “(a) Reducing emissions from deforestation; (b) 
Reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) Conservation 
of forest carbon stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forest[s]; 
[and] (e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.”25 REDD+ car-
bon credits would allow funding from industrialized countries to 
reduce deforestation and rehabilitate degraded forests in devel-
oping countries.26 After the decision in Cancun at the Sixteenth 
Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, it is 
clear that mangroves are eligible for REDD+27 funding,28 yet 
their full potential has not yet been realized by countries. Again, 
standardized protocols for measurement, reporting, and verifica-
tion (“MRV”) and monitoring of carbon sequestration and car-
bon emissions due to habitat degradation need to be developed 
and approved by appropriate international bodies, such as the 
Voluntary Carbon Standard (“VCS”).29 Pilot projects exploring 
the feasibility of mangroves under REDD+, are currently being 
developed by non-governmental organizations and national gov-
ernments in REDD countries around the world.30
new opporTunITIes For blue carbon  
In clImaTe Frameworks
While opportunities exist, for Blue Carbon to be included in 
any of these UNFCCC frameworks certain preconditions need 
to be met. First, the science has to be robust, and adequate peer-
reviewed evidence must exist to make a compelling case for the 
IPCC or the UNFCCC to amend their guidelines. This includes 
the development of standardized and internationally approved 
methodologies for MRV of carbon sequestration and emissions 
from habitat degradation. Additionally, an adequate level of 
understanding of carbon fluxes and their response to manage-
ment in and around Blue Carbon ecosystems is necessary for 
the IPCC to include the coastal ecosystems in their Assessment 
Reports. The evidence is mounting that Blue Carbon ecosystems 
are an important part of the global carbon cycle, and that their 
destruction releases dangerous amounts of greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere.31 Secondly, Blue Carbon projects need to 
demonstrate “additionality” (the project must demonstrate that 
the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions through the protec-
tion or rehabilitation of Blue Carbon ecosystems would not have 
happened without the sale of Blue Carbon offsets),32 “minimal 
leakage” (the decrease in greenhouse gas emissions by the Blue 
Carbon project does not cause an equivalent increase in emis-
sions by another entity),33 and “permanence” (minimizing the 
risk that greenhouse gas emissions will occur after the Blue Car-
bon project has been sold as a carbon offset).34 Finally, the third 
precondition for the success of Blue Carbon projects and accep-
tance under the UNFCCC and other international climate frame-
works is a feasible economic model, which actually generates 
revenue from the Blue Carbon project. The revenue generated 
by carbon credits sold in the carbon markets must be higher than 
the cost of protecting or restoring the Blue Carbon ecosystems. 
Economic feasibility studies need to be undertaken which exam-
ine the total revenue from carbon sequestered (including carbon 
fluxes), the total value of ecosystem services associated with 
Blue Carbon ecosystems, the total direct costs of protection or 
rehabilitation of Blue Carbon ecosystems, and the total opportu-
nity costs associated with the project (e.g. loss of revenue from 
lost coastal development opportunities).
conclusIon
The fact that Blue Carbon ecosystems such as mangroves, 
sea grass, salt marsh, and seaweed are currently largely over-
looked by the UNFCCC, CDM, and other international climate 
frameworks represents a missed opportunity in our global port-
folio for mitigating climate change through ecosystem man-
agement. The UNFCCC does provide appropriate frameworks 
and opportunities to include Blue Carbon in the global climate 
change debate, and a growing community of UN agencies, non-
governmental organizations, research institutions, civil society 
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groups, and national governments are forwarding the agenda 
for this change to occur. Crucial steps include the develop-
ment and standardization of MRV protocols in order to monitor 
the success of pilot Blue Carbon projects, as well as the con-
tinued amassing of evidence and understanding of the role of 
Blue Carbon ecosystems in the global carbon cycle, including 
the effects of anthropogenic management on their greenhouse 
gas sequestration or emissions. This peer-reviewed evidence 
should be presented to the IPCC and be used to drive changes 
in guidelines so that Blue Carbon ecosystems are included in the 
NIS and LULUCF processes and thus, into the wider UNFCCC 
framework. The potential of Blue Carbon is clear; it is now a 
matter of expediting this process in international frameworks 
before we lose even more of these precious ecosystems.
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InTroducTIon
“What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.”1 Although uttered in Oscar Wilde’s 1892 com-
edy, Lady Windermere’s Fan, its reference could not have been 
more foreboding.2 Wilde’s comedy foreshadowed what was to 
come as the classical economics of the 18th and 19th century3 
evolved into neoclassical economics in the 20th century,4 and 
finally into mainstream economics5 built on the theory, and now 
the practice, of free market economies.6
Unfortunately, over the years, free market economies have 
long since forgotten Wilde’s definition of a “cynic” even though 
remembrance of it today is paramount for environmentalists 
as they try to mitigate climate change. Today, humans have 
embarked on what may be the last frontier of mainstream eco-
nomics, the monetization of what was once thought incalculable, 
Earth’s ecosystems,7 some of which remain largely unscathed 
by mainstream economies.
Payment for ecosystem services (“PES”)8 is a type of 
mainstream economic recognition of benefits provided by land. 
However, this rebirth of economic land recognition is not a rein-
carnation of Adam Smith’s economics that consisted of labor, 
land, and capital.9 Instead, PES programs, such as reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation (“REDD”),10 try 
to monetize aspects of nature, including carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
sequestration with REDD projects.11
The lack of recognition of the total value of land by main-
stream economics is in large part because of the continued clas-
sification of land as a subcategory of capital, which results in 
undervaluation of the land.12 This undervaluation of land is an 
externality of mainstream economics that discounts the ecosys-
tem services provided by the natural environment.13 Mitigation of 
these externalities can occur when there is actual recognition of 
the ecosystem services.14 Although mainstream economies advo-
cate that REDD programs will help “save” the planet from climate 
change,15 current REDD programs fail to internalize many of the 
ecosystem services provided by forests, thus perpetuating the 
undervaluation of land recognition in mainstream economics.16
This article argues that the current design of REDD is a 
myopic Partial PES at best.17 Forest ecosystems provide numer-
ous services beyond the sequestration of CO2, such as pro-
tecting upstream watersheds,18 conserving biodiversity19 and 
gene pools,20 soil formation,21 nutrient recycling,22 and plant 
pollination.23 Thus REDD programs should recognize and 
include these and other ecosystem services.24 After reviewing 
REDD in the international context and the accounting scheme, 
recommendations and concerns are provided for why the expan-
sion of REDD to include other ecosystems and services would 
result in not only a greater CO2 reduction, but also other impor-
tant environmental benefits.25 The article concludes by recog-
nizing that REDD’s accounting loopholes, by focusing solely on 
CO2 reduction without recognition of the ensuing impact from 
that reduction, will impose negative externalities on other eco-
system services, and that REDD needs to transition to a program 
that internalizes these externalities.26
payInG For ecosysTem servIces
payment foR ecoSyStem SeRviceS GeneRally
The Earth’s ecosystem provides benefits, sometimes 
referred to as “services,” for all organisms on the planet.27 These 
ecosystem services may or may not be directly recognized by 
mainstream economics.28 PES is a financial valuation of Earth’s 
ecosystem services.29 The primary purpose of a PES program 
is to maintain a specific ecosystem “service,” such as clean 
water,30 carbon sequestration,31 or biodiversity habitat,32 for 
some type of economic value.33 However, the transfer of money 
to maintain the ecosystem service is not the defining factor of a 
PES program.34 Rather, it is the fact that the “payment causes 
the benefit to occur where it would not have otherwise.”35 By 
having the service be “additional,” a value for the service can be 
determined, thus creating a PES program.36
ReDucinG emiSSionS fRom DefoReStation anD foReSt 
DeGRaDation iS an example of a payment foR 
ecoSyStem SeRviceS pRoGRam
As mentioned above, carbon sequestration is one of the eco-
system services provided by forests. The net forest loss between 
1990 and 2000 was 13.1 million hectares (“ha”) per year and 
12.9 million ha between 2000 and 2005,37 the equivalent of the 
land area of Greece38 or New York39 every year, and according 
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), 
emissions from deforestation during the 1990s were estimated 
at 5.8 gigatonnes (“Gt”) of CO2 per year.
40 With emissions 
iS ReDD accountinG myopic?: 
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beyonD co2 SequeStRation
by Paulo A. Lopes*
* Paulo A. Lopes is a J.D./M.P.P. Candidate, 2011, at American University, 
Washington College of Law and School of Public Affairs.
winter 2011 26
from deforestation and forest degradation accounting for nearly 
twenty percent of total greenhouse gas emissions,41 there is a 
need to reduce emissions from forests.
Over the years, varying countries have undertaken numer-
ous schemes, and institutions have proposed ways to reduce 
emissions from deforestation.42 Some programs, listed in order 
from narrowest to broadest include: reducing emissions from 
deforestation (“RED”); reducing emissions from deforestation 
and degradation (“REDD”); and reducing emissions from defor-
estation, degradation, and the enhancement of carbon stocks (the 
“+” in “REDD+”) by means of carbon sequestration.43 These 
schemes—coupled with needed financing—should result in 
reducing emissions from deforestation.44
redd wIThIn The InTernaTIonal clImaTe conTexT
In 1997, the third Conference of the Parties (“COP-3”) of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC” or “Convention”) adopted the Kyoto Protocol.45 
Article 3(3) of the Kyoto Protocol limited Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (“LUCF”) activities to afforestation, reforestation, and 
deforestation,46 while Article 3(4) provided flexibility with the 
inclusion of other activities as determined by the first session of 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.47
Noting the conclusions found by the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (“SBSTA”) at its eighth 
session and the decision by the IPCC to prepare a report on 
Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (“LULUCF”), the 
fourth Conference of the Parties (“COP-4”) of the UNFCCC, 
began to lay the legal groundwork for the recognition and inclu-
sion of LULUCF.48 This establishment of more specific legal 
provisions for LULUCF continued with the sixth Conference of 
the Parties (“COP-6”) in 2000, with the IPCC scientific report49 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) definition 
for “forests.”50 At the 2001 seventh Conference of the Parties 
(“COP-7”), the Parties agreed upon the inclusion of additional 
activities, such as revegetation, forest management, cropland 
management, and grazing land management, which were pro-
hibited from jointly implemented activities but included in 
domestically conducted activities.51
In 2007 in Bali, Indonesia, the thirteenth Conference of the 
Parties (“COP-13”) recognized “the urgent need to take further 
meaningful action to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries.”52 The Bali Action 
Plan established a goal to complete the policy approaches and 
incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation by 2009.53 
While the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-15”), in 
2009, concluded with the nonbinding54 Copenhagen Accord, 
which “recogniz[ed] the crucial role of reducing emission[s] 
from deforestation and forest degradation,”55 the goal set by the 
Bali Action Plan was not met.56
At the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-16”), in 
2010 in Cancun, Mexico, the COP concluded by adopting numer-
ous decisions, including one that recognized the need to reduce 
emissions from forests.57 The outcome of the thirteenth ses-
sion of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action (“AWG-LCA-13”) under the Convention resulted in 
agreement by Parties for “policy approaches and positive incen-
tives on issues relating to [REDD] in developing countries; and 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.”58 
It encouraged each country, as appropriate, to undertake the fol-
lowing actions: “(a) Reduc[e] emissions from deforestation; (b) 
Reduc[e] emissions from forest degradation; (c) Conservation of 
forest carbon stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forest; [and] 
(e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.”59 Countries agreed to 
develop a national strategy or action plan60 and a “robust and 
transparent national forest monitoring system for the monitor-
ing and reporting of the activities” listed above.61 During the 
development and implementation of their national strategies or 
action plans, developing countries are asked, “to address, inter 
alia, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure 
issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and . . . 
[to] ensure the full and effective participation of relevant stake-
holders, inter alia, indigenous peoples and local communities.”62 
This agreement of the AWG-LCA-13 text at COP-16 in Cancun, 
Mexico is a step forward for the recognition and implementation 
of REDD at the international level.63
co2 emIssIons accounTInG
It is important to recognize that forestry accounting of CO2 
emissions, although maturing, is in its infancy and thus still 
imprecise.64 Accurate accounting allows for the determination 
of whether the REDD program will have added benefit,65 which 
requires that the benefit be accurately quantified and docu-
mented.66 For a carbon offset to actually result from a REDD 
program, one must review the additionality, definition of a for-
est, leakage, measurement, verification, and permanence of the 
offset.67 If a REDD program fails to meet any or all of these 
requirements, then the offset is not actually realized since for-
estry CO2 emissions were not reduced.
68 Recognition of this 
failed emission reduction offset would allow countries to emit 
more, since emissions were not offset by the REDD program 
even though they were recognized as having occurred.69
aDDitionality
Additionality refers to the quantity of emission reductions 
that result from the implementation of the REDD program 
when compared to business as usual.70 The difference between 
the reference level and the emission reductions achieved is the 
“additionality.”71 Although in theory this sounds possible, if not 
straightforward, experts still differ on approaches for determin-
ing the additionality amount since “there is no correct technique 
for determining additionality because it requires comparison of 
expected reductions against a projected business-as-usual emis-
sions baseline . . . [, which] is inherently uncertain because, it 
may not be possible to know what would have happened in the 
future had the projects not been undertaken.”72 Fundamentally, 
the test to determine additionality will always vary depending 
on the balance between reduction of administrative costs versus 
program rigor and environmental certainty.73
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DefinitionS of foReStS
Article 3(3) of the Kyoto Protocol lists LULUCF activities 
as afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation74 but does not 
provide definitions for these activities.75 In 2000, the IPCC, in 
a special report on LULUCF, recognized the importance of pro-
viding clear definitions of these activities to facilitate account-
ing for different land-use activities.76 The report also notes that 
“[f]orest definitions based on legal, administrative, or cultural 
considerations” may not be appropriate for carbon accounting 
since these definitions do not always correlate to the quantity of 
carbon stored on the site as illustrated by the following forest 
definitions.77 The ninth session of the Conference of the Parties 
(“COP-9”), in 2003 in Milan, Italy, provided the Parties with 
flexibility on a forest definition with “(a) A single minimum tree 
crown cover between 10 and 30 per cent; (b) A single minimum 
land area value between 0.05 and 1 hectare; and (c) A single 
minimum tree height value between 2 and 5 meters.”78 The 
Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”), in a 2006 work-
ing paper, also noted the issue of selecting a forest definition for 
accounting in Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) proj-
ects.79 Unlike COP-9’s three criterions, the FAO working paper 
put forward a ten-step process to aid countries in selecting the 
optimal parameters for a forest definition.80 As evident by these 
different approaches, providing flexibility in defining forests is 
necessary since ecosystems around the world vary greatly. This 
variation prohibits creation of a uniform international definition 
applicable to all countries, because it would result in winners 
and losers amongst countries.81
leakaGe
While the emphasis and requirements under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol that CDM projects be additional82 is important, the risk 
of leakage must also be recognized.83 Leakage “occurs when 
economic activity is shifted as a result of the emission control 
regulation and, as a result, emission abatement achieved in one 
location that is subject to emission control regulation . . . is offset 
by increased emissions in unregulated locations.”84 For example, 
in the context of a REDD program, leakage occurs when site A’s 
forest emissions, which are under a REDD program, are reduced 
by two tonnes of CO2, yet CO2 emissions from site B, which is 
not under a REDD program, increases CO2 emissions by two 
tonnes.85 The achieved emission reductions of site A is negated 
by the increased emissions from site B, resulting in a zero-sum 
game of emission reductions.86 COP-9 recognized leakage if the 
increase in emissions occurs outside of the project and is mea-
surable and attributable to the reduced emissions undertaken by 
the project.87
meaSuRement anD veRification
Measurement and verification of deforestation is essential 
to any REDD project with a goal of issuing emission reduction 
credits.88 However, measurement and verification of carbon 
sequestration is difficult since “rates vary by tree species, soil 
type, regional climate, topography and management practice.”89 
In the United States, carbon sequestration rates for tree species 
are better understood than soil carbon sequestration rates, which 
vary by cropping practice and soil type.90 Over time, the rate of 
carbon sequestration absorption decreases in trees and stops as 
it nears the saturation point, when no additional sequestration of 
carbon is possible.91
peRmanence
Permanence is one of the major concerns with biological 
carbon sequestration projects such as REDD,92 because it is key 
when trying to achieve overall emission reductions.93 With bio-
logical sequestration programs—unlike emission reductions that 
achieve results by reducing the release of carbon—if the seques-
tered carbon is released sometime in the future, the sequestra-
tion program is a failure.94 This concern over a potential release 
also applies to avoided deforestation, since avoided deforesta-
tion today may turn into future deforestation.95 The release 
of sequestered carbon may result from human causes, such as 
changes in land use and management, or from natural causes, 
such as a fire.96
polIcy recommendaTIons and concerns: 
expandInG beyond The myopIc conFInes oF 
redd To recoGnIze and Include oTher 
ecosysTems and servIces wIll resulT In noT 
only a GreaTer co2 reducTIon buT oTher 
ImporTanT envIronmenTal beneFITs.
otheR ecoSyStemS: expanDinG ReDD to mitiGate 
ReDD’S accountinG loopholeS
The negotiations concerning biological carbon sequestra-
tion evolved over the years from COP-3 with the Kyoto Proto-
col’s recognition of LULUCF,97 to the COP-6 debate,98 and final 
recognition by COP-7 of a more expansive program recognizing 
additional activities.99 In 2007, the Bali Action Plan of COP-13 
acknowledged the need to establish incentives to reduce emis-
sions from deforestation,100 which was reiterated in the Copen-
hagen Accord of COP-15.101 At COP-16, additional progress 
occurred with the decision to adopt the AWG-LCA-13 policy 
approaches and positive incentives on REDD.102 Although the 
progression of the need to reduce emissions from biological 
sources is evident, the unifying theme over the COPs has come 
to focus on forests, as a result of the recognition of the need to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation.103
The progression is also apparent with the IPCC account-
ing of emissions recognized by the UNFCCC.104 The IPCC 
has released numerous reports over the years on forestry and 
carbon capture: in 1996, on Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(“LUCF”), which identified major emissions from large prob-
able land use sources;105 LULUCF in 2003, which expanded 
LUCF to include all carbon pools;106 and in 2006, a report that 
transformed LULUCF into Agriculture, Forestry, and Other 
Land Use (“AFOLU”), which integrated both the agriculture 
and LULUCF sectors.107
While the IPCC accounting has evolved over the years to 
include all carbon pools from all sectors, the UNFCCC’s deci-
sions and resolutions on RED, REDD, and REDD+ all focus on 
forestry.108 Although emissions from forests are substantial and 
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the need to reduce forest emissions is necessary,109 the UNFCCC 
should evolve negotiations on REDD+ to include all of the land 
use sectors recognized under AFOLU.
Is There a Better Scheme than RED, REDD, or REDD+?
A scheme that would go beyond the confines of RED, 
REDD, and REDD+ is Reducing Emission from All Land 
Uses (“REALU”).110 By applying AFOLU accounting, some 
of the emissions recognized by REALU would include for-
estland, grassland, cropland, settlements, wetlands, and other 
lands; meanwhile this would also account for agriculture and 
other land use emissions resulting from liming, urea, manure, 
enteric fermentation, nitrous oxide, and others.111 REALU with 
AFOLU accounting would “include all land use proportionate 
to actual emissions and emission potential.”112 REALU, like 
other proposals,113 is supported by many organizations and is 
still evolving.114
One of the lingering issues pertaining to REDD is the defi-
nition of what is a forest115—or rather when does a tree become 
classified as a forest? The Kyoto Protocol and COP-9 provided 
a flexible definition based on tree crown cover, minimum land 
area per hectare, and minimum tree height,116 a 2006 work-
ing paper by the FAO provided a ten-step process for selecting 
the optimal parameters for a forest definition,117 and the IPCC 
special report on LULUCF noted the importance of clarity.118 
However, none of these definitions account for trees outside the 
forest or wetlands, which also sequester large quantities of car-
bon.119 REALU with AFOLU accounting, since it covers all sec-
tors, would recognize the tree that is not yet considered a forest 
under these other definitions, along with the vast expanses of 
wetlands.120
The definition of forests in the Kyoto Protocol also allows 
for “areas normally forming part of the forest area which are 
temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention such 
as harvesting or natural causes but which are expected to revert 
to forest” to maintain their forest classification.121 The Kyoto 
Protocol establishes no duration for “temporarily unstocked” 
forest,122 yet still regards these areas as forested.123 Thus, the 
Kyoto Protocol does not recognize the release of emissions from 
clearcutting as long as there is an intention to replant the forest 
since it is only a “temporary” release.124 Furthermore, the Kyoto 
Protocol forest definition does not account for the emissions 
from clearcutting of trees not classified as forest, regardless of 
whether there was an intention to replant the trees.125 The Kyoto 
Protocol forest definition creates this “in or out” distinction for a 
tree,126 which would not be a concern under the more expansive 
REALU with AFOLU accounting.127
Another issue created by distinguishing among trees is that 
of leakage.128 To avoid leakage, forest B’s emissions should not 
increase as a result of a REDD program decreasing forest A’s 
emissions.129 However, by only counting forests, a REDD pro-
gram that decreases forest A’s emissions may result in an emis-
sions increase from the non-forest area C of woody vegetation 
or wetlands.130 Technically, there is leakage, since the increase 
in emissions from area C negated the decrease in emissions 
from forest A.131 Yet under REDD, which only pertains to 
forests, there is no leakage.132 REALU, by applying a more 
expansive landscape accounting, AFOLU, would recognize 
the leakage coming from area C, since AFOLU encompasses 
sequestered carbon areas above and below ground, forested and 
non-forested.133
Reduction of forest emissions is necessary, as emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation account for nearly 
twenty percent of total greenhouse gas emissions.134 But it is 
also evident that the current attempts with RED, REDD, and 
REDD+ still falter in many areas because of the forest defini-
tion.135 Emissions and leakages pertaining to wetlands, agri-
culture, and other land uses are not accounted for in forestry 
schemes.136 Thus, the deficiency that stems from the definition 
of forests impacts the other accounting elements of REDD, addi-
tionality and leakage, which subsequently impacts measurement 
and verification.137
REALU with AFOLU captures all of the sectors, which is 
more effective and efficient138 while also being more equitable 
since AFOLU accounting standards would apply to all countries. 
REALU and AFOLU sectors include high forest cover and low 
rates of deforestation (“HFLD”)139 and low forest cover and low 
rates of deforestation (“LFLD”).140 A phased implementation 
of biological sequestration starting with REDD that recognizes 
indigenous peoples’ rights, as established in COP-16,141 and that 
transitions to REALU with AFOLU accounting, would prevent 
a delay in emission mitigation from the forestry sector while also 
allowing the necessary time for the development and refinement 
of REALU with AFOLU.142 A REALU scheme with AFOLU 
may not address all of the biological sequestration issues, but it 
would alleviate many of the problems with the current efforts to 
mitigate forestry emissions under REDD.143
Wetlands: An Example of Biological Carbon 
Sequestration Within REALU but Excluded by REDD 
Type Schemes
Wetlands include freshwater mineral-soil wetlands, peat-
lands, and estuarine wetlands (i.e. salt marshes) and in North 
America, they are the second largest natural carbon sink.144 
Worldwide wetlands store about 223 billion tons of carbon.145 
Although wetlands absorb about one-tenth of the amount of car-
bon as forests, wetlands absorb three times more than agricul-
tural soils.146
While one-tenth might appear to be a small amount, wet-
lands currently only comprise 5.5% of the U.S. landmass 
because land use changes, such as agriculture, have led to the 
destruction of over fifty percent of wetlands.147 In the United 
States, wetlands sequester thirty-five percent of the nation’s total 
terrestrial carbon and further loss of the wetlands would result in 
the release of sequestered carbon, increasing the carbon concen-
tration in the atmosphere.148 The North American149 estuarine 
wetland carbon sequestration is currently estimated at over ten 
million tons per year.150 Collectively, North American wetlands 
have the ability to sequester forty-nine million tons of carbon 
per year.151 It is important to recognize that although wetlands 
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only comprise 5.5% of the total landmass,152 the total seques-
tered carbon stored in wetlands is sixty-four billion tons, only 
slightly less than forests, which store sixty-seven billion tons153 
in twenty-five percent more land.154
Wetlands are a much more effective natural carbon sink 
than forests. As peatlands are drained and converted from wet-
lands to other land uses, the carbon oxidizes, which reduces the 
carbon captured in wetlands by about fifteen million tons per 
year in North America.155 The recognition of wetlands by the 
UNFCCC and payment for the service of carbon sequestration 
would help mitigate the destruction of wetlands through land use 
changes.156
otheR SeRviceS: expanDinG the caRbon centRic 
“paRtial” payment foR ecoSyStem SeRviceS to 
RecoGnize co-benefitS
In addition to storing carbon, forests provide multiple eco-
system services such as soil formation,157 water cycle storage 
and release,158 biodiversity conservation,159 and nutrient recy-
cling.160 However, forests under a REDD scheme are only rec-
ognized for one ecosystem service, carbon sequestration.161 
Although carbon sequestration is an important and neces-
sary ecosystem service provided by forests, the current REDD 
scheme can and already has led to the deterioration of other for-
est ecosystem services.162
The other ecosystem services that are not internalized by 
REDD are not only valuable but also necessary for native forests 
to survive.163 Although REDD is a PES, in its current insular 
form REDD should be viewed as a Partial PES.164 In contrast, 
the recognition of and payment for CO2 sequestration, soil for-
mation, water cycle storage and release, biodiversity conserva-
tion, and nutrient recycling could be considered a Full PES.165 
By recognizing these other economic benefits, mitigation of the 
perverse incentives induced by REDD would be mitigated.166 
The numerous ailments of the Partial PES REDD are reviewed 
below and illustrate the need for the transition to a Full PES, 
such as REALU with AFOLU accounting, to protect the forests 
and other ecosystems.167
Soil Erosion: What Role Does Flora Coverage Play?
The first ecosystem service that REDD does not recognize 
is that provided by soil in reducing or preventing erosion. Ero-
sion occurs when the energy from water or wind is transmitted 
to the soil, and it increases after a forest is deforested or tempo-
rarily unstocked.168 When raindrops hit exposed soil, such as a 
deforested area, the particles of soil and water are launched into 
the air.169 When the land is covered by biomass, such as a for-
est, it protects the land area by dissipating the wind and water 
energy, which results in reduced soil erosion.170
After erosion occurs, the quantity of water runoff on the 
area of land increases, which reduces the availability of water 
for plant vegetation to grow.171 The rate of erosion is often high 
on lands with higher gradients, with sometimes half of the soil 
within the splash eroding.172 Deforestation on higher gradient 
land is regularly used to replace spent agricultural land damaged 
by erosion.173
The eroded soil can end up in ecosystems such as streams 
and lakes.174 The shape of the Araguaia River in Brazil has 
changed, as sedimentation increased by twenty-eight percent, 
and the river became straighter and deeper.175 According to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the final destination for sixty 
percent of soil erosion is streams.176 The Huang He River in 
China, often referred to as the Yellow River because of the color 
of the silt, transports and deposits two billion tons of soil per 
year into the Gulf of Bohai.177
For a forested area to prevent soil erosion, the forest must 
cover a minimum of sixty percent of the land.178 Without the 
flora that reduces the rain and wind energy,179 soil erosion results 
in a decrease in plant nutrients, such as nitrogen, phosphorus, 
potassium, and calcium.180 Without these vital nutrients, yields 
in plant growth decrease.181 The eroded soil can contain as much 
as three times the nutrient content as the soil that remains.182 
Fertilizers and pesticides, derived from hydrocarbons, along 
with irrigation, are often used to temporarily mitigate the natural 
nutrient depletion from erosion on cropland.183 Once the appli-
cation of hydrocarbon-based fertilizers and pesticides become 
futile against the barren soil, the cropland is abandoned.184 To 
replace this wasted land, additional forests are cleared for agri-
cultural use and the cycle repeats.185
While at first glance it may appear that a REDD scheme 
would mitigate many of the above soil erosion issues, since 
people would be paid to reduce deforestation and forest degrada-
tion, if the scheme uses the term “temporarily unstocked” in the 
definition of forests as the Kyoto Protocol does, it actually facil-
itates soil erosion.186 Since the Kyoto Protocol establishes no 
duration for a “temporarily unstocked” forest, but still classifies 
it as a forest, with enough time, the extent of soil erosion may 
have degraded the soil to the point of not allowing the land to be 
“restocked” with the forest that once existed.187 Since erosion 
increases water runoff, the soil in the “temporarily unstocked” 
region will have less moisture because less water has infiltrated 
the land, resulting in a decrease in water-storage capacity of 
the soil.188 Additionally, the erosion of the soil reduces organic 
nutrients and soil depth, which are necessary to restock the for-
est.189 Restoration of the eroded soil is a slow process that can 
take between “200 and 1,000 years to form 2.5 cm (1 inch) of 
topsoil under cropland conditions, and even longer under pas-
ture and forest conditions.”190
Water Cycle: Does Variation in Root Depth Matter?
The second ecosystem service not recognized by REDD is 
the water cycle storage and release provided by the deep roots of 
forests. After a forest is removed as a result of deforestation, the 
flora that replaces the forest typically has shallower root struc-
tures and fewer leaves, which results in the new flora requir-
ing less water than the forest.191 The evaporation from the new 
flora is less than that from a forest because the new flora has 
shallower roots.192 This decrease in evaporation reduces the 
quantity of water vapor returned to the atmosphere, resulting in 
more water runoff from the land and increasing stream flow.193 
Thus the shallower roots result in less water availability and 
winter 2011 30
evapotranspiration during the dry season along with less precipi-
tation during the wet season, all of which negatively impact the 
water cycle.194
The degree of impact on the water cycle depends on not 
only how the forested land is utilized after deforestation but 
also how much of the forest remains.195 Deforestation of twenty 
percent or less will have little effect on the water cycle while 
deforestation of fifty to one hundred percent, which typically 
results from modern agricultural and heavy equipment use, can 
result in a large change in the quantity of water runoff.196 In Bra-
zil, the deforestation of about fifty percent of the Tocantins and 
Araguaia watersheds over the past fifty years has resulted in a 
twenty-five percent annual increase in river discharge.197
The decrease in evapotranspiration, because of the decrease 
in root depth,198 impacts the heat flux, resulting in a decrease 
in the cooling of the surface soil, equating to higher surface 
temperatures, especially during the dry seasons.199 The dry sea-
son is vital for reforestation efforts, but because of the impacts 
from deforestation, such as a decrease in evapotranspiration 
and an increase in surface temperature, there may be a water 
shortage.200 This decrease in evapotranspiration can result in 
extended drought periods, thus slowing the uptake of the refor-
estation efforts and possibly making the habitat more hospitable 
for drought-resistant species.201
However, there is cause for concern if the project uses a 
definition for forests that permits them to be “temporarily 
unstocked.”202 Although the removal of the forest is not classi-
fied as deforestation, because there is an intention to restock the 
forest, the deep roots from the forest are “temporarily” killed.203 
Without deep roots, the evapotranspiration will decrease and 
the water runoff will increase.204 This in turn makes reforesta-
tion efforts more difficult because the quantity of water stored 
in the soil has decreased205 and the surface temperature has 
increased.206 If schemes allow for forests to be temporarily 
unstocked they assume the replanting of the forest and that the 
restocking of the forest will negate the initial carbon release.207 
Nevertheless, this reasoning is myopic since successful restock-
ing is dependent on the root growth, and reestablishment of deep 
roots will likely be more difficult because of longer dry periods 
that are “warmer, drier and more intense.”208
Biodiversity: Does REDD’s Focus on Carbon 
Concentration Create Perverse Incentives for Other 
Ecosystems?
The third ecosystem service that REDD does not internal-
ize is biodiversity of fauna and flora that have a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the forest. Forests cover roughly seven percent 
of the Earth’s dry land, yet they may contain half of the spe-
cies on Earth.209 Some species are so particular to their forest 
microhabitats that they live nowhere else, which increases the 
chances of their extinction.210 After deforestation and loss of 
these specialized species, the surrounding fauna and flora may 
also face extinction as the biodiversity in the forest decreases 
and the habitat becomes fragmented.211 In Riau, Indonesia, the 
tiger population actually declined at a quicker rate than the rate 
of deforestation because of habitat fragmentation.212
The fauna and flora also impact the soil composition.213 
Before deforestation, the forest soil is teeming with organic mat-
ter, possibly supporting up to one thousand species of fauna per 
square meter.214 The bacteria and fungi in the soil can add an 
additional four to five thousand diverse species.215 However, 
the lack of forest cover exposes the soil to erosion, washing the 
nutrients from the deforested land and further diminishing bio-
diversity, and potentially causes the surrounding ecosystem to 
collapse.216
Although initially it would appear as though REDD would 
complement efforts to protect biodiversity, low-biomass and 
high-diversity ecosystems, such as grasslands, savannas, wood-
lands, and transition forests, may be at a disadvantage for 
protection when compared to high-biomass forests, such as 
plantations.217 This is because REDD focuses on the quantity of 
biological carbon sequestered and thus biomass that sequesters 
more carbon, i.e. high-biomass ecosystems, are more advanta-
geous for REDD projects than ecosystems that store less carbon, 
i.e. low-biomass ecosystems.218 This focus on carbon con-
centration in biomass results in a preference for high-biomass 
ecosystems even if the low-biomass ecosystem has a higher 
conservation value pertaining to biodiversity, soil, and water, 
since the focus of REDD is on biomass concentration and not 
biodiversity.219 Thus, REDD programs will be more apt to pro-
tect high-biomass ecosystems because of the higher return on 
investment, which is based on carbon concentration, than that 
of a low-biomass high-diversity ecosystem, with the latter likely 
being more prone to conversion for agricultural use.220
Forests with high-diversity native ecosystems must also 
counter the introduction of alien species that grow quickly, such 
as monocrop eucalyptus plantations.221 With REDD’s focus on 
high-biomass because of carbon credits, trees that grow quickly, 
such as eucalyptus trees, are already encouraging some REDD 
projects to introduce these alien monocrop species.222 In Brazil, 
in an effort to earn carbon credits, eucalyptus plantations, which 
are native to Australia, are replacing savannas and high-diversity 
cerrado woodland ecosystems.223 However, these eucalyptus 
plantations, since they are non-native, often require fertilizers 
and pesticides, which increases the risk of chemical contami-
nation and soil degradation.224 Additionally, the definition of 
forests under the Kyoto Protocol makes no requirement that a 
temporarily unstocked forest be restocked with species native to 
that ecosystem.225
Furthermore, genetically modifying the non-native species 
to increase the chance of survival in the foreign habitat is another 
risk since species with increased resilience may overtake the 
native species.226 These practices currently occur under REDD 
projects and is one of the perverse incentives induced by REDD 
since the accounting does not recognize a distinction between 
carbon stored in genetically modified species versus native spe-
cies.227 This deficiency in REDD is one of the reasons that orga-
nizations are proposing REALU with AFOLU accounting since 
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it does recognize the carbon sequestered in native species of the 
savannas and woodlands.228
The exclusion of ecosystems from the Kyoto Protocol 
separated biodiversity and ecosystems from carbon and climate 
change, and has resulted in the UNFCCC ignoring these syn-
ergies and placing biodiversity at risk.229 This is unfortunate 
and inward-looking by the international community because 
only five years prior to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, more commonly known as the Earth Summit, in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992230 resulted in numerous important achieve-
ments, two of which were the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (“CBD”)231 and the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”),232 the latter of which lead to the Kyoto 
Protocol.233
Some might view the link between these two documents as 
only being intrinsic, but in 2001, the CBD’s Subsidiary Body 
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice took “note 
of the discussion of the interlinkages between biological diver-
sity and climate change.”234 Two years later, the Secretariat of 
the CBD released a formal report235 and in 2008, COP-9 of the 
CBD recognized the possible use of REDD pertaining to climate 
change236 but also the need to monitor “the threats and likely 
. . . impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation activi-
ties on biodiversity.”237 In 2009, the Secretariat of the CBD 
released a second formal report and a year later at COP-10, the 
CBD recognized the need to “enhance the benefits for, and avoid 
negative impacts on, biodiversity from [REDD].”238 Moreover 
the CBD stressed the need to consider “converting only land of 
low biodiversity value or ecosystems largely composed of non-
native species, and preferably degraded ones” while also “avoid-
ing [the use of] invasive alien species.”239
Although the CBD has been proactive in recognizing the 
interlinkages between biological diversity and climate change, 
the UNFCCC is focused almost exclusively on the objective 
outlined in 1992—the adverse affect of anthropogenic climate 
change on natural ecosystems and humankind.240 At COP-16, the 
AWG-LCA under the Convention indicated that actions should be 
“consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological 
diversity” and that they should not be “used for the conversion 
of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize the protec-
tion and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem ser-
vices, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits.”241 
While the AWG-LCA document does mention biodiversity, the 
UNFCCC continues to be myopic in regards to biodiversity and 
makes no reference or granular distinction like the CBD’s docu-
ment between low- and high-biodiversity ecosystems or the risk 
of introducing alien species, such as eucalyptus trees.242
conclusIon
The accounting of REDD, which focuses on additional-
ity, definitions of forests, leakage, measurement, verification, 
and permanence, while all important facets, is not actually the 
difficult part of implementing a successful REDD program.243 
These “difficult” facets are merely illusions that hide the true 
difficulties of REDD, the loopholes that REDD accounting are 
plagued with.244 The lack of protection of other ecosystems and 
services beyond CO2 sequestration, which REDD accounting 
externalizes instead of internalizes, facilitates the market’s abil-
ity to exploit these loopholes, without regard to the externalities 
imposed on others.245
REDD accounting currently gives no regard and thus no 
value to soil formation, water cycle storage and release, or bio-
diversity conservation and nutrient recycling.246 REDD simply 
facilitates the market determination of the price of carbon stored 
at the expense of these other ecosystems and services provided 
by nature.247 Adam Smith’s recognition of labor, land, and capi-
tal resulted in a more accurate valuation and pricing of these 
other ecosystems and services.248 However, REDD in its current 
form classifies land as a subcategory of capital by disregarding 
these other ecosystem services.249 Although a transition from 
REDD to REALU with AFOLU accounting may not mitigate 
all of REDD’s externalities, it would help to elevate and start 
to recognize land as an equal with labor and capital.250 There-
fore, since REDD merely determines the price of carbon without 
valuing the other ecosystem services provided by forests, envi-
ronmentalists, when sequestering and monetizing carbon, must 
not forget Oscar Wilde’s definition of a cynic: “[a] man who 
knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.”251
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InTroducTIon
Climate change is increasingly coming to the fore of pub-lic debate. Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on December 10, 19971 and its entry into force on Febru-
ary 16, 2005,2 the international community has drawn increas-
ing attention to the topic of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions. 
The most recent international meetings and political trends, such 
as the Copenhagen Climate Conference of 20093 and the latest 
steps taken by the U.S. administration4 have resulted in perplex-
ity and criticism from many international commentators.5 Critics 
have argued that “the Copenhagen Accord left most substantive 
disagreements unresolved.”6 However, these recent develop-
ments have paved the way for a more informed debate on global 
warming and environmental issues in general.7
The development of high-profile domestic and global dis-
cussion has also impacted the legal realm.8 In recent years, par-
ticularly since 2006,9 climate change lawsuits have increased in 
quantity and in sophistication, presenting one of the newest chal-
lenges within the public law arena. The increased sophistication 
of climate change lawsuits is a result of individuals who recog-
nize that climate regulation is an issue for both governments and 
citizens to pursue. This mounting public awareness is evident in 
U.S. climate change lawsuits. The vast majority of U.S. climate 
change-related claims are based on individual or communal 
actions meant to influence industrial and environmental policies 
by promoting regulation and impact assessment. The U.S. focus 
on “regulatory claims,” rather than on tort law claims, is mainly 
due to the difficulties individual applicants face in showing locus 
standi, in demonstrating direct liability of the entity sued, and in 
finding a feasible pathway for redressability. On the other hand, 
European climate change litigation has blossomed out of private 
and governmental market-induced interests, as they have been 
brought primarily with respect to “carbon market” issues. Such 
a tendency has clearly been highlighted by European Union 
Courts’ case law concerning the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (“EU ETS”) Directive.
An additional method of linking climate change to legal 
claims is the presentation of individual actions for damages 
directly associated with global warming-related human rights 
violations. Although important, such an approach to climate 
change litigation is still far from being widely accepted by 
courts. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (“IACHR”) are not encouraging for the prospects of the 
viability of human rights claims within the climate change con-
text. Therefore, it may be a long time before climate change liti-
gation becomes commonplace among individual rights claims.
This article provides an overview of the evolution of climate 
change related litigation, highlighting the differences and simi-
larities between the U.S. and the European context. Addition-
ally, the article analyzes the future perspective of such claims 
and concludes with a discussion concerning the possibility of 
linking climate change to human rights.
clImaTe chanGe lITIGaTIon:  
The unITed sTaTes scenarIo
Recent U.S. case law involving climate change demonstrates 
that most successful claims concern existing regulations. This is 
due to the specific aims that applicants pursue, using “existing 
law—primarily environmental law—to force or block regula-
tory behavior” in response to policy failures.10 Thus what climate 
change litigation has so far achieved is to effectively function as a 
“gap-filling role” as defined by Professor Hari Osofsky.11
The results of a recent study relating to climate change cases 
filed through the end of 2009 highlights that the courts play a 
pivotal role in governance, especially with respect to partially 
unregulated areas such as those of environmental law, regula-
tion, and responsibility.12 The same survey depicts a situation 
where almost 40.5% of legal actions related to climate change 
are brought to achieve “substantive mitigation regulation.”13 
Therefore, most controversies are based on the willingness of 
public bodies, states, companies, or non-governmental organi-
zations (“NGOs”) to urge for public intervention, focusing on 
the necessity of the limitations of the promulgation of statutes 
and policies establishing more stringent limits on emissions. 
The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. EPA14 
is probably the most distinguished example of a regulatory claim 
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in the context of climate change.15 Twelve states, three cities, a 
U.S. territory, and several NGOs claimed that the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) denial of a petition to address CO2 
emissions was an arbitrary exercise of the EPA’s mandatory 
function.16 Many petitions of the same nature17 have been filed 
by public and private actors18 in state and federal U.S. courts 
to promote enhanced regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
and to force public authorities to take positive action in limiting 
CO2 pollution. Such pressures by both public and private actors 
ultimately resulted in urging public authorities to reform the 
existing regulatory framework, which happened mainly through 
the modification of existing laws. Examples of these modifica-
tions may be found in some of the major environmental related 
acts such as the Clean Air Act of 2000 (“CAA”) or the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).19 The aforemen-
tioned statistics uncontrovertibly demonstrate that in most cir-
cumstances “climate change litigation . . . represents an effort to 
fill perceived regulatory gaps.”20
A second trend playing a dominant part in U.S. climate 
change litigation is what Professors David Markell and J.B. 
Ruhl have defined as “Procedural Monitoring, Impact Assess-
ment, and Information Reporting.”21 Claims that fall within this 
category are similar in scope to those of the “regulatory claims 
model” outlined above, as they seek to impose on public or pri-
vate entities new or more stringent obligations in monitoring, 
assessing, or disclosing the environmental impact of activities 
that such entities perform. An example of this type of claim is 
the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that Green-
peace, Friends of Earth, and four U.S. cities filed against a pri-
vate investment corporation and a bank for the failure to produce 
an environmental impact assessment when developing heavily 
polluting overseas projects.22 Some fifty-five petitions of this 
kind have been filed in U.S. courts with the same monitoring 
and assessment purpose,23 representing the majority of the U.S. 
climate change related claims.
Thirdly, tort claims, mostly public nuisance and negligence, 
have also been brought in U.S. litigation.24 However, case law 
concerning the violation of individual rights and liabilities rep-
resents only a small minority of the legal arguments brought 
before U.S. judges when compared to the amount of cases aimed 
at pushing authorities toward a more efficient, large-scale regu-
lation of CO2 emissions.
25 Although tort law as a basis for cli-
mate change challenges has advanced from a situation in which 
“such cases were . . . derided as frivolous long shots that would 
be shot down quickly”26 to one in which more reliance is placed 
in claims of individual harms from CO2 emitters, such claims 
have yet to result in fully successful outcomes.
The difficulties complainants encounter are numerous when 
seeking redress of environmental wrongs linked with carbon 
emissions through tort actions.27 The primary hurdle for appli-
cants is demonstrating substantial interest for standing.28 The 
“classic” U.S. theory of environmental locus standi does not fit 
the peculiar requirements of climate change.29 Climate change 
usually does not entail the existence of a specific natural fea-
ture (e.g. a river or a forest) which human behavior is about to 
despoil or endanger. On the contrary, climate change stems from 
a multiplicity of sources and affects different aspects of the envi-
ronment including: arctic melting, rising sea-levels, and disap-
pearing endangered species due to changed weather conditions; 
these are merely examples of the numerous, yet unpredictable, 
consequences of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere.30 
Since it is difficult to identify the specific harms that may affect 
the environment and the specific species that are at risk of being 
endangered, it is that much more difficult for a judicial panel to 
grant standing to the plaintiffs.31
The most difficult standing-related hardship that applicants 
must face when filing emissions-related court claims is proving 
an emitter’s direct responsibility. It is often argued that there 
are not a definitive number of entities liable for climate change, 
or that, on the contrary, this number is too great. Scholars have 
tried to overcome such hurdles by applying innovative theories 
on climate change liability,32 some of which aim to establish a 
link between local causation and local consequences.33 These 
doctrines may prove successful in those cases where the dam-
ages at stake are clearly identifiable (and, therefore, the obstacle 
of locus standi has already been surmounted) and where such 
damages occur in areas where major emitters directly operate. 
Also, the application of the environmentally based precaution-
ary principle to tort litigation may provide a clearer basis for 
allocating liability, thereby providing a reverse burden of proof 
under which “economic actors are liable unless they can prove 
that their activities are environmentally harmless.”34 Such a 
principle though, despite having been frequently recognized 
as a “general principle of international law,”35 has not yet been 
accepted by U.S. courts, so that future applications within the 
United States still appear highly improbable.
However, even if these doctrines may sometimes prove suc-
cessful, applicants may not always find the road to redress clear 
of impediments since “there is at present no international liabil-
ity framework directly applicable to climate change-related dam-
age.”36 This is demonstrated, for instance, by the unfortunate 
outcome of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company,37 
in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully alleged infringement by six U.S. 
power companies (alleged to be major polluters with respect to car-
bon dioxide emissions) of federal and state public nuisance law.38 
Although the decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit,39 the District Court decision represents a 
valuable example of an approach that is still frequently adopted by 
U.S. courts. Even if it were proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
climate change-related damages had actually occurred, it would 
nonetheless be difficult to identify the entity liable for damages.40
Finally, there is one other barrier to justiciability which 
may be the most difficult to overcome. The “political question 
doctrine” permits judges to defer climate change questions for 
political consideration reason.41 The doctrine highlights the fact 
that climate change concerns are more appropriate for the leg-
islative branch of the government than for the judiciary.42 The 
original District Court’s decision in Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power Co. aligned with this doctrine,43 which is now at 
the center of the American debate.44
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Nevertheless, tort claims have attracted a lot of attention 
from the public. Many “liability” actions result in widespread 
discussion. Some of the most renowned examples include the 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference Petition, which will be further 
examined below,45 or the Hurricane Katrina case,46 in which 
victims of the Katrina hurricane sought compensation from CO2 
emitters for loss of private property and use of public property.47
In light of the above, it can be concluded that the U.S. 
approach to climate change litigation has been primarily based 
on regulatory claims. Although it is debatable whether the CAA 
is the most suitable instrument for addressing such problems,48 
it is nonetheless clear that judicial rulings cannot substitute for 
robust and stringent policies on global warming and carbon 
emissions, and that the “abdication of congressional responsibil-
ity” feared by some commentators should be avoided.49 Despite 
the fact that many, even within Congress, applauded the initia-
tives undertaken by the Supreme Court, viewing them as ways 
to enact CO2 controls without directly taking responsibility for 
them, it has been noted that such ceding of legislative power to 
non elected litigators and judges may ultimately endanger the 
principle of representative democracy.50
clImaTe chanGe lITIGaTIon:  
The european scenarIo
European climate change litigation has differed from that 
of the U.S. mainly because of the diverse and less homogeneous 
framework that characterizes Europe. Each European state tends to 
tackle domestic issues, including those related to the environment, 
with a unique and cultural-specific approach, not only from a legal 
perspective, but also from political and cultural points of view.
To identify a common European trend, it is necessary to 
reference the supranational political framework provided by the 
European Union (“EU”) institutions, which have been far-sighted 
in enacting a thorough regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
When analyzing EU climate change policies, recall that the EU, 
which was born out of the ashes of a purely economic entity,51 
is facing a difficult process of integrating political, military, 
financial, and cultural aspects.52 This process is ongoing, with 
many purported goals still unachieved, and the road to further 
unification seems at present tortuous and uncertain.53 Although 
important steps have been taken to allow individuals to use the 
European Union Foundation Treaties, which include the defense 
of individual subjective rights,54 when European Union litigation 
is involved (the Luxembourg-based Court of First Instance and 
European Court of Justice) the concerns of applicants and defen-
dants are arguably of a purely economic nature.55
Directive 2003/87/EC established a greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowance trading system within the Community56 com-
monly known as the Emissions Trading Scheme (“ETS”),57 
which fixes a number of allowances for the quantity of CO2 that 
can be emitted by a single Member state over a particular period; 
the level of emissions in such period shall then “be equal to the 
established cap.”58 Under the ETS, Member states may buy and 
sell allowances, thereby creating a supply and demand model 
that forms a basis for the European carbon market.
As a result, carbon market litigation has ensued, resulting in 
a considerable number of proceedings before the Luxembourg 
Courts, which have been conceptually divided into the follow-
ing three categories:59 challenges to the validity of the Direc-
tive,60 infringement proceedings,61 and challenges to decisions 
of the European Commission on the National Allocation Plans62 
designed by Member states for re-allocating the allowances 
to national installations.63 The case of Abraham and Others64 
slightly detaches itself from this categorization since the appli-
cants asked the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) to interpret 
the European Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
(85/337/EEC) so that restructuring of the Liège-Bierset Airport 
could be included within the definition of “project” set out in 
the directive, and the environmental impact assessment could be 
considered mandatory for the restructuring.65
Although many claims have been brought with respect to 
carbon market issues, regulatory claims are similarly predomi-
nant in Europe. Even the abovementioned case of Abraham and 
Others, although directly linked to the impact of potentially pol-
luting works on the well being of a community, was aimed at 
triggering inclusionary interpretation by the ECJ of a specific 
regulation.66 Evidently, little room is left for individual applica-
tions aimed at recovering damages suffered as a result of global 
warming and, therefore, linked to CO2 emissions. Currently 
“EU ETS litigation is not concerned with the impacts of climate 
change . . . but rather the finessing of a new market mechanism 
from the perspective of key market actors within the established 
confines of EU law.”67
The implications of this mainly regulatory approach to cli-
mate change litigation are even worse for Europe than they are 
for the U.S. Although the U.S. carbon emissions framework is 
in dire need of further regulation,68 and though litigation may 
not be a completely adequate substitute for legislative control, 
the benefits of litigation far outweigh the drawbacks of total 
inaction. In Europe, where the ETS is the core of the carbon 
emission regulatory framework, climate change related claims 
are primarily concerned only with the applications of such a 
scheme.69 The influence of the resulting jurisprudence thus ends 
up being considerably more limited, and the possibilities of evo-
lution more scant.
In addition, other criticisms may arise. Firstly, as has 
already been mentioned, regulation is not considered by some 
as an appropriate task for judges. Even though such an assertion 
is debatable, it will always be difficult for counter-arguments to 
prevail, even from a theoretical standpoint.70 It may be argued, 
for instance, that the strict “separation of tasks” theory, which 
some British judges are already accustomed to,71 is often sup-
ported by governments, entities, and courts for nothing but spe-
cious reasons.72 Such arguments, though, appear particularly 
difficult to prove, and the “spatial separation of competence 
theory” remains difficult to rebut.73
Secondly, once a regulatory mechanism has been success-
fully implemented, it may not suffice on its own to reduce the 
effects that greenhouse gases have on the environment.74 As 
Philippe Cullet argues, “[I]t cannot be expected that the Climate 
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Change Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, or any other protocol . 
. . would be sufficient to effectively mitigate global warming so 
as to avert the need for adaptation . . . .”75 In other words, the 
EU ETS Directive, as well as the other international instruments 
mentioned by Cullet, should be supported by a more complete 
framework of policies (for instance, liability schemes applicable 
at the international level), in order to be more effective at pre-
venting—or at least in limiting—climate change.
Thirdly, a lack of political willingness to attain a stricter lia-
bility regime for ecological damages exists. The European Envi-
ronmental Liability Directive, which entered into force in 200976 
with the purpose of harmonizing the concept of pollution and the 
reinstatement of regimes throughout the region, has been until 
now heavily criticized for not having provided Europe with the 
expected uniformity with regard to liability for ecological dam-
ages.77 Similarly, the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability 
for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environ-
ment,78 which established tougher rules for liability for environ-
mental damages,79 has not yet been ratified or entered into force.80
The above analysis clearly does not favor a bright future for a 
comprehensive civil liability regime for damages stemming from 
carbon dioxide emissions.81 The outcomes of the efforts made 
by applicants in the human rights law arena are not any more 
encouraging.
lInkInG clImaTe chanGe To human rIGhTs
Recent attempts to link climate change claims to human 
rights principles have not achieved any revolutionary outcomes. 
While several human rights-based petitions alleging climate 
change damages have been filed in international or regional tri-
bunals, none of them has yet come to a completely favorable 
conclusion for the applicants.
The Inuit petition filed at the IACHR,82 by far the most 
famous case in which a human rights-focused body addressed 
climate change, featured applicants seeking “relief from human 
rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming 
and climate change caused by acts and omissions of the United 
States.”83 The action was brought against the U.S. for being the 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases and because, according to 
the applicants, it continually refused to undertake serious efforts 
to reduce emissions.84 The IACHR rejected the petition, holding 
that the information provided by the claimants did not enable the 
Commission to determine whether the alleged facts entailed a 
violation of the rights protected by the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man.85 Even though a subsequent hear-
ing could be held by the IACHR focusing on “the right to use 
and enjoy property; the right of peoples to enjoy the benefits of 
culture; and the rights to life, physical integrity, and security,”86 
no further action has been taken.87
The Inuit petition outcome may sound surprising, especially 
in light of the fact that the IACHR had previously upheld indig-
enous people’s claims related to violations of rights analogous 
to those mentioned in the petition.88 However, the Inuit peti-
tion distinguishes itself from other indigenous communities’ 
legal actions because of its peculiar liability-related aspects. It is 
difficult to establish direct links of causation between emitters, 
no matter how big they are, and damages when climate change 
is involved. In addition, it can be argued that a decision holding 
the United States responsible for arctic melting and other dam-
ages related to CO2 emissions would have ended up being too 
big of a step, providing legal basis for claimants all around the 
world to sue Western industrialized countries for sea-level rise, 
hurricanes, flooding, and other effects of climate change. It is 
undisputable that politically revolutionary decisions have to be 
balanced with political counter-interests that cannot be set aside: 
therefore, justices and commissioners tend to be cautious before 
allowing potentially destabilizing claims to succeed.
In Europe, claimants have not been any more successful. The 
ECtHR, based in Strasbourg and acting within the framework of 
the 1951 European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”),89 
is renowned for being the most important tribunal for assessing 
human rights claims in Europe and one of the most efficient civil 
rights monitoring bodies in the world.90 However, the area per-
taining to environmental damages is a partially neglected area in 
the ECtHR’s case law: successful claims in connection with the 
environment have so far been grounded mostly on Article 8 of 
the ECHR on protection of private and family life, broadly inter-
preted so as to include interferences with individuals’ well-being 
caused by public nuisance and environmental damage.91 In the 
context of violation of property rights,92 the Court has also rec-
ognized that “the environment is a value in itself in which both 
society and the public authorities take keen interest.”93 Although 
the ECtHR has recently begun to consider the precautionary 
principle, while assessing claims on unlawful interference on the 
applicant’s right to a healthy life,94 there are several obstacles 
that impede climate change-related claims from being justiciable 
within the ECHR framework.
First, for a claim to succeed, applicants must demonstrate 
a concrete interference of their rights beyond all doubt.95 Given 
that the Convention does not provide for an express right to a 
safe and healthy environment, whether the latter is included 
within the scope of Article 8 (the right to private and family life) 
or Article 1, Protocol 1 (the right to peaceful enjoyment of pos-
session) of the ECHR, is a matter of interpretation. In light of 
the abovementioned case law, this hurdle may not seem insur-
mountable. However, climate change claims are different from 
the classic “environmental claims” brought before the ECtHR 
because in the former no explicit link between emissions and 
damages can be easily demonstrated.96
Second, in the unlikely case of an incontrovertible causal 
relationship between greenhouse gases and local damages in 
Europe, the “margin of appreciation” doctrine could serve as 
a convenient tool for the ECtHR judges to defer the matter to 
the national regulatory level.97 In short, once a private or pub-
lic entity has satisfactorily demonstrated that domestic law on 
greenhouse gas emissions has not been infringed upon, the 
Court could decide to leave this sensitive area of judgment to the 
discretion of national Member states’ authorities (legislators and 
judges), thereby abiding by the Court’s subsidiary role.98
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It has been recently argued that the ECtHR should address 
climate change within the scope of the right to property, namely 
that of protecting private low-carbon investors against risks of 
excessive state interference through regulatory changes and the 
imposition of heavy financial burdens.99 This innovative and prac-
tical approach is proof that there are strong countervailing inter-
ests (namely, those of investors and corporations) that should be 
balanced with the perceived need of establishing the civil liability 
of corporations and emitters. These countervailing interests are 
worth considering if their aim is “stimulat[ing] the flow of private 
capital in the implementation of low-carbon investments.”100
In other fora, more attention has been drawn to the human 
rights implications of climate change. For example, in Gbemre 
v. Shell101 the Federal High Court of Nigeria held that gas flar-
ing, an unconstitutional practice in breach of the fundamental 
human right to health, also contributes to adverse climate change 
as it emits carbon dioxide.102 The case is particularly important 
because it is “one of the first where a national court held that 
climate change, like other environmental issues, may implicate 
human rights.”103 However, the Nigerian judges’ conclusions on 
climate change are not final and do not address global warming 
directly since gas flaring was the real underlying issue in the case.
In light of the above, it is clear that counter-interests 
have thus far prevailed over the commitment of states to take 
a strong standpoint against violations of fundamental human 
rights caused by human-induced global warming. Arguments 
against linkages between climate change and human rights law 
have been brought on several grounds, including the idea that 
international human rights actors and tribunals should prioritize 
other emergencies (which are also depicted as easier to cope 
with in legal terms) and concerns relating to the current trend 
of excessive anthropocentricity under which climate change is 
currently being approached.104 The most convincing explana-
tion of the scant success obtained by climate change petitions 
in human rights fora seems to be, however, the one which links 
together hypothetical favorable judgments and their potential 
consequences, and which takes into account the countervail-
ing economic interests of major public and private emitters.105 
The unwillingness of domestic tribunals throughout the world 
to acknowledge the existence of “environmental refugees” (who 
often flee from their countries because of the consequences of 
climate change) and to grant to such migrants the state-onerous 
refugee status is clearly another side of the same story.106 In this 
sense, the obstacles that prevent human rights tribunals from 
intervening directly in the climate change issue are similar to 
those that actors seeking redress in domestic tort actions have 
found.
conclusIon: bleak prospecTs For cIvIl lIabIlITy?
Notwithstanding the recent developments of the environ-
mental liability doctrine, which seems to be undergoing a pro-
cess of strong “internationalization,”107 it can be concluded 
that the road to clear and convincing guidelines for establish-
ing liability in cases of climate change-originated damages still 
appears to be long and tortuous. Even those authors who have 
tried to provide climate change litigation advocates with a “more 
realistic understanding of the scientific reality of causation” that 
“will suitably address climate change”108 have had to deal with 
the fact that the proposed solution of making recourse to “proba-
bilistic causation” still leaves several problems unsolved.109
Moreover, all the proposed “technical” solutions for estab-
lishing airtight causational links tend to overlook the political and 
institutional problems underlying the task that courts should per-
form in relation to climate change. As it has been argued in this 
article, there is a lack of commitment by governments, judges, and 
other public and private multinational actors to allow the courts 
to take over the role, which many see as best left to domestic 
and international regulators. Should a court provide leeway for 
claimants to obtain redress for damages not strictly linked to local 
infringements, more petitions would proliferate and the conse-
quences on the international equilibrium would be immense.
The scenarios discussed may be satisfying to those who are 
“skeptical that tort litigation will be an effective way to com-
bat climate change.”110 However, from a different standpoint, 
this “skeptical” approach appears to be misplaced as it tends to 
confuse the regulatory function with that of assessing damages. 
While on the one hand it is difficult to rebut the critiques that 
regulation should be left to the government, on the other hand 
one could object that the “skeptical” approach would sound 
more reasonable if applied to regulatory claims, which have 
proved to be the most successful up to now. On the contrary, 
establishing standing, liability, and redressability is an appropri-
ate task for the judiciary to carry out.111
Civil liability is still far from taking root in the climate change 
litigation context for different reasons. They are grounded on 
the far-sightedness that judicial panels have so far demonstrated 
in dealing with this area of litigation. Judges are often conscious 
of the vast, wide-ranging consequences (involving, inter alia, 
economic, energetic, developmental, and migratory issues) that 
holding an American or European actor responsible for damages 
occurring thousands of miles away would entail in legal terms. 
Consequently, before innovative liability principles are estab-
lished, decision-makers, such as national legislators, must ask if 
the climate change litigation floodgates are ready to be opened.
Endnotes:  The Tortuous Road to Liability
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A series of Republican-supported bills in the 112th Con-gress are aimed at preventing the Environmental Pro-tection Agency (“EPA”) from regulating the heaviest 
polluting industries in America.1 At the forefront is H.R. 97—
short-titled the Free Industry Act—a bill introduced by Rep. 
Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) and sponsored by 120 other repre-
sentatives.2 H.R. 97 would amend the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) 
to exclude a series of greenhouse gases (“GHG”) from the list 
of pollutants that the EPA can regulate.3 Media sources have 
already pointed out that H.R. 97 will likely die in the Senate or 
by Presidential veto.4 Regardless, H.R. 97 indicates an agenda to 
impede EPA regulatory authority that could rise to the forefront 
should Republicans take control of Congress.5 The philosophy 
that undergirds H.R. 97 represents a paralytic force to U.S. cli-
mate change policy, and policymakers should begin drafting 
solutions now before H.R. 97 and similar bills become a reality.
The CAA is a cornerstone of U.S. climate change policy, 
and the EPA is the primary vehicle through which the federal 
government enforces the provisions of the CAA.6 Congress 
successively increased the EPA’s authority to regulate harm-
ful pollutants under the CAA with amendments in 19777 and 
1990.8 GHG emissions entered the dialogue in 2007 when the 
Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, mandating that 
the EPA had the authority to regulate GHG emissions pursu-
ant to the CAA.9 In 2009, the EPA issued an Endangerment 
Finding, stating that GHG emissions posed a serious health risk 
for the population and environment.10 With the support of the 
Obama Administration, the EPA declared that it would pursue 
new regulations for mobile and stationary sources.11 It is against 
this backdrop that Republicans in the 112th Congress levy their 
attacks against the EPA.
Supporters of H.R. 97 (“97’ers”) wish to strip the EPA of 
its regulatory authority because they claim that stricter GHG 
standards will “kill” American industrial jobs.12 The 97’ers first 
argue that the detrimental effects of GHG emissions are uncer-
tain and require more research before the EPA can move to 
regulate those emissions.13 The argument continues that stricter 
regulations will force companies to expend money installing 
new equipment and put American jobs at risk.14 There is evi-
dence that lends credence to the 97’ers’ economic argument, but 
most of it comes from industry-led reports.15
The two largest stationary sources of GHG emissions 
are the electric power industry (oil, natural gas, and coal) and 
manufacturing, producing an estimated 51.3% of U.S. GHG 
emissions in 2007.16 The oil and natural gas industries directly 
employ roughly two million people,17 coal employs about ninety 
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thousand,18 and manufacturing employs around twelve million 
people.19 With more than fourteen million people employed by 
these industries (not including “supporting” industries),20 it is 
reasonable to assume that new regulations could cause poten-
tial job losses. However, the 97’ers’ argument fails to consider 
the potential for job creation resulting from new technology and 
programs required to comply with these regulations.21 Instead, 
H.R. 97 proposes an extreme political maneuver that threatens to 
dismantle the core of U.S. climate change policy.
By eliminating EPA’s authority to regulate GHG, H.R. 
97 unleashes a host of consequences. Without the EPA as the 
regulatory authority, state governments will have the choice, or 
obligation, to regulate GHG emissions. This means a patchwork 
of regulations from state to state instead of one uniform federal 
standard.22 Companies who wish to escape GHG regulations 
may decide to move to states without emissions standards.23 
Also, without GHG regulations, it is unlikely that industrial 
companies will invest in “clean tech,” only further delaying U.S. 
entrance into a growing global marketplace with $7.8 billion in 
investment in 2010.24 Finally, there is no way to measure how 
much credibility the U.S. will lose in the international climate 
change dialogue without an effective policy in place.25
H.R. 97 is part of a broader Republican plan to dismantle the 
EPA.26 The bills presented in the 112th Congress bear an eerie 
resemblance to bills presented by Republicans during the 111th 
legislative session.27 To assume that Republicans will not present 
these bills in the 113th Congress would be foolish. Policymakers 
who favor a strong climate change policy must take affirmative 
steps to entrench the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions. 
Amending the CAA or passing an authorization bill would be two 
ways of accomplishing this goal.28 Although the political distribu-
tion of the 112th Congress is unlikely to allow the entrenchment 
efforts to succeed, it could provide a rally-point for all those in the 
public who stand against H.R. 97.
Endnotes: Hazy Skies in America's Future?
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Climate change has become one of the biggest developmen-
tal challenges facing the planet. The challenges are even more 
pronounced and significant for the African continent, because 
of its levels of poverty and low capacity to adapt. . . . Time has 
now come that we collectively as nations [and] individually in 
our right have to do something to avert consequences of climate 
change in order to avoid a future catastrophe. We need to act 
now, because if we do not, the development gains that we have 
attained in our countries will be lost, thereby leaving more peo-
ple in poverty. – Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika1
InTroducTIon
Over the past decade or so, climate change has been regu-larly cited as one of the biggest impediments to Africa’s realization of sustainable growth and development.2 In 
particular, African leaders have been warned that, in light of the 
immense challenges posed by the phenomenon, the continent 
stands a very marginal chance of making meaningful progress 
towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(“MDGs”) by 2015.3 It cannot be gainsaid that these warnings 
are not without basis. Climate change commands significant 
influence on Africa’s performance; it portends innumerable 
socio-economic and political challenges for the continent, which 
has perennially garnered “breaking news” coverage largely for 
the appalling humanitarian catastrophes on its soil.
Though it contributes only about 3.8% of the total green-
house gas (“GHG”) emissions,4 the continent constantly experi-
ences the adverse impacts of climate change, as a result of its 
high poverty levels and low capacity to adapt.5 For example, 
the continent’s food security situation has continually worsened 
as the productivity of rain-fed agriculture, the main source of 
livelihood for most Africans, frequently slumps due to erratic 
rainfall patterns;6 massive livestock losses have been caused by 
successive prolonged droughts in virtually every corner of the 
continent;7 sea level rise (leading to coastal erosion) and flood-
ing (even in areas that never before experienced floods) have 
become a common sight;8 persistent and new health problems 
are increasingly reported in virtually every corner of the vast 
continent;9 and violent conflicts have become the order of the 
day as environmental migrants and local communities clash over 
control of, or access to, resources.10 Worryingly, the effects of 
climate change have proved to be akin to Russian roulette, with 
every pull of the trigger posing risks for all, and the poor bearing 
the heaviest brunt because of their dependence on the surround-
ing environment for their survival.11
afRica anD the climate chanGe aGenDa: 
huRDleS anD pRoSpectS in SuStaininG the outcomeS of the Seventh  
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Today, issues relating to climate change are addressed in a 
plethora of treaties adopted within the United Nations (“UN”) 
framework. These international instruments include the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),12 
which was adopted at the landmark UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (“Earth Summit”) in 1992 as part of 
the package to save the planet along with the UN Convention 
to Combat Desertification (“Desertification Convention”),13 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), which 
seeks to ensure conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
as well as fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of genetic 
resources.14 Other instruments related to climate change which 
were subsequently created include the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC (“Kyoto Protocol”),15 which establishes legally bind-
ing obligations for the developed countries to reduce their GHG 
emissions and, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (“Cartagena 
Protocol”), which was adopted (as a supplement to the CBD) 
to protect biodiversity from the potential risks posed by living 
modified organisms (“LMOs”) resulting from modern biotech-
nology.16 In their formal acknowledgment of the importance of 
climate change issues, African countries have overwhelmingly 
subscribed to these instruments.17
Africa’s predicament has received formal acknowledge-
ment in various circles. Within the inter-governmental African 
Union (“AU”) framework, on several occasions climate change 
has garnered the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (“the Assembly”). For instance, in January 2007, 
the Assembly called upon the AU Member States to integrate 
climate change into their respective national development pro-
grams.18 In February 2009, the Assembly emphasized the need 
for international climate change negotiations to give Africa an 
opportunity to demand compensation for damage caused by 
global warming.19 More importantly, the Assembly approved 
the Algiers Declaration on Climate Change (“Algiers Decla-
ration”),20 thereby paving way for the building of a common 
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African Position in preparation for the fifteenth Conference of 
the Parties to the UNFCCC (“COP-15”).21
In July 2009, the Assembly, among other things: 1) estab-
lished the Conference of African Heads of State and Gov-
ernment on Climate Change (“CAHOSCC”)22 to spearhead 
leadership in the climate change negotiation process;23 2) urged 
the CAHOSCC, all ambassadors, and negotiators to use the 
approved African Common Position24 to achieve optimal results 
for the continent;25 and 3) authorized the AU Commission to 
facilitate the AU’s accession to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, and the CBD.26 Then, in February 2010, the Assembly 
requested the CAHOSCC to establish a streamlined single nego-
tiating structure at both Ministerial and Expert levels.27
At the inter-ministerial level of the African Ministerial Con-
ference on the Environment (“AMCEN”), climate change issues 
were addressed on a number of occasions. The agenda was offi-
cially floated at the Conference’s twelfth session in Johannesburg, 
laying the groundwork for the preparation of a common conti-
nental position on climate change.28 Shortly thereafter the special 
session on climate change, which also had the African Group of 
Negotiators in attendance, adopted the Nairobi Declaration on the 
African Process for Combating Climate Change,29 which, among 
other things: 1) noted with concern the inadequacy, complexity, 
and fragmentation of the existing climate financing mechanisms, 
as well as the constraints faced by African countries in access-
ing these facilities;30 2) reaffirmed the adoption (by the Assembly) 
of the Algiers Declaration, and “the need [for African countries] 
to speak with one voice in the negotiations process for the new 
legally binding global climate change regime;”31 3) stressed that 
“Africa’s priorities are to implement climate change programmes 
on adaptation . . . , in particular to alleviate poverty and attain 
the Millennium Development Goals, with emphasis on the most 
vulnerable groups, especially women and children;”32 and 4) rec-
ognized the need “to ensure coordination and coherence in the 
implementation” of existing climate change adaptation and miti-
gation actions in Africa.33
Within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (“NEPAD”),34 the Action Plan of the Environ-
ment Initiative affirms the continent’s concerns vis-à-vis the 
challenges posed by climate change, and provides for climate 
change as one of the core priority areas to be addressed by the 
continent’s leadership.35 On the realization that climate change 
poses a key challenge to environmental sustainability, biodiver-
sity, and food security in Africa, through its Climate Change and 
Natural Resource Management program, NEPAD provides a 
platform on which the continent’s players share knowledge and 
experiences in addressing the fast-creeping threat.36
Climate change issues have equally garnered the atten-
tion of various forums, in particular the African Development 
Forum (“ADF”), a biennial multi-stakeholder gathering commit-
ted to building consensus and mobilizing partners for Africa’s 
development. The 2010 Seventh African Development Forum 
(“ADF VII”), whose theme was “Acting on Climate Change for 
Sustainable Development in Africa,” was jointly organized by 
the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(“UNECA”), the AU Commission, and the Tunis-based African 
Development Bank (“AfDB”).37 The participants, drawn from 
diverse stakeholders,38 deliberated on the challenges and oppor-
tunities presented by climate change in Africa, and, after the 
five days of intensive panel discussions and parallel sessions, 
adopted a common statement (“Consensus Statement”) with 
some fifty-six points of agreement.39
This article aims to unearth the challenges and prospects 
in sustaining the outcomes of these principled negotiations for 
the African continent to make lasting progress in addressing the 
effects and impacts of climate change and variability.
undersTandInG The Forum
on the foRum GeneRally
The African Development Forum (“ADF”) is a joint ini-
tiative of UNECA, the AU Commission, and the AfDB.40 It is 
Africa’s pioneer multi-stakeholder platform established with a 
view to establishing a consensual African-driven development 
agenda, and mobilizing partners for Africa’s development.41 
Every forum has a designated theme, on which deliberations 
are based. Initially, it was intended that the Forum be convened 
annually. However, after the second ADF, in 2000, the partici-
pants agreed that the Forum be convened biennially. Thus, the 
third ADF was held in 2002, instead of 2001. The seventh ADF 
VII was recently held in October 2010 and the eighth ADF VIII 
is slated for 2012.
aDf vii: a contextual oveRview
Thematic Focus of the Forum
ADF VII was devoted to discussions on climate change and 
participants were tasked to examine the challenges and opportu-
nities presented by the phenomenon, with a view to, within the 
global context, identifying long-term actions to ensure Africa’s 
development process is climate resilient.42 The discussions were 
carried out against the backdrop of the realization that climate 
change is one of the biggest threats to sustainable growth and 
development in Africa.
Objectives of the Forum
Generally, ADF VII was intended to provide a multi-
stakeholder platform to discuss and build consensus on how to 
mainstream climate change concerns into development policies, 
strategies, programs and practices in Africa, and to strengthen 
the African Common Position to ensure that it adequately 
reflected the continent’s concerns and priorities in the on-going 
international climate change negotiations.43
Specifically, the Forum was convened to accomplish sev-
eral goals. First, it considered the evidence and impacts of cli-
mate change in Africa and the need for adequate information and 
services to better inform decision-making and actions.44 Sec-
ond, it deliberated on the challenges and opportunities climate 
change poses in Africa and policy-making,45 while promoting 
cooperation in sharing of best practices and lessons-learned.46 
Finally, within the framework of the demonstrated evidence and 
impacts of, as well as the challenges and opportunities presented 
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by, climate change, the Forum defined priority actions and 
measures, built new strategic alliances and partnerships, and 
provided momentum for the African Common Position, in prep-
aration for the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-16”) 
in Cancún, Mexico.47
adF vII: hIGhlIGhT oF The key ouTcomes
On the premise of the evidence presented, which reflected 
climate change as a serious, urgent, and compelling reality in 
Africa,48 the participants concluded the Common Statement, 
which embodies some fifty-six points of agreement. The key 
ones are highlighted below.
conSenSuS on the afRican common poSition
With a view to enhancing the continent’s position in the 
international climate change processes, ADF VII participants 
agreed that African countries and their leadership should engage 
all relevant stakeholders in the on-going climate change discus-
sions, and in particular, build the continent’s capacity through a 
coordinated, effective, and representative position to effectively 
participate in the relevant international negotiations, in order to 
ensure that the outcomes reflect the continent’s concerns and pri-
orities.49 The agreement also pledged to support implementation 
of decisions and resolutions of the AU Assembly, the AMCEN, 
and other relevant continental bodies in regard to climate change 
concerns for the continent.50
Leadership for Climate Change Response
On the understanding that African leaders and their devel-
opment partners have critical roles to play in implementing 
Africa’s climate change agenda, participants also agreed that 
African leaders and their development partners should strongly 
support the CAHOSCC to enable it to effectively mobilize polit-
ical commitment and provide effective political leadership. Fur-
ther, there were pledges to demonstrate additional leadership.51 
These included commitments relating to: 1) taking bold deci-
sions on the issue of innovative climate change financing mech-
anisms, including proper carbon pricing to complement funding 
under the UNFCCC;52 2) educating the public to enhance under-
standing of climate change and variability; 3) garnering support 
necessary to meet national commitments; and 4) addressing the 
fallacy that developed countries only have a charitable obliga-
tion to finance climate change actions in developing countries.53
The Role of the Private Sector
On the understanding that the private sector54 has a vital role 
to play in addressing climate change in Africa, the participants 
agreed that African governments should “create an enabling 
policy environment to encourage the private sector to harness 
its expertise, resources and creativity.”55 Related to this pledge, 
there was agreement to create and develop partnerships between 
public, private, and civil society stakeholders.56
Further, the participants called on African governments 
to “establish minimum standards for local and Foreign Direct 
Investments” (“FDIs”) that were appropriate for both national 
needs and the private sector.57 Finally, there was a pledge to 
“encourage research and development that will create Africa-
specific technological solutions . . . taking into account [the con-
tinent’s] rich indigenous knowledge systems.”58
key outcomeS on fooD SecuRity anD economic 
Development59
In the Consensus Agreement, ADF VII participants pledged 
a number of sector-specific actions, including in agriculture, 
food security, and infrastructure. For instance, in order to 
improve the continent’s approach in addressing agriculture and 
food security challenges, the Agreement called on African coun-
tries to take a “holistic approach;” seek a strong, fair, and com-
prehensive future agreement on payment systems for agriculture 
sector emissions;60 improve and grow “index-based insurance 
schemes and safety nets;” and accelerate initiatives aimed at 
reducing dependence on rain-fed farming.61
In addition, to address the adverse impacts of climate 
change on the continent’s infrastructure development efforts, 
the agreement called on African governments to “climate-proof 
their water infrastructure,” promote more sustainable demand, 
increase efficiency, increase rain-water harvesting, and sup-
port more successful water management at all levels, including 
for states sharing water resources, notably rivers.62 In addition, 
the agreement pledged to adopt a “holistic approach” to pro-
mote low-carbon energy sources and technology, and “to sup-
port the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(“PIDA”)63 to ensure development of the continent’s priority 
infrastructure projects.64
outcomeS on human Development, SecuRity, anD 
ecoSyStem SuStainability
In their resolve to address the social and human develop-
ment challenges posed by climate change,65 the participants 
agreed to “employ . . . a human rights-based approach (HRBA) 
in climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.”66 The 
agreement pledges the governments to support an “equity-based 
health care financing in climate change funding mechanisms 
and internal resource mobilization.”67 There was also a pledge 
to comprehensively incorporate gender perspectives in develop-
ment, encourage eco-friendly development and awareness, and 
promote “youth-led actions and processes.”68
Further, the participants agreed that, in order to address the 
peace and security issues posed by climate change,69 African 
countries should “engage in preventive diplomacy,”70 in part 
through the Climate for Development in Africa (“ClimDev-
Africa”) Programme, to effectively address the interface 
between climate change, peace and security issues, and disaster 
response.71 The agreement also proposed amending the African 
Union Protocol on peace and security,72 and tasked the AU Peace 
and Security Council (“PSC”) to, in its work, take into account 
climate-related peace and security issues, including migration.73
Finally, in their efforts to address the impacts of climate 
change on ecosystem sustainability,74 African governments 
agreed to promote effective and sustainable human-centered eco-
system management,75 encourage the use of Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus (“REDD+”) 
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initiatives to reduce poverty, and implement the UNFCCC, the 
CBD, and the Desertification Convention “in a synergistic man-
ner to promote coherent [environmental] management.”76
outcomeS on haRneSSinG meanS of ReSponSe to 
climate chanGe: financinG, RiSk manaGement, 
Science & technoloGy, anD capacity builDinG
It was agreed that, in order to improve financing for climate 
change actions in Africa,77 African governments and their devel-
opment partners should promote financial reform to enhance 
funding access for Africa, in particular by identifying and pri-
oritizing efficient financial resource distribution, in part through 
newly forged Public-Private Partnerships. The agreement also 
“strongly supports” the establishment and setting up of the pro-
posed African Green Fund (“AGF”),78 which is expected to 
coordinate and manage climate financing on the continent.
In addition, the participants agreed that to improve the con-
tinent’s capacity to manage the risks of climate-related disas-
ters,79 African governments should strengthen the national 
institutions generating and handling climate-related data, and 
promote the exchange of this information. The agreement also 
calls for promotion of broad cooperation in sharing climate-
related knowledge (through early warning systems) and disaster 
management, and strengthening of surveillance and monitoring 
systems across all regional levels.80 It also calls for promotion of 
index-based insurance in arid and semi-arid areas,81 as well as 
promotion of integration of climate risk management (“CRM”) 
in all levels of education and all levels of policy-making.82
Further, to improve the continent’s level of scientific and 
technological innovativeness to respond to climate change,83 
the participants agreed that African countries should “build 
a regional climate change knowledge repository,”84 invest in 
scientific research and development,85 and support and priori-
tize disaster risk-management and preventive capacity. On the 
international level, the agreement seeks to promote the pursuit 
of technology transfer and global partnerships to that end.86 
Finally, the Agreement promotes the strengthening of African 
universities and research and technology centers to “increas[e] 
their competitiveness in the global market.”87 To improve 
Africa’s capacity to respond to climate change,88 the agree-
ment pledged that African countries, with the support of their 
development partners, should strengthen CRM-related national 
institutions, including educational institutions at all levels, and 
improve the capacity of vulnerable groups;89 and foster South-
South cooperation.90
susTaInInG The ouTcomes: a realITy check
pRactical challenGeS in SuStaininG the outcomeS
Impotent Political Leadership
Africa lacks credible leadership to address climate change. 
The political leaders are yet to effectively walk their unending 
talks; save for the multitude of pious resolutions,91 there is no 
concrete effort to deal with the fast-unfolding crisis. In fact, 
the continent’s affairs have been reduced to endless spirals of 
meetings and deliberations, only to come up with more meet-
ings. It is this circus that has, for instance, delayed the estab-
lishment of the AGF.92 In general, the continent’s leadership 
lacks the requisite political will to steer the continent to the path 
of sustainable growth and development, with mere rhetorical 
promise to tackle the climate change-related challenges engulf-
ing the continent.
Further, leadership has been lacking in preventing the 
destruction of the continent’s ecosystems, and in mitigating 
poverty and hunger, two of the biggest drivers of environmental 
destruction on the continent. For instance, in the fast-evolving 
“global land rush,” millions of African farmers have lost their 
arable lands to foreign investors.93 These deals, often shrouded 
in veils of secrecy, have violated the resource rights of millions 
of poor Africans, fuelling poverty and food insecurity,94 two of 
the biggest drivers of environmental destruction on the African 
continent. Furthermore, as vast forestlands (and other ecosys-
tems that act as carbon sinks) are opened up to large-scale farm-
ing, the continent continues to be exposed to further threats of 
climate change. Sadly, attempts by environmental activists to 
resist the deals are often forcibly countered by the concerned 
governments.95
Against this backdrop and in the absence of committed and 
visionary leadership, it cannot be denied that at both regional and 
national levels it would be an exercise in futility to attempt sus-
taining the outcomes of ADF VII. Sadly, if African leaders con-
tinue to act in the way they are currently, the Consensus Statement 
may as well land in the heap of unimplemented texts on climate 
change, only to gather dust and be forgotten altogether.
Corruption and Economic Mismanagement
Corruption may be the most talked about problem in most 
African countries, many of which have been poorly managed for 
the better part of their post-independence histories. As we begin 
the twenty-first century, unfortunately, not much has changed; 
most of the leaders still use their official positions for self-
aggrandizement, as opposed to public service.96 In fact, over 
the years, many African countries have perpetually ranked very 
poorly on Transparency International’s corruption scorecard.97
In both the public and private spheres, the vice has greatly 
undermined the continent’s growth and development prospects, 
while exacerbating the costs and effects of climate change.98 
Undoubtedly, the resulting impoverishment, dilapidation of 
basic infrastructure, and decay of the social justice system, 
among many other associate evils, will adversely undermine 
the affected population’s resilience to shocks related to climate 
change. More importantly, corruption affects the flow of financ-
ing for addressing climate change.99 These are real challenges 
that starkly stand in the path to effectuation of the outcomes of 
ADF VII.
Continued Impoverishment and Worsening Food 
Insecurity
For decades, Africa has unsuccessfully struggled to eradi-
cate poverty.100 Closely intertwined with, and largely culmi-
nating from, poverty is chronic food insecurity, a situation that 
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has seen millions of Africans deprived of food, the most basic 
necessity in life. According to a recent estimate by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) of the UN, Africa hosts 
approximately thirty percent of the world’s hungry popula-
tion—about 276 million Africans face hunger.101 The causes are 
many and complex, and include corruption, protracted armed 
conflicts, economic and political marginalization, and continued 
desertification.
Unfortunately, the millions condemned to perpetual poverty 
and chronic food insecurity have often turned to various forms of 
environmentally harmful means of survival, including charcoal 
burning, fuel-wood vending, logging, and encroachment on for-
ests and other sensitive ecological zones to open up more farm-
lands. These actions will undoubtedly exacerbate the impacts of 
climate change in the affected areas, thereby portending a vis-
ible challenge to sustenance of the outcomes of ADF VII.
The Culture of Marginalization
Discussions on climate change issues in Africa are largely 
dominated by the political elites and their ilk.102 Many have been 
left out of the process. In particular, groups that have remained 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change (like indig-
enous peoples, women, children, and the youth) have been 
pushed to the peripheries of the discussion, and millions of Afri-
cans have had no effective voice in the process.103 This has fur-
ther led to a number of individuals and communities expressing 
skepticism of the nexus between the environment and climate 
change, thereby dismissing claims that the current problems are 
attributable to man’s activities.104
These challenges, which were expressly acknowledged at 
ADF VII,105 cannot be wished away even in the post-Forum 
periods, for they portend a serious challenge to effectuating the 
outcomes of the Forum. Indeed, it need not be emphasized that 
addressing these challenges will greatly contribute to sustenance 
of the outcomes.
Global Inaction and Unreliable Pledges
Africa’s efforts to address climate change issues cannot suc-
ceed if treated in isolation of the global trends. Further, we must 
not forget that, contributing only about 3.8% of the global GHG 
emissions,106 Africa is suffering the wrongs of others, and even 
if it were to fully tackle climate change in its domain, its efforts 
would not be more than a drop in the ocean. In light of this, a 
cursory view of the prevailing global practices reveals a mixed 
track record, with non-commitment surfacing at various times.
For instance, the commitment of some developed coun-
tries to address climate change in developing countries has 
been merely rhetorical; some of them have yet to honor their 
pledges under the current global financing mechanism.107 This 
has resulted in inadequate, unpredictable, and unreliable financ-
ing for climate change actions in Africa, as in other developing 
countries.108 The World Bank too has not been straightforward 
in its dealing with (and in) developing countries; through its sub-
sidiaries, it continues to finance the “global land rush”109 and 
other projects that would likely contribute to climate change.110
Surely, if Africa is to meaningfully address climate change, 
and if the outcomes of ADF VII are to be sustained, adequate, 
predictable, and reliable, financing for climate change actions is 
indispensable. Otherwise, in the absence of such external financ-
ing support and recognizing that most climate change actions 
are largely capital-intensive, Africa may be able to only do very 
little, if anything, to manage climate change on its own.
pRoSpectS in SuStaininG the outcomeS
Proliferation of Climate Funds
Over the last few years, we have witnessed proliferation of 
climate funds, a handful of which have benefited (or are expected 
to benefit) the African continent in its efforts to implement vari-
ous climate change mitigation and adaptation actions. Such fund-
ing regimes include the Clean Technology Fund (“CTF”),111 the 
Special Climate Fund (“SCF”),112 the Kyoto Protocol Adapta-
tion Fund,113 the Congo Basin Forest Fund (“CBFF”),114 the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (“FCPF”),115 the Global 
Environment Facility Trust Fund (“GEF Trust Fund”),116 the 
Global Climate Change Alliance (“GCCA”),117 the Least Devel-
oped Countries Fund (“LDCF”),118 and the Special Climate 
Change Fund (“SCCF”).119 These funding efforts received a 
major boost when the establishment of a “Green Climate” Fund 
was proposed at the recently concluded COP-16.120
It cannot be denied that, the dissatisfactions notwithstand-
ing,121 cumulatively, these initiatives can greatly contribute 
to Africa’s cause to address the challenges posed by climate 
change. If well harnessed, these funding mechanisms have the 
potential to significantly contribute to the sustaining the out-
comes of ADF VII.
Developments within the AU Framework
A number of recent developments within the AU frame-
work hold some positive prospects in sustaining the ADF VII 
Outcomes. For instance, on October 13, 2010, at a ceremony 
on the sidelines of ADF VII, the AU Commission, the AfDB, 
and UNECA launched the Climate for Development in Africa 
(“ClimDev-Africa”) Programme,122 which aims at strengthen-
ing the climate-resilience of economic growth and the MDGs 
through mainstreaming of CRM in sensitive sectors. Shortly 
thereafter, in November 2010, under the auspices of the AU 
Conference of Energy Ministers (“CEMA”), the AU Commis-
sion, the AfDB, and UNECA jointly hosted the First All-Africa 
Energy Week 2010 (“AAEW”), a high-level stakeholder forum 
for monitoring progress, taking stock, undertaking constructive 
dialog, and sharing knowledge, with the aim of enhancing uni-
versal energy access.123
In addition, on November 4, 2010, the AfDB launched the 
African Carbon Support Project (“ACSP”), which is designed 
to assist project developers in the continent in accessing carbon 
finance to ensure commercial viability of their projects.124 Most 
recently, on December 6, 2010, the AfDB representatives joined 
representatives from other Multilateral Development Banks in a 
joint side event of the COP-16, whose theme was “Scaling-up 
International Climate Finance.”125
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By and large, their individual merits or otherwise notwith-
standing, these initiatives hold immense potential to sustain the 
outcomes of ADF VII, as well as other regional commitments 
to address challenges related to climate change and variability.
The Cancún Gains
Though heavily criticized as having yielded too little,126 
COP-16 heralded a number of gains with potential to contrib-
ute to sustenance of the Outcomes of ADF VII. For instance, 
though not legally binding, the Cancún Agreement reflects some 
level of changing relations between developing countries and 
the developed countries; it embodies a “fairly modest” deal on 
reduction of emissions, calling on developed countries to reduce 
their GHG emissions (as pledged in the Copenhagen Accord).127 
The Agreement also proposes the establishment of a “Green 
Climate” Fund, which is intended to assist developing countries 
finance emission reductions and adaptation actions.128
Contributions of the Civil Society and the Private 
Sector
The African private sector and the civil society, though long 
excluded from the mainstream discussions, currently play indis-
pensable roles in addressing climate change issues on the con-
tinent. While the civil society has been particularly involved in 
lobby and advocacy activities,129 the private sector has proved 
critical in supplementing the existing global climate financing 
initiatives.130 For instance, on June 5, 2008, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—through 
their Nairobi-based Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(“AGRA”)—established the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund 
(“AECF”) to leverage private sector and donor funding for suc-
cessful eco-friendly projects and enterprises.131
SuStaininG the outcomeS: the way foRwaRD
In order to sustain the various outcomes of ADF VII, Afri-
can governments should, as a matter of priority, implement a 
number of measures. Though not offered as an absolute panacea 
for the climate change problem in Africa, these measures are 
believed to wield immense potential to sustain the outcomes and 
other related initiatives to address the challenges posed by cli-
mate change and variability on the continent.
First and foremost, they must back up their words with 
action—moving from the unending official rhetoric to offer-
ing effective leadership in addressing issues related to climate 
change. In particular, they have to link the continent’s Common 
Position and the prevailing regional, sub-regional, and national 
policies, strategies, practices, and programs. Second, they have 
to fully commit themselves to the fight against corruption, 
ensure proper targeting of funds received under the prevailing 
climate funds regimes, and establish effective normative and 
institutional frameworks. Third, they have to fully commit them-
selves to the fight against poverty, also through the establish-
ment of appropriate normative and institutional approaches, and 
with adequate budgetary focus.
Fourth, they must profile climate change as a human 
rights issue and nurture a sustainable culture of human rights, 
in particular through mainstreaming of human rights concerns 
into all regional, sub-regional, and national polices, strategies, 
practices, and programs. Indeed, climate change issues have 
to be effectively integrated in litigations on the environment, 
with effective remedies for any resulting violations of environ-
mental rights. Fifth, African governments need to effectively 
leverage the window of opportunity availed by climate change 
and variability, in particular the opportunity to establish green 
economies.
Sixth, African governments have to consider inviting lead-
ers from developed countries to their meetings, with a view to 
enabling them to fully appreciate the African version of the cli-
mate change debates. Seventh, they need to effectively engage 
the big GHG emitters, with a view to having them honor their 
pledges to reduce their emissions and support climate change 
adaptation and mitigation actions in Africa. Eighth, they need to 
engage the international community to break the long-standing 
lack of transparency at the Breton Woods institutions, in particu-
lar the World Bank.
Ninth, African governments have to invest in routine situ-
ational assessments in order to establish the progress, challenges 
and prospects in addressing climate change. In addition, they 
need to work towards breaking the reigning skepticism (through, 
for instance, broad-based social mobilization and dissemination 
on the interface between the environment and climate change. 
Further, the governments have to establish and sustain credible 
specialized institutions, preferably within the AU Commission 
framework, to coherently address climate change issues on the 
continent. In particular, they must prioritize the operationaliza-
tion of the AGF, while engaging the continent’s international 
development partners to sustainably support the initiative.
Last but not the least, African governments have to con-
sider subscribing to the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.132 The Protocol, which opened for signa-
ture and ratification on February 2, 2011, has the potential to 
promote more equitable distribution of genetic resources for the 
continent.
conclusIon
This article highlighted key challenges and prospects in sus-
taining the outcomes of ADF VII. Although immense challenges 
lie in the path to sustenance of the outcomes, there are equally 
immense prospects, which, if properly harnessed, can ultimately 
drive Africa towards effectively combating climate change. On 
the basis of the balance sheet of challenges and prospects, the 
article has offered measures that African governments must to 
adopt. These measures, though not an absolute panacea for the 
continent’s woes, have the potential to contribute to the cause of 
fighting the challenges posed by climate change and variability 
on the continent.
African leaders must improve the continent’s normative 
and institutional capacities to deal with the challenges posed 
by climate change. Undoubtedly, they cannot just sit and watch 
calamities unfold in series; the time has come for them to 
jointly and individually take action to avert the consequences 
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of climate change, if they are at all committed to saving Africa 
from fatal catastrophes. Otherwise, the continent’s hard-earned 
development gains may quickly erode, thereby subjecting more 
Africans to the curse of poverty for the foreseeable future.
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InTroducTIon
The notion that nothing is possible belongs to those who are reluctant or unwilling to take the first bold steps. South Africa has taken a bold step in the right direction, 
which may unlock various potential opportunities for renew-
able energy in South Africa. On March 31, 2009, the National 
Energy Regulator of South Africa (“NERSA”)1 announced 
the long-awaited Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (“REFIT”) 
Regulatory Guidelines. South Africa, in order to source and use 
energy in a sustainable way, has focused on renewable energy 
as opposed to energy from conventional sources.2 REFITs “are, 
in essence, guaranteed prices for electricity supply rather than 
conventional consumer tariffs.”3 The underlying basic economic 
principle underpinning this system is the “establishment of a tar-
iff (price) that covers the cost of generation plus a ‘reasonable 
profit’ to induce developers to invest.”4
In October 2009, NERSA approved REFIT Phase 2 based 
on the Levelized Cost of Electricity (“LCOE”).5 The newly 
approved regulatory framework adds new technologies to the 
existing REFIT guidelines, namely, biomass, biogas, concen-
trated solar without storage, photovoltaic (“PV”), concentrat-
ing photovoltaic, and concentrated solar power (central tower).6 
Though the guidelines were generally welcomed by the role 
players in the renewable industry, the overarching contention 
was the omission of PV from the March 2009 RREFIT guide-
lines.7 Consequently, Phase 2 of the guidelines addressed this 
concern and includes large-scale PV that is greater than 1 mega-
watt (“MW”)) due to economies of scale.8 It is expected that 
during the annual REFIT review, small-scale PV technology 
would be considered and added.9
The first and the second phases of the REFIT guidelines 
are the culmination of a study initiated in 2007 by NERSA10 
to facilitate the introduction of renewable energy generation 
into the electricity network in order to meet the target of 10,000 
gigawatt hours (“GWh”)11 from renewable energy sources, and 
possibly surpass the target prior to the 2013 due date set by the 
2003 Government White Paper on Renewable Energy.12 Articu-
lating the cost benefit of REFIT to the investors, NERSA likens 
it to the cost recovery used to regulate utilities, which is based 
on the cost of capital.13 There have been aggressive moves and 
attempts by the proponents of REFIT to rename the mechanism 
“Renewable Energy Payments” in order to stop using the term 
tariff. However, these efforts proved unsuccessful and the name 
still remains.14
implementinG a Renewable eneRGy feeD-in 
taRiff in South afRica:
the beGinninG of a new Dawn
by Dr. Kola O Odeku, Professor Edson L Meyer, Professor Obeng Mireku, and Professor JLH Letsoalo*
REFITs are common in many countries and are aimed at 
encouraging renewable energy generation by making renewable 
energy generators financially viable.15 The REFIT approach 
makes strategic sense in South Africa because it will serve as 
a powerful tool to address rapid climate disruption.16 REFIT is 
now promoting growth of renewable energy and private sector 
and donor financing at the same time.17
Against this backdrop, South Africa has joined a number of 
countries that have already introduced regulatory frameworks on 
REFIT.18 With the proper political and administrative will, the 
current steps taken towards aggressive implementation prom-
ise to be a success—particularly as the system was adopted by 
South Africa from countries that have successfully introduced 
and implemented REFIT.19 Germany, Spain, and Denmark are 
among the countries that have successfully used legislation to 
promote the least expensive and fastest growth of renewable 
energy.20 As a result of substantial successes achieved through 
renewable tariffs, massive increase in investments in renewable 
electricity generation has occurred and these countries have 
produced “more installed generating capacity and more robust 
competition among manufacturers.”21 Moreover, the tariffs 
have stimulated more renewable technology development, not 
withstanding some problems encountered at the commencement 
periods.22
polIcy Framework supporTs and  
beneFITs oF reFIT
“Within a policy framework, the development of renew-
able energy in South Africa is supported by the White Paper on 
Renewable Energy, which has set a target of 10,000 GWh [of] 
renewable energy to [contribute to the final] energy consump-
tion by 2013.”23 REFIT is anticipated to run over fifteen years 
until 2022,24 beyond the 2013 target of 10,000 GWh set by the 
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Department of Minerals and Energy (“DME”) in the 2003 White 
Paper on Renewable Energy.25 The “DME’s macroeconomic 
study of renewable energy, developed under the now completed 
Capacity Building in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(“CaBEERE”) project, has established that the achievement of 
this target would provide a number of economic benefits, includ-
ing increased government revenue amounting to R299 million, 
increased GDP of up to 1 billion [rand] per year and the creation 
of an estimated 20,500 new jobs.”26 “In addition, the develop-
ment of renewable energy beyond the 10,000 GWh target holds 
further employment benefits and would maximize the number of 
jobs created” per terawatt hour (“TWh”).27
One of the activists for the promotion and deployment of 
wind energy for electricity generation saluted the courage and 
the bold step taken by South Africa and described the REFIT as 
a laudable project.28 Stefan Gsänger, the Secretary General of 
the World Wind Energy Association said in a release that “South 
Africa is the first African country to introduce a feed-in tariff 
for wind energy. Many small and big investors will now be able 
to contribute to the take-off of the South African wind indus-
try. Such decentralized investment will enable South Africa to 
overcome its current energy crisis. It will also help many South 
African communities to invest in wind farms and generate elec-
tricity, new jobs and new income.”29
Furthermore, REFIT has many advantages over other mech-
anisms in spite of the extra initial cost.30 In order to ensure stable 
return on investment by the investors renewable power prices 
should not be subjected to the forces of demand and supply in 
the market place.31 Guaranteeing profits for project developers 
will serve as an impetus for the investors to expand the business 
by applying for credit/loan facility from banks and other finan-
cial institutions since repayments are guaranteed from the sale 
of electricity.32
souTh aFrIca’s renewable enerGy Feed-In 
TarIFF: an overvIew
backGRounD to initiativeS taken by Role-playeRS
REFIT was introduced in South Africa to progressively 
reduce carbon-based power generation by creating a move 
towards sustainable energy sources, along with socio-economic 
and environmentally sustainable growth.33 Endless debates in 
Parliament about energy crises, global footprints, endangered 
species, and new coal-fired power stations had done little to 
solve South African problems. Stemming from this lack of 
progress, efforts to decrease greenhouse gas emissions fostered 
a movement known as e-Parliament Renewable Energy Activ-
ists (“eREACT”) by some parliamentarians with the objective 
of shifting the government’s focus away from coal and nuclear 
towards renewable energy.34 The introduction of REFIT was ini-
tially met with stiff opposition from those entities that believed 
in business as usual.35 But, in 2008, South Africa endured a 
serious energy crisis when the national energy supplier, Eskom, 
failed to meet electricity demand.36 As a result, eREACT was 
able to influence future decisions and present the financial via-
bility of developing renewable energy in South Africa.37
This initiative commenced the bold step towards the estab-
lishment of the current energy generation mix in South Africa. 
South African Member of Parliament Dr. Ruth Rabinowitz, 
explaining the stiff opposition encountered in the Parliament, 
said that at the hearing of the private members’ legislative com-
mittee in the South African Parliament on the REFIT, “in spite 
of overwhelming support from NGO’s, businesses, academics, 
local governments and civil society, both the DME and Eskom 
were opposed to the idea of separate REFIT legislation” claim-
ing that the Guidelines had already been drafted and would be 
introduced to the public in early 2009.38 “Their resistance to 
Parliament’s involvement is hardly surprising since the Eskom 
monopoly is unlikely to suddenly give way to diversity, flex-
ibility and open competition.”39 The firm commitment and per-
severance of parliamentarians who believed that South Africa 
should jettison the notion of using cheap coal to generate elec-
tricity and shift to renewables eventually led to the promulgation 
of the regulatory guidelines.40
the GuiDelineS in context
The most potent legislative mechanism being used world-
wide to introduce and implement the use of renewable energy to 
generate energy is feed-in tariff. South Africa has just joined the 
numbers of the countries that are using renewable energy to gen-
erate power. It is the responsibility of NERSA to ensure that the 
energy utility, Eskom, purchases energy from the generators at a 
fixed price, provided they conform with the standard prescribed 
by NERSA.41 The guidelines contain twelve sections. Section 1 
provides a general introduction, while sections 2 and 3 highlight 
the purpose, scope, and objectives of the guidelines in detail. 
Purchase obligations of all players and stakeholders are outlined 
in section 4, while sections 5 and 6 deal extensively with the 
qualification criteria and the application process respectively. 
Section 7 enumerates tariffs applicable to different technolo-
gies. The rights and obligations of qualified renewable power 
generators, regulator, and renewable energy purchasing agency 
(“REPA”) are provided for in sections 8, 9, and 10 respectively. 
While section 11 provides for the monitoring, reporting, and 
review mechanisms, section 12 provides for appropriate appli-
cable law to resolve dispute arising from the guidelines. Any 
ensuing dispute must be resolved in accordance with section 5 of 
the Electricity Regulation Act 2006 of South Africa (including 
the Regulations).
expoSition, analySiS, anD cRitique of  
the GuiDelineS
Introduction, Purpose, Scope, and Objective
Section 1 of the guidelines provides an overview of why 
the government has opted for renewable energy provisions side 
by side with the current conventional energy. One of the key 
reasons is that renewable energy resources in South Africa are 
enormous.42 In a move to enlarge the market implementation, 
government has now, through NERSA, introduced REFIT.43 
“This is quite similar to the concept of cost recovery used in 
utility rate regulation based on the costs of capital”44 invested in 
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each technology deployed.45 With regards to cost, using the tech-
nique of degression, both the grid interconnection and metering 
are covered by REFIT.46 The overarching benefit of this is that 
the costs are spread across electricity customers and the tariff is 
reduced overtime.47 The essence of this technique is to mount 
pressure on the generators to continue to lower the costs of gen-
erating electricity from REFIT so that it will be affordable.
The IPPs will be remunerated based on the renewable 
energy power they feed into the national grid.48 The guidelines 
allow IPPs operators to receive preferential rate in a pay-for-
energy-delivered contract allowing them to earn payment over 
and above conventional prices.49 It is hoped that REFIT system 
will create and foster an enduring and economically sustainable 
renewable energy industry in South Africa.50
The scope and objective of the guidelines are outlined in 
section 3.51 Section 3.1 provides for the applicable rules and 
requirements governing license applications and the issuing 
of approved licenses to energy developers.52 Section 3.2 gives 
NERSA the mandate to determine the prices and the conditions 
under which generated electricity may be supplied.53 Sections 
3.3 and 3.4 provide that all subsequent relevant Acts of Amend-
ment would also be applicable in conjunction with relevant 
license procedures.
The underlying economic basis of section 3.2 is that eco-
nomic principles of supply and demand do not affect prices 
because NERSA has the absolute authority to determine the 
rates. The rationale for this is that these prices have been chosen 
to promote and increase investment in renewable energy, allow 
small enterprises to make substantive entry into the market, and 
operate by generating electricity for sale. This model is suitable 
to developing countries in view of the fact that energy markets 
are small in number and dispersed.54
But these guidelines could be amended by subsequent Acts 
under section 3.3,55 which raises some concerns. The section 
sets no boundaries on what type of amendments are permit-
ted.56 A preferred approach would be to exempt certain provi-
sions from future amendment. One provision that, if amended, 
would undermine the entire regulation is the guarantee of pay-
ments over a specified period of time. This is assuredly the only 
way an investor can realize the projected return on investment. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no explicit prohibition 
on amending any section, the fears of the investors have been 
allayed by virtue of section 3.5(ii), which states that one of the 
key objectives and principles of REFIT is the establishment of 
“a guaranteed price for electricity generated from renewables for 
a fixed period of time that provides a stable income stream and 
an adequate return on investment.”57
Obligation to Purchase
Section 3.5(iv) enables access to the grid and obligates 
Eskom to purchase power generated by IPPs. Eskom is des-
ignated as the Single Buyer and appointed as the Renewable 
Energy Purchasing Agency (“REPA”) under sections 4 and 4.3. 
To be eligible the generator must follow the rules and proce-
dures of the regulatory body duly licensed under section 5.4 and 
fulfill all the license conditions under Section 5.5. While Eskom 
must purchase electricity from the IPPs at set rates, under sec-
tion 4.4 the IPPs can also sell renewable energy to buyers out-
side of REFIT.58
If a particular generator receives a license and fails to pro-
duce electricity for any reason, NERSA faces no obligations to 
the generator and Eskom cannot be compelled to act on its pur-
chasing obligation.59 Consequently, the maxim nemo dat quad 
non abet meaning you cannot give what you do not have applies 
to the generator if it fails to produce electricity.
Financial Implications for Consumers
Section 3.5(v) mandates the establishment of an equal 
playing field with conventional electricity, but this provision is 
ambiguous in both context and content.60 The meaning of “an 
equal level playing field” is not defined in the guidelines and 
this may result to different interpretations. Section 3.6 allows 
for future inclusion of more technologies, bands within tech-
nologies, and incentives for projects in different geographical 
areas.61 Section 4.5 provides that the financial subsidy required 
to offset the difference in the cost of energy purchased under 
REFIT and the Avoided Cost will be borne by all Eskom elec-
tricity customers through existing “pass-through” arrange-
ments for costs of independent power production.62 While this 
provision makes good economic and financial sense, a cursory 
look at the section shows that neither the poor nor the rich are 
exempted from the “pass-through” arrangements.63 The implica-
tion of this is that various customers of Eskom, irrespective of 
their resources, will bear the financial burden. In South Africa, 
both advanced and developing economies operate alongside one 
another. Those who live in perpetual abject poverty outnum-
bered the rich elites.64
The huge disparity of income in South Africa is reflected in 
limited access to electricity, with the majority of the population 
in rural areas living without modern electricity.65 Even where 
there is access, electricity is not usually affordable and is consid-
ered a luxury by most residents. Even in those areas serviced by 
a grid, there have been reports of persistent default or non-pay-
ment of electricity bills and in some instances, these people have 
improvised and connected to the grid illegally.66 The drafters of 
the guidelines should have excluded indigents and the poor from 
the current additional burden of paying more for electricity.67 
Governments in countries such as Denmark, Australia, and a 
number of U.S. states are sensitive to the plight of indigent citi-
zens who would not be able to afford electricity. Consequently, 
various concessions in the form of subsidies and incentives such 
as reduction in bills, special loans, extra rebates and so on, are 
being offered to unemployed, elderly, disabled, and low-income 
households.68 As noted earlier, section 3.3 authorizes amend-
ments; the guidelines should be amended to offer a range of con-
cessions to the poorest of the poor, as has occurred in the United 
States, Australia, and Denmark.
Qualification Criteria for the Generator
Section 5 lists the qualification criteria for renewable 
generators. Section 5.1 defines renewable energy, and section 
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5.2—read together with the newly published phase 269—sets out 
the specific types of renewable energy technologies that qual-
ify for participation in the REFIT scheme. Section 5.3 requires 
NERSA to consider adding additional technologies to the list of 
qualifying generators.70
By virtue of section 5.5(i), renewable energy generators 
may generate electricity from non-renewables. But the gen-
erators must report the quantities of electricity generated from 
these two different sources.71 Section 5.5(ii) provides for moni-
toring and verification to ensure credible production of renew-
able energy.72 Failure on the part of any electricity generators to 
comply or act in accordance with sections 5.5(i) or 5.5(ii) leads 
to the imposition of sanctions under section 5.5(iii), including 
termination of the REFIT license.73
Importantly, under section 5.7, REFIT does not include any 
electricity generated off-grid.74 Rather, “REFIT only includes 
power generation from generators connected to the Transmis-
sion System and Distribution System and excludes off-grid 
power generation.”75 Although this is the current scheme, in the 
near future advancement in technology innovation and diffusion 
might allow for the consideration of off-grid.76
Application Process
Sections 6.1 to 6.4 require the renewable electricity gen-
erator to state the specific REFIT technology and tariff category 
for electricity produced in accordance to section 6.2. This will 
enable regulatory authority to “specify the technology, the tariff 
approved, duration of the REFIT, and other specific licensing 
conditions” in compliance with section 6.4.77 The purpose of 
this section is to ensure that applicants state the type of technol-
ogy used, due to different prices for electricity produced from 
each technology.78 It is expected that the majority of the appli-
cants will use technologies that are economically beneficial in 
terms of cost and maintenance, and at the same time reap the 
so-called “reasonable profit” because this will continue to guar-
antee return on investment and the continuity of the venture.
Tariffs
Section 7.3 protects the licensees against inflation in each 
year of operation and allows for an adjustment to the tariffs once 
per annum using the consumer price index (“CPI”) or another 
suitable inflation index.79 Section 7.4 requires monitoring of the 
performance and the impacts of each technology, as well as anal-
ysis of reports from the monitoring to ascertain whether there is 
any need for review.80 Irrespective of whether or not inflation 
occurs, a full tariff review will take place every year for the first 
five-year period of implementation and every three years there-
after.81 Section 7.5 stipulates that the resulting tariffs will only 
be applicable to new projects.82 Section 7.6 provides for future 
pricing of electricity produced by the generators. Consequently, 
at the end of the contracted REFIT tariff, the generator will be 
required to negotiate tariffs under current market conditions.83 
The implication is that the economic principles of demand and 
supply will dictate prices to be charged by the regulator. While 
this is beneficial to the regulator, it does not foreclose the appro-
priate intervention by the regulator at any point in time—this 
is achievable in view of the fact that the generators still have 
to negotiate tariffs under market conditions. The significance 
of these tariffs is that they will stimulate the inflow of invest-
ment into the renewable sector and increase the pool of capital 
in the sector, which may be used to promote the innovation and 
advancement in renewable technology.84
Rights and Obligations of Generators, Regulators,  
and REPA
Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the guidelines explicitly provide 
for the rights and obligations of all parties.85 Any meaningful 
discussion on rights and obligations must necessarily be founded 
on conceptualization of both terms. The description of rights as 
enshrined in the guidelines recognizes the legal rights of the gen-
erators to be entitled to an amount that will ensure their invest-
ments are properly protected, connected to the grid, and able 
to provide a reasonable return on investment. In the same vein, 
regulators are expected to act responsibly by virtue of section 
8.5, which mandates that all the parties be on an equal level.86
It must however be mentioned that failure to act as stipu-
lated under section 8.5 of the guidelines imposes an obligation 
on the regulator to apply the appropriate sanction that could lead 
to termination of the erring generator’s license.87 This is the only 
reason why the right of the generator could be restricted. Conclu-
sive and well founded evidence that a generator has acted con-
trary to section 8.5, for instance by generating electricity from 
non-renewable technology mentioned in the guidelines without 
a full disclosure to the regulator, will automatically affect all the 
inherent rights in the guidelines and allow for imposition of the 
appropriate sanction.
Monitoring, Reporting, and Review.
In accordance with sections 11.1 to 11.10, the regulator 
will closely monitor the overall activities of the players and 
stake holders enshrined in the REFIT. Monitoring, collection, 
and maintenance of data on energy purchased under REFIT are 
outlined in section 11.2, and the publication of summary of the 
progress report by June 1st of every year is required by section 
11.4. Section 11.4(iii) mandates the regulator to disclose the 
financial impacts of REFIT, which includes both the increase 
in electricity prices and the additional overall cost to consum-
ers.88 This proviso serves as a basis for determining whether the 
poor and previously disadvantaged people are able or not able 
to access electricity services due to the additional cost imposed 
on them. If the majority of the poor are unable to access and use 
electricity based on the increase in cost, one of the fundamentals 
of poverty reduction and eradication, as enshrined in the prin-
ciples set out in the Millennium Development Goals, will not be 
achieved.89 One of the ways to assist the poor in realizing their 
economic and social aspirations is to offer them concessions on 
electricity. It is suggested that in the interim, costs should be 
passed on to the affluent in the hybrid residential and industrial 
areas of urban South Africa. Various electrical appliances and 
industrial equipment that are not energy efficient are used in 
these areas. Increasing the costs of electricity for the more afflu-
ent might encourage them to use energy efficient appliances. An 
SuStainable Development law & policy49
additional benefit of this differential pricing would ultimately be 
less pressure on the transmitters from reduced energy use.
Resolution of Disputes and Remedies
Section 12 provides that any disputes arising from the oper-
ation of REFIT would be resolved as laid down in sections 42 to 
43 the Electricity Regulation Act 2006.90 Before the commence-
ment of any dispute resolution, the Minister is compelled by vir-
tue of section 42(3) to prescribe the procedure to be followed for 
the mediation and the fees to be paid.91 However, mediation or 
arbitration of disputes occurs only at the request of the parties to 
the dispute by virtue of section 42(4).92 While section 42(1)(a) 
compels the regulator to appoint a mediator in a dispute between 
licensees if so requested by both parties to the dispute, sections 
42(1)(b) and 42(2) give discretionary power to the regulator to 
appoint a suitable person to mediate.93
However, if any party disagrees with the outcome of the 
decisions regarding adjudication as provided in section 42, such 
party, under section 43, can seek remedies pursuant to section 10 
of the National Energy Regulation Act of 2004, and specifically 
invoke sections 10(3)(4)(a)(b) which provide that:
Any person may institute proceedings in the High 
Court for the judicial review of an administrative action 
by the Energy Regulator in accordance with the Promo-
tion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 of 
2000). Any person affected by a decision of the Energy 
Regulator sitting as a tribunal may appeal to the High 
Court against such decision. The procedure applicable 
to an appeal from a decision of a magistrate’s court in 
a civil matter applies, with the changes required by the 
context, to an appeal contemplated in paragraph (a).94
Section 10(1)(a) of the Act recognizes the supremacy of the 
Constitution of the Republic South Africa.95 Hence every deci-
sion of the regulator or of the mediator, arbitrator or any person 
appointed by the regulator, must be consistent with the provi-
sions of the Constitution and applicable laws. The legal impli-
cation is that any party who is not satisfied with the decisions 
arising out of section 42 of the Electricity Regulator Act, can 
appeal for review of the decision, and ultimately appeal consti-
tutional rights up to the Constitutional court.
conclusIon
The establishment of REFIT in South Africa provides an 
excellent opportunity for South Africa to increase the use of 
renewable energy and enhance the growth of the sector both 
nationally and internationally. Most of the renewable energy 
considered for the initial implementation has been included as 
a result of experiences and success stories in countries that have 
introduced and implemented REFIT. However, there is need 
for extensive and expansive improvements in areas such as, 
namely, harmonization of various policies on renewable energy, 
enhancement of the standard to achieve sustainability, dissem-
ination of information on the benefits of renewable energy to 
attract investors, making stakeholders be more proactive, and 
creating enabling policy and law for concessions and incentives 
that will continue to bring down the cost of investment and make 
cost of electricity affordable.
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InTroducTIon
To adequately protect the national security interests of the United States, the President should immediately imple-ment domestic policies and vigorously pursue agreement 
on international standards that stabilize greenhouse gas concen-
tration at 350 parts per million (“ppm”) as soon as possible, and 
no later than 2050.1 The Obama Administration acknowledged 
the real threat climate change poses to U.S. security in the 2009 
National Intelligence Strategy (“NIS”) and 2010 National Secu-
rity Strategy (“NSS”).2 However, in failing to use the authority 
delegated to the Committee on Transnational Threats to imple-
ment climate change prevention policies, the Administration has 
not met its obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to 
protect U.S. people, property, and interests.3
The most politically feasible and compelling argument for 
addressing climate change promptly is that U.S. security depends 
upon it. Threats to security emanating from climate change are 
many and varied, internal and external, and are already begin-
ning to occur.4 This article explains the science behind climate 
change, then discusses the impacts that climate change will 
have on people and communities, and the relationship of those 
impacts to threats on U.S. security. In response to these impacts, 
the article examines national security law and the Administra-
tion’s faulty understanding of its power under that law and sug-
gests how the Administration can use the authority it already 
possesses to implement the necessary policies to ensure a com-
prehensive national security program and actions to take to meet 
the present and future threat posed by climate change.
clImaTe scIence
There is no longer any scientifically sound question as to 
whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring, and will 
continue to occur in the future; only the ongoing debate of how 
much change human activity will produce remains.5 The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report finds 
definitive anthropogenic warming between 3.2°F and 9.2°F 
over the twenty-first century.6 Based on the amount of carbon 
already released into the atmosphere, the Earth is committed to 
a temperature increase of at least 2°F.7 The best estimates of 
the IPCC, which depend on future reductions in CO2 emissions, 
predict global average temperature increases of 3.2°F to 7.2°F 
during the twenty-first century.8
In order to understand climate science, it is important to 
also understand the political environment surrounding climate 
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change science and to consider what that means for determining 
future policies in the United States. The IPCC is a joint project 
of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organi-
zation that has compiled extensive, highly scrutinized data9 to 
become the source of internationally accepted science on cli-
mate change, relied on by governments around the world includ-
ing the U.S. government.10
The problem with the scientific numbers presented by the 
IPCC is that they are influenced by the politics of strong, fossil-
fuel-dependent nations like Saudi Arabia, the United States, and 
China, whose economies run on the sale and use of fossil fuels.11 
The desire to keep their economies humming without chang-
ing their habits is a strong incentive to downplay the impacts 
of CO2.
12 Middle Eastern member states, like Saudi Arabia, 
work to ensure that the primary export upon which their entire 
economy depends on is not rendered valueless by the findings.13 
Thus, the highly certain findings of the IPCC report exist in spite 
of the efforts of oil exporting countries to water-down the lan-
guage until more evidence of anthropogenic change is found.14 
The result is an IPCC report with watered-down, politically 
motivated findings,15 being represented to the global community 
as scientifically factual findings,16 and ultimately the interna-
tional acceptance of compromised science as the basis for cli-
mate change policy.
Other scientists, unconstrained by the challenges within 
the IPCC, believe more significant temperature—and climate—
change will occur.17 Scientists know from studying ice cores 
that Earth’s surface temperature increased 9°F when CO2 lev-
els in the atmosphere rose by 100 ppm at the end of the last 
ice age.18 Thus, logic renders it unlikely that a doubling of CO2 
over the level in 1800 (an increase of approximately 280 ppm, 
or nearly three times larger than the prior increase) will result in 
a temperature increase of just 5.4°F, as the IPCC seems to pre-
dict.19 Based on scientific data, leading experts believe that the 
current global goal must be to reduce CO2 concentrations below 
350 ppm in order to prevent and reverse destabilizing global 
warming.20
Climate science is becoming increasingly more accurate 
as scientists continue to refine computer simulation programs 
called Global Circulation Models.21 With increasing frequency, 
these computer programs are able to accurately model weather 
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and climate events based on inputted data, for events that already 
happened in the past.22 Because the events already happened and 
we know what the model should look like, the computer models’ 
accuracy can be readily tested and proven by its ability to cor-
rectly forecast those events.23
Comparing current predictions with known previous atmo-
spheric changes illustrates the appropriateness of skepticism 
regarding the more conservative scientific estimates, like those 
of the IPCC. Further, the scientifically accepted 550 ppm CO2 
“threshold,” which is the maximum allowable level to avoid 
inducing dangerous climate change, is nearly twice as high as 
pre-Industrial Revolution levels.24 Even the IPCC predicts an 
increase in temperature varying from 3.2°F to 7.2°F,25 which 
is clearly below the 9°F history has proven can occur.26 Given 
these illogical ratios, it is reasonable to be skeptical of the con-
servative estimates of the impacts of climate change, rather than 
skeptical that climate change is real.
ways In whIch clImaTe chanGe ImpacTs 
ThreaTen u.s. securITy
Congress and the White House understand that climate 
change threatens U.S. national security, because it threatens 
internal systems and contributes to the destabilization of gov-
ernments and people abroad.27 The range of threats begin with 
“natural” disasters, including increasingly severe hurricanes like 
Katrina in 2005,28 and extend to heightened terrorism risks as 
diminished resources threaten livelihoods and foreign popula-
tions slip further into extremism.29
Natural disaster impacts are easier to visualize because they 
have a direct cause and effect. Sea level rise threatens to wipe 
small island nations off the face of the Earth.30 Rapid rising sea 
levels of this type directly threaten military infrastructure on 
low-lying islands, and in all coastal regions worldwide.31 More 
hurricanes of higher intensity means military equipment and 
personnel must be moved out of harm’s way, adding expense 
and wear and tear, reducing general readiness, and interrupting 
training operations.32 Increasingly severe storms can devastate 
infrastructure, as hurricane Andrew damaged Homestead Air 
Force Base in Florida in 1992 and prevented the base from ever 
reopening.33 More frequent and intense flooding has similar 
impacts, requiring disaster response, while simultaneously dam-
aging the economy, and wasting resources that could be utilized 
elsewhere. The Navy has additional concerns about vessel safety 
in a polar ice-free world, since mapping of shifting ice locations 
will become more difficult.34
The United States has the most varied and severe weather 
of any country on Earth.35 With vast, drought-prone, high, arid 
plains, extensive coasts vulnerable to sea level rise, coasts that 
have already been battered by record-intensity hurricanes, and 
plains repeatedly flooded by rivers following massive rains and 
snow-melt runoff, the United States has more to lose in terms of 
climate change induced domestic threats than nearly any other 
country, except perhaps those that will be lost to the oceans.36 
The western states should prepare for decreased snowpack and 
correspondingly reduced summer runoff37 and extended periods 
of drought.38 Without even addressing the military components 
of homeland security, these direct impacts on the infrastructure, 
economy, and livelihoods of citizens threaten the security of 
most of the largest cities in the U.S., because they are located 
on coasts, and much of the farmland located in flood plains.39 It 
is clear, however, that changing precipitation patterns, increased 
severe weather events, and rising sea levels are all expected in 
the future, with negative direct implications for U.S. national 
security interests.40
The more complex threats are the indirect effects, which 
result not from the changed climate and associated weather 
events, but from the human actions which follow. As resources 
become scarcer and local living conditions harsher, populations 
with weak governments that are unable to assist those people in 
adapting to changes will likely resort to methods of self-pres-
ervation.41 U.S. military leaders expect the United States will 
see increased conflict for resources, mass migrations to escape 
the dearth of resources, and incidences of terrorism.42 Where the 
most basic resource needs—food and water—go unmet, disputes 
spiral into full-fledged conflict,43 as evidenced by the “at least 
[eleven] violent conflicts since 1990 [which] have been fueled 
in part by the degradation of renewable natural resources.”44 In 
these situations, populations may turn to extremism and terror-
ism,45 similar to al-Qaida in Afghanistan where half the coun-
try’s gross domestic product comes from farming or ranching, 
but drought and overuse of the land has left most of the country 
at risk of desertification.46 Populations will also likely participate 
in mass migrations as environmental refugees increase global 
tensions and further strain resources in the new location.47 The 
IPCC and others believe that average global warming exceeding 
3.6°F may be dangerous,48 while others argue that 3.6°F “warm-
ing would be catastrophic for large segments of humanity.”49
This type of instability in the developing world is a “threat 
multiplier”50 and U.S. military leaders believe that “climate 
change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on 
terror”51 because “droughts, violent weather, ruined agricultural 
lands—those are the kinds of stresses we’ll see more of under cli-
mate change [which lead directly to] more poverty, more forced 
migrations, higher unemployment” so that “climate change pro-
longs those conditions [that increase terrorism risks] . . . [and] 
makes them worse.”52 Many nations that struggle to maintain 
political stability currently, or are likely terrorist safe-havens, are 
also highly vulnerable to destabilizing climate change impacts, 
such as drought,53 flooding,54 and increased disease.55 When a 
region is “traumatized by an event or a change in conditions trig-
gered by climate change . . . [i]f the government there is not able 
to cope with the effects . . . you can be faced with a collapsing 
state . . . as breeding grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for 
warlords.”56 Ultimately, these conditions enhance the threat of 
terrorist networks and risks for U.S. security.57
Increased temperatures will have dire consequences for 
fresh water access, flood mitigation, and human health.58 Access 
to fresh water for drinking, farming, and hygiene is threatened 
by changing precipitation patterns and especially by altered 
mountain glacier runoff.59 Three billion people already live in 
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water-stressed developing nations. However, that number is 
expected to increase to half of the global population by 2030 and 
those people will be exposed to high water stress, beyond what 
is currently experienced.60 In addition to the increased spread 
of disease resulting from reduced water availability,61 human 
exposure to malaria will double and dengue fever will increase 
with only a 1°F to 2°F temperature rise as the geographical 
range of mosquitoes expands to new regions.62 Drought—or 
permanently drier climates—result in food and water shortages, 
as seen in Darfur, Sudan, that pose serious threats to stability,63 
and these conditions are expected to increase around the globe.64 
What began in Darfur as a struggle between farmers and camel 
herders for minimal water during time of “drought” became a 
permanent end of precipitation in the region, leading to despera-
tion, civil unrest, and mass migrations.65 Mass migrations out of 
permanently “drought” afflicted areas into northern hemisphere 
countries should be anticipated, along with strained resources 
and tempers in all regions.66
Changes in sea level and acidity could also have a devastat-
ing impact on communities around the world.67 Approximately 
two-thirds of the world population lives within fifty miles of 
the coast, and in some places, including New Orleans and The 
Netherlands, below sea-level.68 Many vulnerable populations 
live within the expected zone of sea-level rise, including the 
ten million inhabitants living within three feet of sea-level in 
Bangladesh.69 In addition to the encroaching waters, many of 
the vulnerable populations are also vulnerable to the increasing 
acidity of the oceans, which is a primary source for protein for 
more than one billion people.70 Ocean acidity is increasing at a 
rate that will be evolutionarily difficult for fish to keep up with, 
and diminished food supplies are expected to result in greater 
unrest.71
Between increased crises within the United States, reduced 
capacity to respond to those crises, and the possibility of 
increased extremism abroad, climate change impacts directly 
and indirectly threaten U.S. national security. If the President 
truly believes that “[t]o advance our common security, we must 
address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster 
instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately 
undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within 
their borders,”72 then the United States must address climate 
change as a leading future cause of those political and economic 
de-stabilizers.
The developmenT and role oF  
naTIonal securITy law
The Obama Administration fully acknowledges that prompt 
and sweeping action is needed to bring greenhouse gases 
(“GHG”) to a safe level, thereby reducing the effects and degree 
of climate change.73 The 2010 NSS acknowledges that the “dan-
ger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe” and that 
the effects of climate change “will lead to new conflicts over 
refugees and resources” as well as “catastrophic natural disas-
ters.”74 However, the Administration incorrectly believes that 
comprehensive legislation from Congress is required before 
such climate protection actions can be taken.75 The Administra-
tion already has the authority to take decisive action under the 
National Security Act.
The National Security Act of 1947 (“NSA”) established the 
National Security Council (“NSC”) with the intention of ensur-
ing an open and effective working “relationship between those 
responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military 
policy”76 by creating a central advisory coordinating office for 
all matters related to national security.77 Before World War II, 
it had become increasingly clear that the United States needed 
a more unified approach to deal with national security issues, 
and that need became apparent to the public at large with the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.78 The NSC may have originally been 
conceived of as an advisory group, rather than a force for imple-
mentation, but the group’s function has varied to both ends of 
that spectrum over the years.79
The sweeping language in the opening lines of the National 
Security Act of 1947 expresses Congress’s acknowledgement 
of the need for a large-scale program to address threats to U.S. 
security.80 The Act opens with the declaration that, “[i]n enact-
ing this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a com-
prehensive program for the future security of the United States; 
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and pro-
cedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Gov-
ernment relating to the national security.”81 The Act does not 
define a threat to national security, instead leaving that unde-
fined for future experts to determine in order to fulfill the stated 
purpose of the Act.82
Congress also provided for a National Security Council 
whose purpose was advising the President regarding “the inte-
gration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the 
national security to enable the military services and the other 
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more 
effectively in matters involving the national security,”83 and 
other duties in addition to functions directed by the President.84 
Congress’s plain intention was government-wide policies pro-
moting national security. Though some members of Congress 
expressed concern that the NSA should not delegate unsuper-
vised authority to the Executive,85 they were persuaded that 
extensive delegation would not deprive Congress the author-
ity of oversight or implementation of new laws,86 and gave the 
Executive the power necessary to carry out the desired mission: 
protecting national security.87 Additionally, at the time of enact-
ment, like today, flexibility in national security was a serious 
concern and other members of Congress believed too many 
restrictions on military activity would undermine the purpose of 
unifying defense intelligence and strategy under this new pro-
tocol.88 Ultimately, Congress was convinced of the necessity 
of the NSC as an advisory council to the President and coordi-
nation center for all matters relating to national security.89 The 
result of these competing Congressional concerns was a broadly 
written statute creating the NSC, which has enabled Presidents 
to determine the structure and workings of the Council, while 
conforming to the purpose, functions, and duties established in 
the original Act of 1947.90
SuStainable Development law & policy53
Given the flexibility of the NSA, Presidents have altered 
the structure and use of the NSC from its beginnings to fit their 
leadership styles and the changing nature of the challenges faced 
by the nation at any particular time.91 Where President Truman 
rejected the authority to promote “implementation,” President 
Eisenhower specifically authorized the coordinated implemen-
tation of national security policies under the NCS, creating an 
Operations Coordinating Board.92 While this “implementa-
tion” function was criticized by some, its legal validity was not 
questioned,93 and President Kennedy went on to invoke similar 
powers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, even after rejecting the 
practice.94
The oscillating nature of the NSC95 peaked during President 
Reagan’s tenure, in the form of the Iran-Contra Affair, but ulti-
mately resulted in a strong and stable NSC to shape and monitor 
the implementation of national security policy.96 Accordingly, 
extensive reforms were made whereby the NSC became respon-
sible for making policy recommendations and “reviewing, coor-
dinating, and monitoring the implementation of national security 
policy.”97 Upon assuming office, President George H. W. Bush 
was able to use his experience as the lead intelligence officer to 
the NSC as a prior Director of National Intelligence to estab-
lish working groups (Policy Coordinating Committees “PCCs”) 
for the NSC that actually worked.98 This structure was also 
adopted by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush because of 
its effectiveness.99
Congressional approval of increased authority to the Execu-
tive was evident following the attacks on September 11, 2001 in 
the United States, in the creation of the Department of Home-
land Security,100 and in President Bush’s creation of a Homeland 
Security Council (“HSC”) with extensive powers.101 The Presi-
dent created the HSC to assist in developing and implementing 
homeland security policy, and created the Policy Coordinat-
ing Committees—modeled after the NSCs PCCs that became 
so effective under the first President Bush—to coordinate the 
development and implementation of homeland security policies, 
including working with local governments.102 Congress passed 
legislation supporting this Executive-created expanded author-
ity (the HSC’s creation), and authorized the Council to advise 
the President and “perform such other functions as the President 
may direct,”103 supporting a similar attitude towards the NSC, 
which also contains language authorizing “other functions as 
the President may direct.”104 Even before September 11, 2001, 
Congressional appreciation for the need of unified, flexible, and 
responsive national security systems, following increasing inter-
national terror attacks,105 was plainly expressed in the passage 
of the Intelligence Renewal Act of 1996.106
Specifically, Congress added the Committee on Transna-
tional Threats (“CTT”) to the NSC107 as part of a commitment to 
reexamine and modernize intelligence and security programs108 
following attacks on U.S. soil in the 1990s.109 The statute 
defines a “transnational threat” as “any transnational activity 
(including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery sys-
tems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the 
national security of the United States”110 or “any individual or 
group that engages in an activity referred to in [the prior defi-
nition].”111 The CTT is directed to “coordinate and direct the 
activities of the United States government relating to combat-
ing transnational threats.”112 The Committee is required to iden-
tify these threats; develop strategies to respond to such threats; 
“monitor implementation” of those strategies; make recommen-
dations of appropriate responses to specific transnational threats; 
develop policies and “procedures” to ensure effective informa-
tion sharing about such threats between Federal departments and 
agencies; and develop guidelines to enhance and improve the 
coordination of activities regarding national security.113
The Committee membership includes the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attor-
ney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, and any other members that the President chooses to 
include.114 The NSC membership has fluctuated remarkably 
since its inception,115 but Congress clearly granted the President 
authority to include any one else he believes is properly included 
for the purpose of protecting national security from transnational 
threats.
Congress understood when passing the Intelligence Renewal 
and Reform Act of 1996 that with the close of the Cold War, 
non-traditional factors, from increasingly varied sources,116 
influenced national security.117 Before passage of the law, floor 
speeches from members of both houses of Congress advocated 
for an adaptable118 and “dynamic” twenty-first century secu-
rity force119 to counter the “rapidly changing threats.”120 This 
included environmental research desired by the departments to 
increase “understanding of global environmental challenges.”121 
The language in the Conference Report indicates that Congress 
supports CTT engagement in both developing and implement-
ing coordinated policies across departments to protect the nation 
from transnational threats, whatever they may be.122
Climate change is a transnational threat to U.S. national 
security by the plain language of the law. First, it inherently 
extends beyond the national borders of the United States 
because it occurs across the planet through the atmosphere and 
oceans.123 Second, the negative impacts of climate change, doc-
umented above, both from a purely domestic perspective and 
from added tensions and risks at the global scale, establish the 
consequences of climate change as national security threats.124 
The original intention of Congress to create a unified security 
force capable of adapting to the emerging and unknown threats 
that left the United States vulnerable prior to World War II sup-
ports these broad and evolving views of national security.125 
Even President George W. Bush’s policies support the inclu-
sion of climate change by including “manmade disasters” in the 
realm of national security.126 Thus climate change plainly falls 
within the delegated responsibility of the NSA’s Committee on 
Transnational Threats.
Congress has specifically recognized the importance of 
climate change in the context of national defense127 and, since 
2008, has required the Department of Defense to include the 
armed forces capability to handle “the consequences of climate 
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change” in its Quadrennial Defense Review.128 At the same 
time, Congress required all future National Security Strategy129 
and National Defense Strategy reports to provide military per-
sonnel guidance on how to “assess the risks of projected climate 
change.”130
Excuses that responsibility for implementing policies to 
protect against climate change are already within the authority 
of other departments and agencies within the Executive, and thus 
outside the President’s authority within the NSC, are unfounded. 
This argument rests on CO2 regulation by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”), which currently only has authority 
to regulate GHG emissions131 to protect the public health or wel-
fare.132 EPA does not have authority to implement GHG policies 
to protect national security.133 The President and his NSC have 
a mandate to do so,134 and climate change policy is not solely 
about air quality standards, but also about protecting Americans 
from increasing threats posed by catastrophic weather events, 
destabilized global populations, and terrorism.
The variation in Presidential styles and uses of the NSC over 
the years, recently expanded powers granted to the Presidency, 
and creation of the CTT all demonstrate the President’s power to 
use the NSC to establish policies and to oversee their implemen-
tation in the other departments. President Obama ought to use 
his NSC to implement policies protecting the U.S. from modern 
threats,135 since the purpose of the Act was to provide the United 
States with a “comprehensive program . . . of integrated policies 
and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of 
the government relating to the national security.”136 Congress 
has recognized climate change as a national security issue137 and 
it is now the President’s responsibility to use the NSC and the 
CTT to their fullest capacity, as Congress intended, to protect 
U.S. security.
recommendaTIons
U.S. national security policies cannot be based on inter-
nationally accepted science, when that science is subject to 
manipulation by segments of the U.S. public and private sec-
tors, as well as some of the very nations whose activities may 
threaten U.S. national security.138 To adequately address climate 
change in the national security context, the United States ought 
to abandon its reliance on the conservative IPCC estimates and 
use the best available science to determine the actual risks, and 
likelihood of those risks, to people, property, and interests of 
the United States.139 Recent studies, including those by NASA 
scientists, make clear that change must occur promptly to ade-
quately reduce CO2 levels.
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The United States should also take on the challenge like a 
new Cold War, fully deploying all resources necessary to defeat 
the threat. President Obama already recognized this in his 2010 
National Security Strategy stating,
[w]hen the world was confronted by fascism, America 
prepared itself to win a war and to shape the peace 
that followed. When the United States encountered an 
ideological, economic, and military threat from com-
munism, we shaped our practices and institutions at 
home—and policies abroad—to meet this challenge. 
Now, we must once again position the United States 
to champion mutual interests among nations and 
peoples.141
Fully engaging to defeat the threats of climate change will 
require more than just tax incentives—though these should be 
utilized too—it will require significant financial investment in 
overhauling U.S. infrastructure and international diplomatic 
maneuvering to effect the necessary changes.142
First, the President should implement an aggressive green 
Job Corps program, in the style of President Franklin Roos-
evelt’s Works Progress Administration, employing Americans 
and building U.S. infrastructure for the new technological age, 
harnessing the power of proven renewable energy resources.143 
While such a program would cost significant sums of money, it 
would also provide jobs to millions of Americans144 who cur-
rently receive ongoing unemployment benefits, without any ben-
efit to U.S. infrastructure, as the job market refuses to improve 
significantly.145 These jobs would vary in skill level from senior 
planning positions to low-skill labor jobs building and installing 
the new electrical generation and transmission systems. Addi-
tionally, proven economic advantages exist in moving to a low-
carbon economy.146 Similar to the construction of the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways under President 
Eisenhower, this new infrastructure system is necessary for 
U.S. security in the future.147 Not only are U.S. civilians reli-
ant on the current fossil-fuel-burning energy grid, exposing cit-
ies and entire regions to potential brown-outs,148 so too is the 
U.S. military which relies almost entirely on the national power 
grid at fixed installations and on petroleum in combat and opera-
tions.149 Thus, strategic security motivations exist for moving 
to renewable energies that actually improve battlefield readi-
ness.150 Dependence on fuel supply lines reduces operational 
preparedness, and results in astronomical monetary costs asso-
ciated with transporting large quantities of fuel in comparison 
to the dependable renewable energy options, while jeopardizing 
troops’ lives.151
Second, working with the Secretary of State, the President 
must actively convince other nations, like China, to do the same, 
to secure U.S. security into the future.152 This could be accom-
plished in a similar fashion to the “space race,”153 but intention-
ally created, since countries that implement the new technologies 
first will be better prepared for the future.154 Unfortunately, the 
2010 NSS claim that the United States is “promoting universal 
values abroad by living them at home,”155 is simply not true.156 
The 2010 NSS claims that the United States must be a global 
leader and “reengage the world” to facilitate “global cooperation 
on issues . . . [including] climate change . . . that challenge all 
nations, but that no one nation alone can meet.”157 These state-
ments, while true, effectively punt U.S. responsibility in dealing 
with climate change by: emphasizing the global nature of the 
problem and the need for individual nations to take responsibil-
ity; professing U.S. leadership on climate change solutions while 
also asserting that the U.S. will meet climate goals; but hedging 
the promise with the need for Congressional action.158 Now is 
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not the time for the United States to shy away, but the time to 
lead by example and convince others to join our efforts, through 
diplomacy and fear of future ostracism in the global community 
for failure to adopt clean renewable energy technology.
conclusIon
The impacts of climate change touch every aspect of U.S. 
national security. They increase destabilization of governments 
and demands on U.S. resources to aid or re-stabilize a region 
after a crisis. They threaten U.S. land, people, and infrastructure 
around the world, and are largely preventable. However, they 
are only preventable if the Administration takes responsibility 
for our future and utilizes the resources available to it, indeed 
required of it, to protect the national security of the United 
States. The President should seek Senate approval to appoint 
the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Labor, as well as the 
EPA Administrator, to the NSC.159 The President should rely 
on the best science available, not the lowest common denomi-
nator, and should take responsibility on the international stage 
for U.S. CO2 emissions by making the United States the leader 
in climate change mitigation technology, enabling effective dip-
lomatic and economic pressure in convincing other nations to 
do the same. The President has the authority, and the responsi-
bility, to establish these policies and procedures to protect U.S. 
national security.
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In 1999, the rising sea level swallowed two islands of the nation Kiribati.1 Rising sea level2 is one of the effects of climate change to which small island nations are particu-
larly susceptible.3 Considering that the average elevation of 
this nation of ninety thousand people on thirty-three islands and 
atolls4 is only about two meters above sea level,5 it is no surprise 
that Kiribati’s President Anote Tong considers the rising sea a 
threat to the very existence of his nation.6 Taking a cue from a 
policy first announced by the Maldives, President Tong has sug-
gested that the solution to his nation’s disappearance could be 
purchasing land in another country to relocate the entire popula-
tion of Kiribati.7 This unprecedented situation raises the ques-
tion: what would be the legal status of an I-Kiribati or Maldives 
population on the run from the rising waters?
Estimates vary, but it is undisputed that current and future 
effects of climate change, including droughts, floods, desertifica-
tion, and rising sea level, will displace millions each year.8 At least 
some displacement will occur across borders, especially when 
dealing with small islands nations. 9 In spite of this potential for 
massive displacement, at present no international legal framework 
exists which will recognize and protect those displaced by envi-
ronmental factors, even though the concepts of “environmental” 
and “climate” refugees have been contemplated since the 1980s.10
Two different approaches to the legal problems have been 
proposed. On one hand there have been voices calling for an 
expansion of the legal definition of “refugee” to incorporate 
environmentally displaced persons,11 while others argue that a 
new and separate legal framework be created.12 Island nations, 
while supportive of finding an international legal solution, are 
unwilling to wait for international consensus and are taking their 
own measures to avoid catastrophe.13
“Refugee” is a legal term, narrowly-defined by the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, protecting per-
sons who fled their home country in fear of persecution for rea-
sons of race, religion, political opinion, or ethnicity.14 In 2006, 
the Maldives proposed amending the Convention to include 
“climate refugee.”15 Recently, the Bangladeshi Finance Min-
ister called for “[t]he [C]onvention on refugees [to] be revised 
to protect [those displaced by climate change.]”16 However, the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) is concerned 
that the inclusion of environmental or climate refugee could 
potentially undermine the clarity of current standards.17 Further, 
UNHCR is already under pressure from host countries to reduce 
the burden of refugees18 and it is also concerned that renegotia-
tion of the Convention could result in the lowering of existing 
protection standards.19
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For these reasons, some argue that dealing with climate 
refugees calls for a new and independent legal framework.20 
Any new framework would need to draw upon widely agreed 
principles and connect the protection of those displaced with the 
broader international legal framework on climate change.21 The 
international instrument would also need to address the practi-
calities of enforcement and establishment of rights.22
One proposed convention from the University of Limo-
ges23 recognizes different types of environmental displacement, 
protecting generally against “natural and technological disas-
ters.”24 It calls for the creation of a monitoring agency akin to 
the UNHCR.25 The convention would recognize the duty of the 
international community to assist a State that suffers from eco-
logical disasters26 and the right to “conserve the nationality of 
[the environmentally displaced person’s] state of origin . . . and 
to acquire the nationality of the receiving state.”27 This last right 
is especially important for a nation such as Kirbati, where com-
plete loss of territory could result in the destruction of its legal 
status as a nation.
Territory is one of the key elements of nationhood28 and 
without physical territory under sovereign control, no nation can 
exist.29 On the other hand, nationality is considered a fundamen-
tal right in international law.30 How can this right be squared 
with permanent loss of sovereign territory and nationhood? It 
is unlikely that another nation would accept a cash payment to 
transfer the sovereignty of a part of its existing territory. Cer-
tainly, consideration would have to be made for those already 
settled upon the land.31 Without an existing legal framework, 
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perhaps Kiribati and the Maldives are doing the right thing to 
proactively seek out alternatives.
Beyond purchasing land, one plan currently underway is 
to secure “merit-based relocation.”32 Island nationals would be 
trained in needed professions (e.g. nursing) in other countries, 
with the ability to stay and seek citizenship there.33 In this way, 
pockets of I-Kiribati community would be built up worldwide, 
facilitating future resettlement.34 Furthermore, with removal of 
much of the population, it would be possible to build up one 
island and use it to “anchor” the sovereignty of the nation in 
the event of drastic sea level rise.35 However, even if the state 
continued to exist in legal terms36 it is unclear how it would 
function.37
The best choice may be for an island nation to be absorbed into 
another nation, using its own sovereignty to pay for relocation.38 
For example, in exchange for control of Kiribati’s sovereign terri-
tory, India could accept Kiribati’s population and provide resettle-
ment assistance such as language training, vocational training, and 
financial aid.39 An end to nationhood, incorporation and reloca-
tion of an island nation in exchange for the sovereign control of its 
resources and maritime zone would then benefit both parties.40
The world will see an increase in environmentally displaced 
persons in the coming years. Room must be made for them with 
the creation of a new and separate legal framework.41 However, 
this will take time. In the meantime, small island nations are best 
served to take matters into their own hands.
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1 displacement,2 and loss of culture and traditional 
ways of life3 are the likely consequences of continuing 
on the world’s current trajectory of climate change.4 
These phenomena and the images of suffering that they evoke 
reflect situations rich with human rights concerns. Indeed, rights 
activists demanding international action to halt global warming 
invoke these themes of human vulnerability as a central part of 
their protests.5 However, the extent to which the threatened effects 
of climate change can be understood as imposing legal obligations 
within the normative framework of international human rights 
law, rather than simply as rhetorical ideas of moral rights, remains 
unclear.6 In January 2009, the UN Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) published a report announc-
ing that climate change had a range of effects on human rights.7 
Although it may be unclear whether those effects constitute viola-
tions of human rights law, states still have obligations to protect 
those affected by climate change.8 The OHCHR report provided 
minimal guidance on what those human rights obligations consist 
of, thus much remains uncertain about the scope of the obligations 
imposed on states by climate change. As the international com-
munity continues to wrangle with the task of delineating a strategy 
for climate stabilization,9 clarifying the human rights obligations 
of states may help to inform both relevant national policies and 
the emerging international framework.
The move towards climate stabilization, and consequently 
an alleviation of pressures on human rights, will require all states 
to transform the ways in which they produce energy, especially 
developing countries with substantial green house gas emis-
sions. This in turn demands adequate development, deployment, 
and implementation of clean energy technologies, and diffusion 
to those countries in need, including much of the developing 
world.10 Because of the high-tech nature of clean energy solu-
tions, the protection of intellectual property (“IP”) rights has an 
important role to play in each stage of the process.11
States seeking climate change solutions will increasingly 
deal with tensions caused when human rights and IP protection 
obligations conflict. States must find a way to protect human 
rights while addressing climate change.12 This article attempts 
to anticipate some of these tensions and to propose potential 
resolutions. The climate change crisis, the clean energy solu-
tions that have emerged in response, and the role of intellectual 
property protections in that process, provide a backdrop against 
which the relationship between human rights and climate change 
can be charted. This article begins by looking specifically at the 
challenges that climate change poses to the traditional human 
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rights framework, as well as the sources of human rights obliga-
tions in relation to climate change. The discussion then turns to 
questions of access to clean energy technology, and contrasts the 
issue to the debate over access to essential medicines. Next, the 
article focuses on prospective tensions with IP protections in the 
context of access to clean energy technology by applying vari-
ous analytical frameworks grounded in human rights. The article 
concludes by underscoring the importance of the human rights 
analysis in mediating this tension and by cautioning against the 
creation of fortified IP protections that do not prioritize human 
rights considerations.
clImaTe chanGe, clean enerGy soluTIons,  
and InTellecTual properTy
the climate chanGe pRoblem
The temperature of the global climate is rising.13 Once the 
subject of considerable debate,14 the fact of global warming, both 
natural and anthropogenic (human-induced), is now nearly uni-
versally accepted.15 Most states in the international community 
are members of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), an international treaty aimed at 
the reduction of global warming.16 Members of the UNFCCC are 
thus aligned in their commitment to combat the “change of cli-
mate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity 
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is 
in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable 
time periods.”17 Significant strides made in the direction of reach-
ing international consensus on the problem of climate change are 
due in part to the availability of reliable scientific information on 
the causes and effects of global warming.18
In particular, the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) contain assessments and projections 
about climate change which are regarded as authoritative by the 
international community.19 The IPCC is an intergovernmental 
scientific organization established by the UN Environment Pro-
gramme and the World Meteorological Organization, currently 
with 194 members, that reviews and assesses available informa-
tion on climate change in order to provide “rigorous and bal-
anced scientific information to decision makers.”20
According to the IPCC’s most recent assessment, published 
in 2007, there is sufficient scientific consensus to unequivocally 
establish the fact of global warming.21 In making this conclusion, 
the IPCC draws upon observations of increases in global average 
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air and ocean temperatures, the widespread melting of snow and 
ice, and the rising global average sea level.22 Additionally, the 
same report asserts with more than ninety percent certainty that 
most of the global warming experienced in the last fifty years is 
due to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.23
Beyond establishing the reality of human-induced climate 
change, the IPCC assessment also presents the current scien-
tific consensus on the effects of climate change.24 These include 
changes in weather patterns, which are ninety percent certain to 
result in the shrinking of snow-covered areas and of sea ice, ris-
ing sea levels and water temperatures, increased frequency of heat 
waves, and heavy precipitation events.25 These weather changes 
will in turn have grave consequences for agriculture, forestry, eco-
systems, water resources, human health, and society at large.26
The increased strength of consensus around the anthropo-
genic causes of climate change has inspired response efforts 
aimed at reducing emissions levels. These strategies seek to mit-
igate the trend of global warming by sufficiently reducing green 
house gas emissions to a level that would stabilize the rising 
climate temperature.27 Although specific target emissions levels 
were established in the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC,28 the 
shift towards a stable climate will require additional strategies 
and tools in order to reach any global target levels.
clean eneRGy technoloGieS anD intellectual pRopeRty
Climate stabilization, or the emissions reductions that must 
be reached globally in order to effectively combat global warm-
ing, requires a drastic overhaul of energy production systems.29 
As such, there is a need for efficient clean energy technologies 
that can be developed relatively quickly, deployed into action, 
and diffused widely.30
Efforts to develop, deploy, and diffuse clean energy technol-
ogies have been underway for many years now, with significant 
successes. There is great variation in the types of technolo-
gies available to facilitate the global shift to less carbon-reliant 
energy production. Amongst the most prominent technologies 
are photovoltaic (solar), biofuels, and wind technologies.31
As with any other technology industry, clean energy tech-
nologies are subject to a variety of IP protections. However, there 
is considerable debate over the propriety and scope of such IP 
protections since these technologies are integral to alleviating the 
global stress of climate change.32 Those who generally favor IP 
protections for clean energy technologies argue that incentives are 
critical to drive innovation and diffusion of such technologies.33 
Without IP protections, the theory goes, innovation would be 
severely limited and new clean energy technologies would not be 
developed.34 Opponents of IP protections for clean energy focus 
on the problems of access caused by the exclusion rights afforded 
to patent holders, which almost inevitably results in prohibitively 
high costs.35 Thus, IP protections may render the technology unaf-
fordable for those who most desperately need it, including, in this 
case, those developing countries with high energy demands.
Basic renewable energy technologies, including wind, 
biofuel, and photovoltaic, are not new and have been off pat-
ent protection for a number of years.36 Instead, specific 
improvements and add-on features to these existing technolo-
gies are increasingly being patented.37 The emerging modifica-
tion and adaptations are variously aimed at improving efficiency 
by minimizing cost, maximizing energy production, or both.38 
With solar energy, for example, new technologies attempt to 
create a thin film of semiconductors that can be applied to exist-
ing surfaces, greatly reducing the costs of manufacturing solar 
technology.39
While these complex technologies and processes are cen-
tral to any effort to advance climate stabilization, the impacts of 
climate change on humans should not be overlooked. Scientific, 
environmental, and economic dimensions have long occupied 
center stage in the discourse around climate change. However, 
the grave threat that climate change poses to human lives and 
human well-being should be the central consideration in crafting 
solutions that are responsive to the lived realities of this crisis.
human rIGhTs and clImaTe chanGe
The symbolic force of framing climate change as an affront 
to human rights may in itself have great utility. However, it 
does not carry the same weight or consequences as violations 
of states’ legal duties to guarantee the rights of individuals in 
their territories. States will face little formal accountability for 
breaching moral priorities that are simply phrased as a matter of 
conceptual right.40 Violations of international human rights law, 
on the other hand, may give rise to monitoring by an interna-
tional treaty body, scrutiny by a special rapporteur, or litigation 
of individual petitions before a regional human rights insti-
tution.41 Additionally, because the legal obligations of a state 
under international human rights law include those standards to 
which the state has explicitly consented to be bound, violations 
of human rights law are a form of a breach. Such a breach threat-
ens to call the credibility of a state into serious consideration.
challenGinG the fRamewoRk
Conceptualizing the effects of climate change as human 
rights violations poses a difficult conundrum for the interna-
tional human rights law framework. At one level, there is no 
explicit normative provision dealing with climate change that 
would give rise to an international legal obligation.42 The uni-
versal treaties that create international human rights obligations 
for states do not explicitly address the dangers posed by the cli-
mate change crisis.43 Even if we attempt to locate the human 
impacts of climate change within the framework of environ-
mental protection, the key human rights treaties—the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)44 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”)45—include no reference to a specific right 
to a safe and healthy environment.46
The global nature of greenhouse gas emissions along with 
the related transboundary impacts disrupts the traditional focus 
of human rights on obligations that states have to individuals 
in their territories.47 Although there are certain states who have 
contributed more significantly to climate change, the effects 
on their populations is often more attenuated. The most severe 
impacts threaten to disrupt the lives of citizens in other parts 
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of the world.48 Indeed, the states whose citizens would be most 
dramatically affected by climate change, and thus who have the 
greatest stake in efforts to combat global warming, are those 
states who have least contributed to global greenhouse gas emis-
sions.49 Holding these states responsible for human rights vio-
lations that they did not directly cause is untenable under the 
existing framework. The traditionally territorial nature of human 
rights obligations is thus inadequate to address the global cli-
mate change problem.
human RiGhtS obliGationS aRiSinG fRom climate 
chanGe
Pursuant to a resolution of the Human Rights Council, in 
January 2009 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (“OHCHR”) released a detailed analytical report 
of the relationship between climate change and human rights.50 
The report analyzed the impacts of climate change on various 
human rights protected within the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and 
other international human rights treaties.51 Specifically, the 
OHCHR report detailed the significant threats that climate 
change poses to the rights to life, adequate food, water, health, 
adequate housing, and self-determination, while also highlight-
ing the particular impacts on highly vulnerable groups such as 
women, children, and indigenous peoples.52 Additionally, the 
report discussed the prospects for displacement, as well as for 
conflict and related security risks, that are likely to occur as a 
result of climate change along with the attendant human rights 
implications for the individuals affected.53
The OHCHR report concluded that while it was unclear 
whether the effects of climate change amounted to human rights 
violations, states nonetheless had obligations to protect human 
rights in the context of national-level measures undertaken to 
address climate change.54 In addition, human rights law also 
obliges states to engage in international cooperation to protect 
and promote human rights. Specifically, the ICESCR carries 
extraterritorial obligations that require states to 
(1) refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of 
human rights in other countries; (2) take measures to 
prevent third parties over which they hold influence 
from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights 
in other countries; (3) take steps through international 
assistance and cooperation, depending on the availabil-
ity of resources, to facilitate the fulfillment of human 
rights in other countries, including disaster relief, emer-
gency assistance, and assistance to refugees and dis-
placed persons; and (4) ensure that human rights are 
given due attention in international agreements and that 
such agreements do not adversely impact upon human 
rights.55
Within the framework of the ICESCR, a state is obliged 
to “take steps, individually and through international assis-
tance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achiev-
ing progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means.”56 The duty to 
engage in international cooperative efforts aimed at the advance-
ment of economic, social, and cultural rights is in direct con-
trast to the language in the ICCPR, which expressly describes 
obligations of a state to “individuals within its territory and sub-
ject to its jurisdiction.”57 The broader scope of duties under the 
ICESCR than in a traditional human rights model is supported 
by the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) which note, inter alia, 
that under the ICESCR, it is “particularly incumbent on States 
parties and other actors in a position to assist to provide ‘interna-
tional assistance and cooperation, especially economic and tech-
nical’ which enable developing countries to fulfill their core and 
other obligations.”58
access To clean enerGy TechnoloGy
oveRview of technoloGy anD acceSS iSSueS
Most of the clean energy technology that has been devel-
oped in response to climate change has originated in developed 
countries.59 This has created an imbalance in access between 
developing and developed countries, with developing countries 
asserting that intellectual property regimes prevent them from 
gaining access to these critical technologies.60 Although there 
have been numerous attempts to study the issue, there is no con-
clusive evidence that IP protections present or do not present a 
barrier to the diffusion of clean energy technologies.61 However, 
there are at least some indications that the process of negotiat-
ing for access when the base technology is subject to foreign 
IP protection hinders developing country industries that want to 
produce new technologies or develop an adaptation to an exist-
ing technology.62 Strong IP protection in developing countries 
may promote diffusion by assuring patent holders that if they 
license their technology to a firm in the target country, there will 
be sufficient protection against unlawful copying.63
Regardless of the lack of conclusive data on whether intel-
lectual property rights are a barrier to access to clean energy 
technologies, it is irrefutable that they do influence access in a 
variety of different ways.64 Despite the particular importance of 
encouraging innovation in the clean energy technology indus-
try in light of the great significance that slight modifications or 
adaptations can have, technology transfer has rarely focused on 
supporting the development stage of climate stabilization tech-
nology.65 Instead, funding and other forms of programmatic 
support have been the primary strategies for spurring innovation 
in developing countries.66
Most of the technology transfer that has taken place in the 
context of climate change has been in the deployment stage.67 
Transfer of technology for the purposes of deployment can take 
various forms. First, products that incorporate the technology 
can be transferred directly to the developing country for domes-
tic use.68 A second form of transfer would be licensing produc-
tion to a company in the target country.69 Third, transfer may 
simply involve capacity building for research and production 
facilities in the target country.70
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contRaStinG clean eneRGy anD eSSential meDicineS
Despite the apparent parallels in the debates over access to 
medicine and access to clean energy technology, there are some 
acute differences between the two industries that limit the extent 
to which arguments for access can be shared. One key difference 
between pharmaceuticals and clean energy is the availability of 
substitutes. A drug that is developed to cure or treat a particular 
disease is likely to be one of the only medications that serve 
that purpose; there are unlikely to be many, if any, substitutes.71 
Technologies that produce clean energy, on the other hand, 
range from wind and solar to hydro and nuclear.
The framework of normative instruments for facilitat-
ing access to essential medicines is much richer than that for 
clean energy technologies. The Doha Declaration to the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”) formally recognized the flexibilities within the 
TRIPS agreement that could be used as a basis for compulsory 
licenses on essential medicines.72 The CESCR even issued a 
General Comment asserting that the right to health includes an 
obligation for states to promote medical research and to provide 
access to affordable treatments, including essential drugs.73
The Doha Declaration does not significantly adopt a human 
rights framework of analysis despite the human rights arguments 
made by many within the access to medicines movement.74 
Instead, it carves out of the general rule of intellectual property 
protection a limited range of exceptions to apply in narrow cir-
cumstances.75 Thus, the effect of the Doha Declaration is limited 
to issues directly implicating public health rather than the full 
range of human rights.76
reGIme shIFTInG: human rIGhTs analysIs
As the forum for the coordination of the global climate stabi-
lization framework, the UNFCCC has been the site of negotiations 
over technology transfer, innovation, collaborations, and other 
strategies aimed at facilitating the development, deployment, and 
diffusion of clean energy technologies in the developing world.77 
The various climate change conferences held under the UNFCCC 
auspices have not recognized any progress towards articulating 
an actionable global strategy to facilitate a developing world shift 
to clean energy technologies.78 At the same time, activists, non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and international organi-
zations have made repeated calls for the mainstreaming of human 
rights concerns within the UNFCCC process.79 These demands 
have similarly been met with little real action in the way of priori-
tizing human rights within the negotiating texts and processes.80 
Accordingly, the UNFCCC regime has yet to connect human 
rights to the debate over how to facilitate developing world adop-
tion and adaptation of clean energy technologies.81 Therefore, a 
discursive regime shift82 should be attempted from the politicized 
negotiations of the UNFCCC process to a series of human rights 
analyses that seek to link the human impacts of climate change 
to the question of barriers to clean energy technology. While the 
flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement that sufficed for guaran-
teeing access to medicines in the Doha Declaration may provide 
a sufficient legal basis for the granting of compulsory licenses for 
clean energy technologies, the alternative frameworks presented 
in this section aim to conduct the analysis starting from a position 
of human rights protection.83 These frameworks are centered in 
the protection of human rights and are utilized to find theories of 
accommodating intellectual property protections.
The starting point of a human rights analysis is necessarily 
international instruments and other sources of human rights obli-
gations. This framework of analysis is in contrast to intellectual 
property analyses, which take as the starting point instruments 
relating to intellectual property rights.84
human RiGhtS obliGationS
Intellectual Property Rights as Human Rights
The protection of intellectual property is not simply an economic 
tool designed to encourage and award innovation. Instead, the pro-
tections afforded to a patent holder may also be an iteration of human 
rights. As such, intellectual property systems may be frameworks for 
states to fulfill their human rights obligations. The ICESCR delin-
eates the right “authors” to “protection of moral and material inter-
ests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production.”85
Rights Affected by Climate Change
In accordance with the guidance provided by the CESCR, 
states are obliged to ensure the minimum essential level of each 
right codified in the ICESCR.86 The duties of states derive from 
the obligation to secure certain minimum standards of human 
rights; thus, the duty is not fulfilled simply by adopting a par-
ticular policy or engaging in a particular transfer of technology 
if that policy or transfer does not result in the realization of the 
minimum value of the relevant human right.87 Rather, the duty 
is satisfied when the minimum standards are guaranteed.88 This 
substantive duty and its various constituent rights oblige states 
to simultaneously advance development, deployment, and diffu-
sion of clean energy technology.89 The human rights obligation 
includes not only the importation of technology, but also support 
for local capabilities to adopt, diffuse, adapt, and develop tech-
nologies that fit within the particular circumstances of the state. 
This results in changing energy production systems in a manner 
sufficient to meet the core minimum standards of human rights.90 
The simple transfer of technology will not provide the requisite 
knowledge about how or why the technology works without this 
focus on local industry and infrastructure.91 Consequently, it will 
be of little utility to advancing the realization of human rights.
The ICESCR obliges developed states and other actors to 
engage in international cooperation in furtherance of the realiza-
tion of human rights in developing countries. This does little to 
ease the tension of how to balance the human rights of those most 
directly affected by climate change with the rights to moral and 
material interests of those innovators who are developing techno-
logical solutions to the energy crisis. While various human rights 
are affected by climate change, the legal obligations of states to 
cooperatively address climate change issues are not based on any 
explicit norm. Nonetheless, various frameworks of analysis cen-
tered on human rights may prove useful in developing a sense for 




Borrowing the term from U.S. Constitutional law, Marga-
ret Chon proposes a principle of substantive equality that would 
require adjudicators and norm-generators to exercise a non-def-
erential standard of review when considering whether a grant 
of an exclusive IP right or the denial of a limitation on the right 
appears to conflict with a basic human need.92 Although moti-
vated by a development rationale, Chon’s framework is useful for 
thinking about clean energy technology as a “public good” that 
advances an important human need (or a series of human rights). 
The framework requires the potential IP barriers to access to clean 
energy technologies to be balanced against the ways in which 
those technologies would help to guarantee human rights by pro-
viding access to an important public good. As Chon notes, this 
is not only important for the advancement of development and 
human rights, but also for the fortification of IP systems in devel-
oping countries that “cannot ‘take root’ absent a basic national 
capacity, which can only be developed with a population that has 
its essential needs met.”93
The extent to which IP is a barrier to the spread of clean 
energy technology through the developing world is admittedly 
uncertain. Yet, its recurrent mention in policy documents and 
commentary on the UNFCCC process imply that it is at least 
perceived as an important issue by both the technology compa-
nies who hold the IP protections and developing countries who 
encounter obstacles in accessing existing clean energy technolo-
gies.94 Applying Chon’s strict scrutiny to a theoretical category 
of IP protections for such technologies prioritizes the experi-
ences of the most marginalized within the process of norm set-
ting. The implications on the rights of indigenous communities, 
displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups who suffer as a 
result of lack of access to clean energy technologies becomes 
the starting point against which all IP protection regimes must 
be measured. IP regimes that pose barriers to access to clean 
energy technology would be deemed excessive where such lack 
of access negatively impacts human rights.
The appeal of this framework is in its stark simplicity. It 
brings forward the human rights impacts of climate change that 
are all too often relegated to the background of international dis-
cussions or to exceptional circumstances in analyzing the TRIPS 
flexibilities. Strict scrutiny allows for the human side of climate 
change to be made the center point of the discussion. However, 
the problem with applying this analysis to clean energy tech-
nologies is that it is difficult to imagine any IP protections with-
out some negative impact on access and human rights. In other 
words, all IP protections would seem to fail the strict scrutiny 
test. As such, the utility of strict scrutiny is less as a framework 
than as an important framing device that establishes the central-
ity of human rights concerns.
Human Rights Primacy
Another framework through which to understand the rela-
tionship between human rights and the protection of IP is that 
of human rights primacy. Under this theory, “the protection of 
the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protection 
should be subordinated to human rights obligations.”95 Human 
rights primacy as a tool to mediate tensions caused by IP protec-
tion involves striking a balance between the public and private 
interests in innovation with the primary objective of promoting 
and protecting human rights.96 Additionally, this tool of analysis 
is premised on categorizing IP protections as qualitatively differ-
ent from other human rights.97 Specifically, human rights primacy 
understands IP protections as privileges assigned by the state 
according to a pre-determined set of criteria.98 By contrast, human 
rights are innate to an individual and are only recognized (rather 
than granted) by the state.99 IP rights can be licensed or other-
wise assigned, whereas human rights are universal and inalien-
able.100 Although similar to the strict scrutiny approach advanced 
by Chon, human rights primacy carries a number of alternating 
theories that can be used to delineate the scope of rights.
Core Minimum
One such framework is the core minimum approach advo-
cated by both Laurence Helfer and Peter Yu in similar itera-
tions.101 The ICESCR requires that states take sufficient steps, 
as determined by the resources available to that state, to realize 
the obligations to protect economic, social, and cultural rights 
enshrined in the Convention.102 Regardless of available resources, 
however, states are obliged to guarantee certain minimum lev-
els of rights protection.103 The core minimum approach seeks to 
reduce the competing categories of rights—those of the innovator 
and those of the community that desire the technology—to the 
“irreducible core.”104 For innovators, the core right under Article 
15(1)(c) of the ICESCR is “a zone of personal autonomy in which 
authors can achieve their creative potential, control their produc-
tive output, and lead independent intellectual lives.”105 Once this 
irreducible core of rights has been protected, any additional pro-
tections afforded to innovators must be measured against other 
human rights.106 The CESCR directs states to ensure that their IP 
protection regimes “constitute no impediment to their ability to 
comply with their core obligations in relation to the rights to food, 
health and education, as well as to take part in cultural life and to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any 
other right enshrined in the Covenant.”107 This approach takes as 
a starting point that there are certain minimum human rights stan-
dards required of states, and locates intellectual property rights 
as one of the tools to be utilized in advancing those standards.108 
Thus, as Yu notes, under the core minimum approach 
states will not violate the ICESCR if they modify or 
roll back excess protection required under TRIPS, the 
WIPO treaties, and other international, regional, and 
bilateral treaties provided that such protection does not 
have any human rights basis. They can also do so if the 
protection already exceeds what is required under their 
core minimum obligations and if they offer compelling 
evidence of the competing demands with other human 
rights obligations.109
Applying this to the situation of protections for clean energy 
technologies, it appears that anything other than the protection 
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of an innovator’s “zone of personal autonomy” would violate a 
state’s other human rights obligations under the ICESCR. As dis-
cussed above, the realization of even minimum standards of the 
various rights will allow a state to not only secure clean energy 
technology, but also develop domestic capacities to adapt the 
technology and develop locally relevant diffusion mechanisms.
Just Remuneration
Another framework for delineating human rights obligations 
in relation to IP protections for clean energy technology is the just 
remuneration approach.110 Similarly based off of the primacy of 
human rights, the just remuneration approach seeks to delineate 
the human rights dimensions of IP protections and assess adequate 
compensation for use of the protected technology.111 The under-
lying theory is that IP protections have limitations in the form of 
other human rights.112 Thus, if it is within an individual’s human 
rights to utilize a particular creation in advancement of those 
rights, some sort of compensation would be due for any limita-
tions.113 This is different from a compulsory licensing framework, 
although a national-level licensing policy could follow from this 
theory.114 The just remuneration model requires that the innovator 
be paid for his creation, either by the person or entity using it, or 
by the state on behalf of the public (and in fulfillment of the state’s 
obligations to advance human rights protections).115
Under this analysis, the IP protections extended to clean 
energy technologies reflect a mix of human rights obligations and 
non-human rights (economic) purposes. As with almost all IP, the 
innovator of clean energy technologies possesses (human) rights 
to the protection of moral or material interests in his intellectual 
creations.116 However, if the utility of the technology would 
serve to advance the human rights of others, then the interests of 
the author are not limitless.117 In order to adequately protect the 
innovator’s rights under Article 15 of the ICESCR, a state may 
employ a just remuneration approach that provides appropriate 
compensation in the context of a compulsory license to utilize 
the technology for public welfare.118 This effectively changes the 
protection from an IP form to a human rights form, by balancing 
only the human rights interests of the innovator against the human 
rights interests of the individual, industry, or state that is pursuing 
access to the technology. Under this framework, “human rights 
grant to the [entity seeking access to the technology] a compul-
sory license, as compared to a free license, and to the right holder 
a right to remuneration, rather than exclusive control.”119 Thus, 
those individuals or entities holding patents to important clean 
energy technology could have their human rights guaranteed by 
receiving adequate compensation for their technologies.
conclusIon
Although the existing flexibilities within the TRIPS Agree-
ment which, through the Doha Declaration, were asserted to 
be sufficient for facilitating access to essential medicines may 
similarly be sufficient for easing the IP protections on important 
clean energy technologies, the fundamental differences between 
the regimes of IP and human rights protections warrants this 
human rights analysis. The TRIPS Agreement is focused on “the 
promotion of innovation through the provision of commercial 
incentives.”120 With its economic priorities at odds with those 
of the human rights approach, which is centered on the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights, TRIPS is not an ideal or 
sufficient basis upon which to build climate change solutions. 
Instead, in order to keep the climate stabilization framework 
grounded in the realities of the human suffering induced by 
climate change, solutions to the technology access gap should 
begin with a human rights analysis, even if they are eventually 
realized through TRIPS flexibilities.
Beyond the mainstreaming of human rights in the climate sta-
bilization context, the human rights analyses assist in identifying 
a range of interests and obligations beyond the transfer of a clean 
energy technology to a developing country. Funding and program-
matic support for the development stage of clean energy technolo-
gies in developing states is a more sustainable fix for the climate 
change problem. Local technology industries in developing coun-
tries would benefit more from direct access to technologies that they 
could improve or adapt to their local contexts if they had increased 
training in know-how and know-why. In many ways, this would 
place developing countries on equal footing with developed coun-
tries and would enable the development of build-on technologies.
The human rights analysis also reflects an obligation of states 
to cooperate internationally to lend their support to the realiza-
tion of human rights for individuals outside of their territories. In 
the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, the intergovernmental 
bloc of developing countries within the UN, known as the G77, 
has advocated for the creation of a multilateral fund to buy up the 
various IP instruments protecting clean energy technologies.121
As at least one commentator has stated, “[a]n appropriate 
and effective ‘social contract’ needs to be developed around low 
carbon and climate resilient innovation to balance public and 
private interests.”122 Rather than simply transferring technol-
ogy or purchasing the IP protections to certain technologies, the 
framework in which innovation can be incentivized and made 
accessible needs to be revisited.
1 See Press Release, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
Cancun Climate Summit: UN Food Expert Calls for a “Green Marshall Plan 
for Agriculture” (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10565&LangID=E (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) 
(describing that by 2080, 600 million additional people would be at risk of hun-
ger as a direct result of climate change and warning of the threat of fifty percent 
reduction in agricultural production in some parts of South Africa).
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In 2010, with the aim of deviating from “business as usual,”
1 
the member states of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“Convention”) gathered in 
Cancun, Mexico.2 The Convention currently consists of two 
tracks, the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol 
(“AWG-KP”)3 and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”).4 The latter track agreed 
that developing countries would take on a greater responsibility 
in climate change mitigation.5 Many of these countries already 
play a key role in the mitigation effort by voluntarily partici-
pating in projects.6 Now they have agreed to further their role 
under the AWG-LCA by implementing nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (“NAMAs”) for sustainable development7 
and outlining a national strategy for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (“REDD”).8 Developed 
countries, under AWG-LCA, will continue to provide financial, 
technological, and capacity-building support for both projects.9 
However, many climate change programs involving outside 
investment have resulted in violations to the rights of indigenous 
peoples,10 such as forced relocation or loss of sacred land.11 In 
an effort to prevent further violations, the developing countries 
should consider investing foreign funds in indigenous technolo-
gies when implementing their NAMA and REDD Agreements.
Indigenous technology stems from traditional ecologi-
cal knowledge.12 This specific knowledge is a collection of 
“botanical, zoological, hydrological, cultural, and geographical 
knowhow . . . that has developed over time, and that continues 
to develop.”13 Implementing traditional ecological knowledge 
has the potential to result in carbon sequestration, forest protec-
tion, renewable energy production, and land rehabilitation.14 
The technologies derived from this knowledge have proved 
to be environmentally sustainable for eons.15 Moreover, the 
indigenous technologies are evolving to combat climate change 
impacts.16
Simona Gomez Lopez, a representative from a Mexican for-
est community explained how her village evolved their cooking 
methods to mitigate climate change during the opening plenary 
of the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties in Cancun, Mexico.17 
The community recognized the forest warming, the rains start-
ing earlier, and the rivers drying up.18 The village also noticed 
that their traditional use of wood for cooking, which required 
two to three truckloads of wood per family, was significantly 
contributing to deforestation.19 To mitigate their contribution 
to climate change, the community created an environmentally 
iS neweR technoloGy alwayS betteR?: 
why inDiGenouS peopleS’ technoloGy ShoulD be incoRpoRateD into  
the inteRnational fiGht aGainSt climate chanGe
by Ashley Gardana*
* Ashley Gardana is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law.
friendly kiln and now has eight for regular use.20 These kilns 
require approximately eighty percent less wood. 21
Indigenous technology, which can help mitigate climate 
change, is also a valuable tool for reforestation and biodiversity 
conservation projects.22 For example, the indigenous peoples in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh devised new sustain-
able forest management practices, which expanded twenty acres 
of forest to one hundred acres.23 Additionally, the Serangan 
community of Bali rehabilitated their coral reefs and mangrove 
forests, and managed to plant fifteen thousand pieces of coral in 
various coastal regions of Indonesia.24 This collection of knowl-
edge is a valuable resource that developing countries should 
incorporate in the NAMA and REDD projects as appropriate.25
Incorporating indigenous technology into mitigation and 
adaptation efforts will help alleviate the obstacles other climate 
change programs face.26 Certain programs under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) caused 
significant threats to indigenous peoples who refused to hand 
over their territories for the purpose specified in the projects.27 
The CDM is considered a success.28 However, because devel-
oped countries meet their emissions targets by designing proj-
ects that mitigate climate change in developing countries,29 
they have such a strong incentive to maximize the emission 
reductions yielded from these projects that the effects on local 
populations are often ignored.30 For instance, one CDM project 
included hydroelectric dams, which impacted river ecosystems 
and required relocation of an entire indigenous community.31 
Conversely, traditional ecological knowledge employed in the 
Indian Himalayan region utilizes hydro-energy from the hill 
streams and rivers through traditional watermills.32 Placing the 
financial support of developed countries in technology derived 
from traditional knowledge can help maintain indigenous com-
munities’ continued existence with sustainable means.
Implementing the Cancun Agreements with traditional eco-
logical knowledge also upholds the general principles developed 
from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (“Declaration”).33 While not a binding treaty, the stan-
dards of the Declaration are widely accepted and incorporated 
into policies and programs.34 The preamble of the Declaration, 
“[r]ecogniz[es] that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures 
and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable 
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development and proper management of the environment.”35 
Investing in available indigenous technologies while respecting 
indigenous rights can help developing countries fulfill their obli-
gations under the AWG-LCA.
The indigenous communities are the most vulnerable to 
not only climate change impacts, but the mitigation measures 
as well.36 Although the Convention has begun to recognize 
indigenous peoples, “cooperative action” within the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action requires 
improvement.37 Incorporating proven and available indigenous 
technologies can provide nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions for sustainable development and reforestation projects 
within developing countries while still respecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples.
1 uniteD nationS fRamewoRk convention on climate chanGe, climate 
chanGe: impactS, vulneRabilitieS anD aDaptation in DevelopinG countRieS 5 
(2007), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf.
2 The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, COP 16 / CMP 
6, uniteD nationS fRamewoRk convention on climate chanGe, http://unfccc.
int/meetings/cop_16/items/5571.php (last visited Feb 22, 2011).
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M 22, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.pdf.
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indon., 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Dec. 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan, in Rep. of the Conf. of the 
Parties on its thirteenth sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/ Add.1 (Dec. 2007), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Thirteenth Ses-
sion of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, Cancun, 
Mex., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, FCCC/
AWGLCA/2010/L.7, ¶¶ 48, 70 (Dec. 10, 2010), http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2010/awglca13/eng/l07.pdf [hereinafter AWG-LCA Outcome].
6 Christina Voigt, The Deadlock of the Clean Development Mechanism: 
Caught Between Sustainability, Environmental Integrity and Economic Effi-
ciency, in climate law anD DevelopinG countRieS leGal anD policy chal-
lenGeS foR the woRlD economy 235 (Benjamin J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009) 
(recognizing the most notable as the Clean Development Mechanism, Commu-
nity Development Carbon Fund, and the Global Environmental Facility).
7 See AWG-LCA Outcome, supra note 6, ¶ 48.
8 Id. ¶ 70.
9 Id. ¶ 52.
10 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 
(Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP], http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
11 Melissa Farris, Comment, The Sound of Falling Trees: Integrating Environ-
mental Justice Principles into the Climate Change Framework for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), 20 foRDham envtl. 
l. Rev. 515, 517 (2010).
12 What is Indigenous Knowledge?, woRlD bank, http://www.worldbank.org/
afr/ik/basic.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (discussing significant contribu-
tions to global knowledge that have originated from indigenous people such as 
medicinal properties, pastoralist practices, and architecture).
13 Terri Hansen, Traditional Ecological Knowledge Can Guide Community 
Adaptation and Resilience, motheR eaRth j., Nov. 24, 2010, http://mother-
earth-journal.com/2010/11/traditional-ecological-knowledge-can-guide-com-
munity-adaptation-and-resilience/.
Endnotes:  Is Newer Technology Always Better?
14 kiRSty Galloway mclean, uniteD nationS univeRSity, aDvance GuaRD: 
climate chanGe impactS, aDaptation, mitiGation anD inDiGenouS peopleS – a 
compenDium of caSe StuDieS 19 (2010), http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/
Publications/UNU_Advance_Guard_Compendium_2010_final_web.pdf.
15 Eric Kwa, Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples in South Pacific: The 
Need for Regional and Local Strategies, in climate law anD DevelopinG 
countRieS leGal anD policy challenGeS foR the woRlD economy 102 (Benja-
min J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009).
16 See mclean, supra note 14, at 20.
17 Simona Gomez Lopez, Representative of the Indigenous Peoples of Mexico, 
Address at the United Nations Convention on Climate Change Conference in 





22 See mclean, supra note 14, at 6.
23 Id. at 61.
24 Id. at 67.
25 Id. at 6.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 CDM Statistics, uniteD nationS fRamewoRk convention on climate 
chanGe, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
29 Damilola S. Olaquyi, Beautifying Africa for the Clean Development Mecha-
nism: Legal and Institutional Issues Considered, in climate law anD Develop-
inG countRieS leGal anD policy challenGeS foR the woRlD economy 262 
(Benjamin J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009).
30 See Voight, supra note 6, at 238.
31 Id.
32 See McLean, supra note 14, at 20.
33 UNDRIP, supra note 10; see also Siegfried Wiessner, United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples-Introduction, uniteD nationS 
auDioviSual libRaRy of inteRnational law, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/
ga_61-295/ga_61-295.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
34 Wiessner, supra note 33.
35 See UNDRIP, supra note 10.
36 miRjam macchi et al., int’l union foR the conSeRvation of natuRe, inDiG-
enouS anD tRaDitional peopleS anD climate chanGe 15 (2008), http://cmsdata.
iucn.org/downloads/indigenous_peoples_climate_change.pdf.
37 Stanley K. Riamit, Tebtebba Foundation, Statement on behalf of the Interna-
tional Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change, Intervention before the 





The international climate debate currently focuses on the 
world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters: China and the 
United States.1 However, to successfully address the impasse in 
climate change negotiations, the focus should actually be on one 
of the smaller emitters, the Republic of Singapore (“Singapore”). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”)2 classifies nations into two categories originally 
based on 1990 economic levels: Annex I Parties (developed 
countries) and Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries).3 
Although there is no automatic graduation based on predefined 
criteria, a process and a precedent exists for status graduation 
that could provide a model for countries to shift from Non-
Annex I to Annex I Parties. In 2009, Malta, originally a Non-
Annex I country, successfully petitioned the UNFCCC after 
joining the European Union (“EU”) to “put itself on the same 
legal footing as the other Member States of the European Union 
that are included in Annex I to the Convention.”4 Singapore’s 
economy is also strong enough to shift it from a Non-Annex I 
to an Annex I country and other countries can then follow suit, 
providing a solution to the current impasse in negotiations.
This article offers a “Singapore workaround” as a way for-
ward: diplomatic negotiations with Singapore aimed at changing 
the classification of nations that have developed economically 
since the formation of the UNFCCC. It has been argued by 
“[p]roponents of reclassification . . . that responsibility for mitiga-
tion and eligibility for support should reflect contemporary differ-
ences in levels of development among developing countries, rather 
than those current[ly] built into the Convention.”5 The reclassifica-
tion of Singapore from a Non-Annex I to an Annex I Party would 
provide the ideal model for shifting parties’ obligations in the cli-
mate realm in the future. Singapore is a financial leader in both 
globalization6 and the global recovery7 and is well positioned for 
international and domestic “carbon finance.”8 The nation is eco-
nomically poised to retool its energy sector,9 faces imminent and 
significant risks from climate change impacts,10 and is also ready 
to create and enforce modern climate laws.11 This article examines 
climate law in Germany and Spain to show how Annex I classifi-
cation benefited their economies over the past six years. Finally, it 
discusses how establishing climate laws in Singapore could affect 
emerging economies, namely Brazil, India, and China.
opporTunITy For breakThrouGh In 
InTernaTIonal clImaTe law
Current international climate law is regulated primarily 
by the UNFCCC, which was created in 1992 from the United 
the SinGapoRe woRkaRounD: 
pRoviDinG a “GReenpRint” foR a unfccc paRty ReclaSSification
by P. Cal Trepagnier*
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, also commonly known as the “Earth Summit.”12 
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 binds Annex I Parties to 
reduce “their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per-
cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period between 2008 
and 2012.”13 Under the Kyoto Protocol, however, the majority 
of countries—Non-Annex I nations—do not have greenhouse 
gas reduction targets.14 Moreover, there is no automatic system 
that requires them to reduce emissions, regardless of the level 
of gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita.15 The lack of a 
mechanism to graduate Non-Annex I Parties once they achieve a 
certain level of economic development has emerged as perhaps 
the greatest challenge of the UNFCCC.
The richer developing nations with high emissions that do not 
take on Annex I rights and responsibilities have long caused frus-
tration and concern for the United States,16 which refuses to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol and commit to emissions reductions.17 The 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is on course to end 
in 2012 and recent UNFCCC negotiations in Cancun, Mexico fell 
short of creating a second commitment period.18 A lack of emis-
sions reductions targets from emerging economies such as Brazil, 
India, and China have caused stalemates in international negotia-
tions.19 Despite Singapore’s small size and its relatively minor 
greenhouse gas emissions, Singapore’s graduation to an Annex I 
Party could have broader implications for emerging economies in 
the international effort to curb global climate change.
A graduation mechanism in the UNFCCC would adjust 
country mitigation obligations over time. A similar option was 
successfully established by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; that Protocol created a 
panel that reviews country requests for exemptions from ozone 
depleting substance commitments.20 Currently however, the 
UNFCCC’s approach to evaluating country classification is 
ambiguous.21 Singapore taking on the rights and responsibili-
ties of an Annex I Party would help to kick-start the process 
and encourage other rising nations to follow suit. Therefore, the 
United Nations should facilitate talks with Singapore regarding 
the transition of Singapore’s status from a Non-Annex I country 
to an Annex I country.
* P. Cal Trepagnier is a master’s student at The Johns Hopkins University in the 
energy policy and climate program. While pursuing an undergraduate degree in 
environmental chemistry at the University of Virginia, he studied abroad at the 
National University of Singapore.
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economIc readIness
The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) describes Singa-
pore as a “newly industrialized Asian economy.”22 Singapore, 
by land area, is a small, densely populated urban city-state that 
has limited energy resources.23 In contrast to its Southeast Asian 
neighbors, Singapore is not a major agricultural center and there-
fore much of its food is obtained through importation.24 The 
IMF last reported on Singapore’s GDP in 2009 and, at reces-
sion levels, Singapore had a GDP of $182.2 billion U.S. dollars 
or $37,200 U.S. dollars per capita.25 Singapore’s economy has 
proven to be one of the most stable—not just in Asia, but also 
globally.26
As a result of a strong economic outlook, Singapore can con-
tinue to retool its energy sector and meet the challenges of carbon 
reduction.27 Singapore has already taken significant action toward 
clean energy development. In 2001, for example, Singapore’s 
National Environment Agency set up the Innovation for Envi-
ronmental Sustainability Fund to provide grants for clean energy 
investment.28 In 2007, the Economic Development Board created 
the inter-agency Clean Energy Programme Office (“CEPO”).29 
Additionally, the Ministry of National Development allocated 
approximately thirty-nine million U.S. dollars over a five-year 
period for a Research Fund for the Built Environment.30
Currently, Singapore also receives carbon finance through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), under which 
Annex I Parties sponsor projects in Singapore to offset the spon-
soring country’s emissions.31 The Kyoto Protocol defines the 
CDM as an instrument “to assist Parties not included in Annex 
I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to 
the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and to assist Parties 
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quan-
tified emission limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3.”32 If Singapore were to accept Annex I responsi-
bilities, it could no longer receive CDM financing and would 
instead finance these projects in the developing world to help 
offset its own emissions.33 With its regional placement and cul-
tural expertise, Singapore would be well positioned to sponsor 
the projects for other Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”)—nine other developing countries that do not tra-
ditionally participate in climate finance projects.34 Furthermore, 
Singapore’s stable and strong financial sector would bring addi-
tional liquidity to the global carbon market.
sInGapore’s clImaTe neGoTIaTInG posITIon
The Singaporean government has taken a proactive stance 
on mitigating global climate change and enforces its laws effec-
tively. Singaporean climate negotiators made statements dur-
ing the last two Conferences of Parties (“COP”) meetings that 
indicate its willingness to address global climate change.35 On 
January 28, 2010, Singaporean Ambassador-at-Large and Chief 
Negotiator for Climate Change, Chew Tai Soo, wrote, “Singa-
pore therefore wishes to associate with the [Copenhagen] Accord 
as a good basis for advancing further international negotiations 
towards reaching a legally binding global agreement on climate 
change” in a letter to the Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, of 
the UNFCCC Secretariat.36 On December 9, 2010, Shunmugam 
Jayakumar, Singapore’s Senior Minister and Chairman of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change addressed a 
high level conference in Cancun, Mexico at the 16th COP meet-
ing.37 He emphasized his commitment to a legal framework stat-
ing that 
it is important that as we pursue a “Balanced Package” 
in Cancun, we must have clarity that our end goal is to 
reach a legally binding outcome. Whatever we achieve 
in Cancun, and whatever be our next steps, it is impera-
tive that these elements or decisions will eventually be 
stitched together in a legally binding nature, without 
which, there can be no guarantee of mitigation actions, 
nor can there be guarantee of the support provided.38
Moreover, as a requirement for being a member of the 
UNFCCC, Singapore submitted two “national communications 
on climate change.”39 Each communication shows a willingness 
to offer solutions to mitigate and adapt to climate change.40 In its 
first national communication to the UNFCCC in August 2000, 
the government of Singapore wrote, “[c]omprehensive preven-
tive measures to safeguard the environment will not work unless 
there is stringent enforcement to ensure that the laws and regula-
tions are complied with.”41 In its second national communica-
tion from November 2010, the Singaporean government stated,
As a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC, we are not 
subject to binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Our contribu-
tion to global greenhouse gas emissions is, and will 
remain, small. Nonetheless, as a small-island state vul-
nerable to the impacts of global climate change, Singa-
pore takes climate change seriously. We will therefore 
continue to do our part in global efforts to address cli-
mate change.42
However, some opposition exists within the Singaporean 
government. Its chief climate negotiator, Chew Tai Soo, made 
a statement in February 2009 that Singapore should not become 
an Annex I Party given its size and relatively small carbon 
footprint: 0.3% of global emissions.43 Mr. Chew also made an 
unofficial statement at a sustainability conference in Singapore 
regarding his opinion on the UNFCCC country classifications: 
“This approach is flawed as it does not take into account the 
unique considerations and capabilities of different countries . . . 
it penalizes small countries with small populations without tak-
ing into account their limitations.”44
These comments do not reflect Singapore’s overall commit-
ment in addressing climate change and the important example 
it would set for the global community by becoming an Annex I 
party. For example, in 2009 a program called Sustainable Singa-
pore Blueprint pledged that the nation would reduce greenhouse 
gases by sixteen percent below 2020 business as usual levels 
if a binding international agreement on climate change were 
reached.45 With this program, Singapore is already implement-
ing a voluntary mitigation plan, as a contingency should there be 
a binding international climate agreement. The United Nations 
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should facilitate discussions to encourage Singapore to “gradu-
ate” and accept these responsibilities since Singapore is willing 
and able to create and enforce laws necessary to achieve carbon 
reductions.
annex I success and ImplIcaTIons  
For emerGInG economIes
Singapore can benefit from looking to two Annex I Parties, 
Germany and Spain, as models for maintaining economic growth 
through Kyoto Protocol-based energy efficiency and renewable 
energy projects. In 2005, both Germany and Spain entered into a 
binding agreement to reduce carbon emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol.46 Since then, laws designed to reduce carbon and mod-
ernize electricity generation, distribution, and consumption have 
steadily increased.47 Germany has a national commitment to 
reduce its carbon footprint forty percent from its 1990 levels by 
2020.48 Germany met its 2012 goal early, in 2007, by generat-
ing 12.5% of its electricity from renewables, and Germany will 
likely exceed its twenty percent by 2020 goal as early as 2011.49 
By 2020, conservative estimates show that Germany will source 
forty-seven percent of its electricity from renewable energy.50 
Thus, while honoring its Kyoto Protocol commitments, German 
energy projects have in turn bolstered the fifth largest economy 
in the world.51 Spain made a commitment to reduce its carbon 
emissions by twenty percent from its 1990 levels by 2020, in line 
with the EU target.52 Spain also committed to achieving twenty 
percent of its own final consumption and ten percent of its trans-
port energy needs from renewable energy by 2020.53 According 
to its 2005-2010 Renewable Energy Plan, Spain plans to deploy 
clean energy to meet 12.1% of its primary energy needs, 30.3% 
of electricity needs, and 5.83% of transportation fuel.54 One of 
Spain’s goals in its 2004-2012 Energy Efficiency Strategy is to 
reduce domestic energy intensity by 7.2% by 2012.55
If Singapore adopts Annex I status and follows in Ger-
many and Spain’s carbon reduction footsteps, it could advance 
compliance in other developing countries such as Brazil, India, 
and China. These countries will face greater and different chal-
lenges in greenhouse gas reduction from Singapore due to their 
larger size and strong economies.56 However, Singapore could 
establish the model and blueprint, which would help to change 
the playing field for non-Annex I Parties and encourage greater 
participation among those nations. Binding carbon emission 
reductions and carbon finance are only possible if countries take 
responsibility for their contributions to climate change, however 
small they are.
conclusIon
In the UNFCCC, richer nations, mostly those in the EU, 
have assumed the role of Annex I Parties.57 Singapore can and 
should become an Annex I nation so that it can fulfill a broader 
role on the global stage as a leader in greenhouse gas reduction. 
Singapore is the ideal candidate for graduating from Non-Annex 
I to Annex I. Its mature economy is ready to retool its electric-
ity sector and to finance clean development mechanism projects. 
Singapore has national interests in safeguarding its borders from 
flooding and protecting the health of its citizens.58 It has a stable 
government with a history of developing innovative laws and 
enforcing them.59 As the international climate law community 
awaits 17th COP in Durban, South Africa, it should consider 
graduating a nation to Annex I status as a way to shift bind-
ing obligations from the Kyoto Protocol to a new international 
agreement between nations.
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Between November 29, 2010 and December 10, 2010, the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”) met 
in Cancun, Mexico, for the sixteenth Conference of the Parties 
(“COP”) and the sixth Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Proto-
col.1 One of the major decisions that emerged from this meeting 
was to establish the Green Climate Fund.2 While the Fund has 
the potential to be a huge step forward in creating long-term, 
centralized climate change funding,3 its success will depend on 
how subsequent decisions on management shape its efficacy.
The idea for a climate change fund originates from Article 
11 of the UNFCCC, which calls on the Parties to create a mech-
anism that allows developed countries to financially support 
developing countries in implementing the Convention.4 This 
concept formally took shape as part of the Copenhagen Accord, 
where Parties agreed to finance projects that address climate 
change impacts in developing countries.5 The finalized Fund 
includes provisions for technology development and transfer, 
and capacity-building to help developing countries implement 
effective mitigation and adaptation actions.6
In Cancun, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action, made up from representatives of all mem-
ber countries, under the Convention put together the terms of 
the Fund.7 The terms include the creation of a governing body, 
who will contribute to it, and the trustees.8 The Fund has been 
developed under the guidance of and will be held accountable to 
the Conference of the Parties.9 The Parties established a Stand-
ing Committee, to manage the financial mechanism as well as 
verify and report financial support that developed countries will 
provide developing countries.10
The Green Climate Fund will be controlled by a govern-
ing board of twenty-four members, half each from developed 
and developing country Parties.11 The Parties have designated 
the World Bank as the interim trustee of the Fund, and its status 
as trustee will be subject to review after three years of operating 
the fund.12 The trustee will aid the governing board in manag-
ing the administrative portions of the Fund, such as the financial 
records and statements.13 The trustee is required to act in a man-
ner consistent with decisions made by the governing board14 and 
is accountable to the board in performing its responsibilities.15
The Parties have also established the Transitional Com-
mittee to spearhead designing the operational components 
woRlD newS upDate
of the Fund.16 The Committee includes fifteen members from 
developed countries and twenty-five members from develop-
ing countries.17 The Committee will design the legal and insti-
tutional arrangements for the Fund, including its governance 
structure; methods on gathering financial, technological, and 
capacity-building resources; and ways to ensure that the Fund’s 
activities work well with other funding mechanisms that already 
exist.18 The Transitional Committee is also responsible for cre-
ating mechanisms for independent review of the Fund, stake-
holder input, environmental and social safeguards, and financial 
accountability.19 The Transitional Committee is temporary and 
will only exist long enough to establish these initial standards.20
The Green Climate Fund helps create new funding for proj-
ects that will allow developing countries to better mitigate and 
adapt to global climate change. However, whether the Fund will 
be a major improvement over the current financial regime21 will 
largely depend on the effectiveness of the mechanisms that the 
Transitional Committee establishes. One of the greatest oppor-
tunities for the Fund is the creation of environmental and social 
safeguards, which currently do not exist with the other funds.22 
Strong safeguards are essential in order to protect both the envi-
ronment and human rights. The independent review mechanism 
will review decisions made by the governing board and help 
ensure that the Fund runs smoothly and effectively.23 While the 
creation of the Fund can be hailed as a successful outcome of the 
UNFCCC’s COP-16, its true measure will be determined down 
the road.
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